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ABSTRACT 
 
The Nature and Effects of Uncertainty Frames in Science Communication 
by  
Abel Thomas Gustafson 
 
Uncertainty is native to science and thus also to wholly accurate science 
communication, However, uncertainties that are inevitable in individual findings of science 
and in larger processes of science are often not clearly communicated to the public. Instead, 
many public-facing science communicators purposefully avoid discussing the uncertainties 
that are attached to the science they communicate – often out of fear of adverse effects of 
those uncertainty frames. To date, it has remained unclear whether these fears are well-
founded because much of the extant literature has produced competing theory and findings. 
Much of the uncertainty about uncertainty in the extant literature has been caused by 
inconsistent and uncoordinated conceptual and operational definitions of uncertainty and 
uncertainty frames. Therefore, this dissertation develops a new and clarifying conceptual 
explication of distinct uncertainty types, which enables a more nuanced interpretation of the 
extant empirical literature. Specifically, that frames of consensus uncertainty have been 
associated with none of the reported findings of positive effects of uncertainty frames – only 
negative effects and nonsignificant effects. Conversely, frames of technical uncertainty and 
scientific uncertainty frames have been associated with positive and nonsignificant effects. 
Frames of deficient uncertainty have not been a focus of the extant empirical literature.  
However, the summary observations from this informal meta-analytic review are the 
product of disparate methods, issue contexts, concepts, and measures – all of which are 
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confounding factors that render confident meta-analytic conclusions impossible. The 
literature lacked a controlled experiment that compared the effects of each uncertainty frame 
type within one consistent methodology. 
All of these factors together have created a situation where progress toward the 
answers to a question with universal importance and tangible applications has been obscured 
despite many uncoordinated efforts occurring within disciplinary silos. Therefore, this 
dissertation was an effort to move this field of research forward – providing a rigorous and 
robust set of findings that inform the relative effects of different types of uncertainty frames 
in science communication, and the role of motivated reasoning in responses to portrayals of 
uncertainty in science – all tested in one, large, controlled experimental design. 
This dissertation employs an online survey experiment in a between-subjects five 
(frame type) by three (issue context) factorial design to specify and compare the effects of 
four distinct uncertainty frame types (consensus, deficient, scientific, and technical 
uncertainties, respectively) and one control condition on attitudinal outcome variables of 
claim belief, credibility perceptions, and behavioral intentions. These tests are replicated in 
each of three distinct issue contexts: the effects of climate change, the effects of GMO 
labeling laws, and the occupational hazards posed by vibrating machinery.  
Using an opt-in online sample and quotas that approximated U.S. census levels of 
education, age, and gender, this dissertation asked participants to read a simulated news 
article that contained a report of new scientific evidence. These claims of new science 
findings were the experimental manipulations, and as such used a frame of one (or none) of 
the uncertainty types. After reading their assigned news article, participants then indicated 
ix 
 
their belief in the claim, credibility perceptions of the scientists, and intentions to engage in 
relevant behaviors that indicated support for the claim.  
By applying a rigorous sequence of explication and validation in the development of 
the measures and the measurement model, this dissertation demonstrated clear evidence that 
the measures have strong convergent and discriminant validity. By first establishing the 
manipulation check with rigorous testing and revision, and the basic structure of the 
conceptual model with SEM, this dissertation builds a foundation of confidence in 
conceptual, theoretical, and methodological validity upon which to base interpretations of the 
later tests of interaction effects. 
These tests of conditional effects found that – in the issue contexts of climate change 
and vibrating machinery – frames of consensus uncertainty are associated with significantly 
lower belief in the claim and perceptions of credibility of the scientists, compared to other 
types of uncertainty frames. Importantly, and interestingly, the other three types of 
uncertainty frames did not significantly differ from each other in their associations with 
levels of the attitudinal outcome variables. Also, while the tests of the conceptual model 
demonstrated strong motivated reasoning effects, these effects do not differ across 
uncertainty frame types. These findings have important implications for theory, research, and 
practice, and multiple interpretations of them are discussed at length in the latter portions of 
this dissertation.  
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Scientific knowledge is never complete and is never certain. There are always more 
questions to be answered and more answers to be questioned. As scientists, we encounter 
phenomena that defy existing theory, so we propose new theories to make sense of the new 
corpus of data, and then test those theories through those data. In a great many cases, our 
most certain understandings will be eventually usurped by a new paradigm. Indeed, two 
leading epistemological perspectives of science are a) that science can conclusively disprove 
hypotheses but can only provisionally support hypotheses (Popper, 1959) and b) that science 
moves in paradigmatic cycles, in which new discoveries spark a sudden rejection of 
longstanding assumptions and introduce new, additional uncertainties (Kuhn, 1970). In both 
systems, scientific knowledge at any point in time is an effect of myriad contextual forces, 
not necessarily a reflection of any absolute Truth. Thus, the first major component of 
inherent uncertainty in science is the competitive, iterative, unending nature of scientific 
progress, which necessarily breeds conflicting theories and competing hypotheses. These 
create inevitable disagreements among experts that are not always transient or easily resolved 
(Shanteau, 2000). 
Second, science often reports individual findings by describing the degree of 
uncertainty surrounding a parameter. That is, we report our findings in terms of values (e.g., 
mean, standard deviation) that describe a probability distribution. Even this word we use — 
“parameters” — is formed from the Greek prefix “alongside, accompanying” (para-) and 
noun “measurement” (metric). The Pearsonian statistical revolution developed our 
understanding that these individual parameters are not the true measurement of a 
phenomenon (Salsburg, 2001). They are “accompanying,” “alongside” descriptions of a 
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probability distribution. Statistical science itself is an exercise in specifying uncertainty with 
as much precision as possible — highly focused on estimations of variation and error.  
In sum, uncertainty is central to both the philosophical, epistemological nature of 
science, and to the working mechanisms of the scientific study. Consequently, wholly 
accurate science communication is simply a description of the current state of uncertainty in 
deliberately (but well-justified) uncertain terms (Carpenter, 1995). When science 
communication occurs within the scientific community (e.g., scholarly publications, 
conferences, research collaboration), portrayals of uncertainty are part of the shared, native 
language. Similarly, in public-facing science communication (e.g., news media, edutainment, 
public campaigns) — which is the chosen context of this dissertation — it is important to 
honestly convey the uncertainties of science, so that the public is not mislead and so that they 
can make informed decisions (Campbell, 2011; Stocking, 2010).  
However, science communication messages that emphasize uncertainty are neither 
native to the language of public science communicators nor to the language of their audience: 
the lay public. Thus, there are likely to be uses and effects of uncertainty portrayals that are 
unintended, unanticipated, and/or undesirable. For example, despite the centrality of 
uncertainty to the nature of science and scientific findings, journalists often misrepresent the 
uncertainties of science by presenting complex or preliminary information as more certain or 
unambiguous than it truly is (Brechman, Lee, & Cappella, 2009, Lai, Lane, & Ruttenberg, 
2009; Retzbach & Maier, 2015). Jensen (2008) summarizes that journalists can distort 
science by “removing caveats, relying on too few sources, neglecting context, stressing the 
results over the process, and presenting science as a quest whose future is assured” (p. 349). 
This is sometimes done to increase clarity and simplicity to accommodate uninitiated lay 
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audiences (Ebeling, 2008). Also, sometimes it is done out of fear of adverse effects 
(Stocking, 1999). Specifically, scholars in science and environmental communication argue 
that portrayals of uncertainty in science communication are likely to invite motivated 
skepticism and confirmation bias in oppositional audiences, to exacerbate or perpetuate the 
gaps in knowledge, attitudes, and behavior between scientists and the public, and also to 
erode the credibility of science and scientists. 
However, the body of empirical evidence indicates that the assumption of detrimental 
effects from portrayals of uncertainty is tenuous at best, as it is supported by a body of 
inconsistent research findings and contradictory theoretical arguments. In this dissertation, I 
demonstrate that defensible theoretical arguments across diverse communication research 
fields have posited negative effects of uncertainty portrayals in science communication, 
while many others have argued in expectation of their positive effects. Similarly, I will 
summarize the numerous empirical findings that support the assumption of negative effects 
of uncertainty in science communication, as well as the robust evidence that contradicts it. 
In sum, despite the inherent, inextricable role of uncertainty in even the most accurate 
communication of science, science communication research has not yet established the nature 
and extent of the effects that portrayals of uncertain science have on public responses toward 
science communication, nor the contextual-, individual-, or message-level factors that 
moderate this relationship. As Miles and Frewer (2003) summarize, “the literature indicates 
there are various arguments as to why communicating uncertainty is a positive activity, as 
well as why uncertainty should not be communicated, although there is little empirical 
evidence to support either view” (p. 268). Fifteen years later, this assessment is still true.  
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Given the centrality of uncertainty to science and of uncertainty frames to science 
communication, the competing theoretical predictions about the effects of uncertainty frames, 
and the mixed findings of the extant empirical evidence, it is imperative to clarify our 
understanding of the effects of uncertainty frames in science communication. It is also 
necessary to inform practical strategies for accurately representing the uncertainties of 
science in ways that can avoid the negative effects observed in some research and 
consistently realize the positive effects observed in other research. These are the central aims 
of this dissertation. 
One of the primary causes of scholars’ current clouded understanding of the effects of 
science communication messages that emphasize uncertainty is inconsistency and 
imprecision in the conceptualization and operationalization of the term, and concept, 
“uncertainty” itself. Essentially, scholars’ explicit and implicit definitions of uncertainty, and 
our theorizing of its effects, have been characterized — ironically — by enduring and 
pervasive uncertainty (but not of the accurate or precise kind). One of the ancillary purposes 
of this dissertation is to clarify, contextualize, reconcile, and simplify the concepts in this 
literature so as to enable and compare observation of patterns of findings using similar 
definitions. 
Thus, in Chapter 1, I begin by explicating four distinct types of uncertainty that have 
appeared in the conceptualizations and operationalizations of the literature to date: deficient 
uncertainty, technical uncertainty, scientific uncertainty, and consensus uncertainty.  Then, 
in Chapter 2, I summarize the theoretical justifications for competing hypotheses, 
respectively, about the effects of uncertainty frames in science communication, and then 
review (through the lens of this new, nuanced typology) the existing — although limited — 
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empirical research that has found positive, negative, moderated, and null effects of 
uncertainty-framed science. I conclude this chapter by identifying unanswered questions and 
offering corresponding research questions. 
In Chapter 3, I present methods of data collection and analysis that, together, test the 
hypotheses and research questions posed in Chapter 2, and in Chapter 4 I report the results of 
these tests.  Chapter 5 reviews this dissertation’s overall argument, results, limitations, and 
implications for research and practice.
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Chapter 1: Uncertainty about Uncertainty 
1.1 Uncertainty Frames in Science 
Generally, uncertainty is “when details of situations are ambiguous, complex, 
unpredictable, or probabilistic; when information is unavailable or inconsistent; and when 
people feel insecure in their own state of knowledge or the state of knowledge in general” 
(Brashers, 2001, p. 478). As mentioned in the introduction, uncertainty is an epistemological 
fixture that permeates science in particular, and most everything else in the world in general. 
But it also exists as an individual’s perception or belief, and also as a feature or characteristic 
in communication content.  
Regarding the former (uncertainty as a perception, attitude, or belief), communication 
research usually conceptualizes uncertainty as one of two distinct constructs: internal 
certainty and external certainty (Corbett & Durfee, 2004; Dixon & Clarke, 2013). An 
individual’s “internal certainty” (IC) is their own belief about the certainty of a particular 
idea (e.g., “I am uncertain whether my team will win today”). An individual’s “external 
certainty” (EC) is their estimation of someone else’s belief about the certainty of a particular 
idea (e.g., “I think Eric is uncertain whether his team will win today”). 
Regarding the latter (communicated uncertainty), uncertainty is manifested as 
descriptive, qualifying information in a message. That is, information can be presented with 
emphasis on relevant uncertainties. These portrayals of uncertainty vary in style, mirroring 
the various causes of uncertainty. As alluded to above, these causes include, but are not 
limited to, uncertainties due to measurement error, random variation, unobservable 
projections or models, out-of-sample generalizations, disagreement among experts, 
conflicting evidence, a deficit of extant research/data, an expanding problem space, 
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alternative underlying models or theories about the phenomenon, or fundamental 
unfalsifiability (Broomell & Kane, 2017; Miles & Frewer, 2003; Pidgeon & Beattie, 1997; 
Zehr, 2000).  
To accurately communicate the boundaries of scientific knowledge, scientists often 
present “findings” or “discoveries” of science as being bounded, qualified, or otherwise 
limited by one or more of these causes/types of uncertainty, and (with varying fidelity, as 
discussed above) science media are used to relay these diverse caveats to the public. A large 
content analysis of mainstream newspaper coverage of climate change over time (Rice, 
Gustafson, & Hoffman, 2018) found that scientists often include clauses emphasizing 
uncertainties, controversies, and caveats. These specify distinct types of uncertainty held by a 
variety of sources about a variety of topics and claims within the broad issue of climate 
hcnage. In short, the various types and causes of uncertainty manifest themselves in different 
types of portrayals of uncertainty. I will refer to these as uncertainty frames.  
1.1.1. Frames of uncertainty. According to Chong and Druckman (2007a), “framing 
refers to the process by which people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or 
reorient their thinking about an issue” (p. 104), the effects of which are visible “when a 
communication changes a person’s attitude toward an object (e.g., climate change) by 
increasing the weight given to a subset of relevant considerations” (Bolsen, Druckman, & 
Cook, 2014a, p. 2). From a more tangible, message-focused perspective, the act of framing is 
“to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a 
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” 
(Entman, 1993, p. 52). 
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While early research investigating the effects of gain and loss frames (e.g., Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979; 1985) used equivalence frames (varying the orientation of equivalent 
information), much recent research has investigated the effects of emphasis frames 
(emphasizing selected content over other, different, possible content). While there is some 
friction in the field about the nature and boundaries of the concept of framing (see Cacciatori, 
Scheufele, & Iyengar, 2016; Scheufele & Iyengar, 2014), scholars agree that a) framing is a 
core component of human cognition and message processing; and that b) the manner in 
which information is framed influences communication effects because “... frames are never 
neutral: they define an issue, identify causes, make moral judgements and shape proposed 
solutions” (O’Neill, Williams, Kurz, Wiersma, & Boykoff, 2015, p. 380). 
Myriad analyses across diverse media, locations, times, issues, and topics agree that 
science is often discussed through frames of uncertainty (Antilla, 2005; Bailey, Giangola, & 
Boykoff, 2014; Friedman & Egolf, 2011; Heidmann & Milde, 2013; Kuha, 2009; Boykoff & 
Boykoff, 2004; Dispensa & Brulle, 2003; Painter & Ashe, 2012; Rice et al., 2018; Zehr, 
2000). Uncertainty frames in science communication discourse can arise from diverse causes, 
including good intentions such as journalistic ethical norms (Bennett, 1996; Boykoff & 
Boykoff, 2004), malignant motives such as public disinformation campaigns (Jacques, 
Dunlap, & Freeman, 2008; McCright & Dunlap, 2003; Oreskes & Conway, 2011), and — as 
discussed in the introduction — even the inherent nature of science itself (Stocking, 1999). 
These different causes lead to different types of expressions of uncertainty, which are 
explicated here in Chapter 1 as four distinct uncertainty frames. 
1.1.2. Issue contexts of interest. It is helpful to specify which objects of uncertainty 
frames are the focus of this dissertation (i.e., uncertainty about what). Nested within any 
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general science issue are many topics. For example, the issue of climate change can be 
separated into distinct topics of its existence, causes, effects, and remedies. A very large 
number of claims (posited facts, ideas, or theories; e.g., “climate change is anthropogenic”) 
could be made regarding any of these topics. Table 1 illustrates these terms, using each of the 
three sets of issues/topics/claims that will be employed in this dissertation.  
Table 1 
Levels of Issues, Topics, and Claims 
Level Example 
Issue A CLIMATE CHANGE 
     Topic A1 The effects of climate change 
           Claim A1.1 Climate change has negative effects on farmers and agriculture workers 
Issue B GMO FOODS 
      Topic B1 Laws requiring the labeling of all GMO foods 
             Claim B1.1 GMO labeling laws have negative effects on farmers and agriculture workers 
Issue C OCCUPATIONAL HAZARDS OF FARMING 
      Topic C1 Extended contact with vibrating machinery 
             Claim C1.1 Vibrating machinery has negative effects on farmers and agriculture workers 
 
Most framing effects research tests effects in just one issue. In science 
communication, specifically, climate change dominates the field. A limitation of this 
paradigm is that it obfuscates whether findings of framing effects are issue-specific. It is, in 
fact, likely that most findings are issue specific, since (as reviewed in Chapter 2) prior beliefs 
and worldviews are the leading predictors of responses to science communication, and the 
salience of prior beliefs and worldviews to an issue of science varies across issues. In some 
issues (e.g., climate change), many individuals have strong prior beliefs and worldviews that 
are salient to the issue. In other issues (e.g., occupational hazards of farming), most 
individuals do not have strong existing beliefs and their worldviews are not necessarily 
relevant to the issue. 
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In anticipation of issue-specific effects — and in recognition of the importance of 
prior opinions and worldviews to individuals’ responses to science communication — this 
dissertation tests the effects of uncertainty frames on audience attitudes regarding three 
specific claims of scientific research.  Each claim is related to a distinct issue (Table 1): 
climate change (CC; using a claim about the harmful effects of climate change on agriculture 
workers), genetically engineered/modified foods (GMO; using a claim about the harmful 
effects of GMO labeling laws on agriculture workers), and occupational hazards in farming 
(VM; using a claim about the harmful effects of contact with vibrating machinery on 
agriculture workers). The purpose of observing effects across three very different issues is to 
determine to what extent the observed effects are generalizable across issues (as well as 
across individual characteristics). That is, these particular three issues are selected because 
they differ in important ways.  
The first issue, climate change, is deeply associated with American political views 
(Roser-Renouf, Maibach, Leiserowitz, & Rosenthal, 2016) as a logical consequent of 
ideological tenets, and also through popularization and partisan politicizing of the issue, 
particularly in the United States. Public opinion is deeply divided along party lines. 
The second issue, GMO foods, also is popularized and large opposing groups of the 
population hold strong polarized prior opinions, with one survey reporting that 57% of U.S. 
adults believe eating GMO foods is “generally unsafe” (Pew Research Center, 2015) and 
another survey finding that 45% of adults report “absolute moral opposition” to GMO foods 
(Scott, Inbar, & Rozin, 2016). Only 35% of the American public reports that they fully trust 
the government to tell them the whole truth about GMO foods (Kennedy & Funk, 2016). 
Regarding the topic of mandatory GMO labeling, the Pew study reported that half of U.S. 
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adults say they either sometimes (25%) or always (25%) purposefully look for GMO labels 
when grocery shopping. When U.S. adults are faced with a forced choice question — “do 
you support or oppose mandatory GMO labeling” — 84% indicated support (McFadden & 
Lusk, 2017), and one in six U.S. adults saying they “care a great deal” about it (Pew 
Research Center, 2016).  
However, opinions about GMO foods and GMO labeling are not driven by political 
ideology (Pew Research Center, 2015). Instead, opposition to GMO foods is (positively) 
correlated with (lower) education, (female) gender, and (higher) perceptions that genetic 
engineering is unethical or immoral (Elder, Greene, & Lizotte, 2018; Hassell & Stroud, 2018; 
Lusk et al., 2004). 
For a vast majority of the population, the third issue (occupational hazards in 
farming) does not have strong, pre-existing, polarized attitudes like the first two issues, and 
also is not connected to any particular ideology. In sum, this assortment of issues will allow 
for observation of responses to uncertain science in one issue where responses are driven by 
strong political/partisan prior opinions (CC), in one issue where responses are driven by 
strong but non-political prior opinions (GMO), and in an issue where there are few, if any, 
strong prior opinions (VM). This design is a reflection of the integral role of prior opinions 
and ideological worldviews in responses to science and to uncertainty. 
1.1.3. Source context of interest. Often, a source is also attached or attributed to a 
claim (“Dr. Jones believes that climate change is anthropogenic”). Myriad types of actors 
(e.g., scientists, politicians, celebrities, government agencies, organizations, lobbyists, the 
public) could be a source of information or opinions about science, and these differences 
influence the meaning or implications of the frame (Rice et al., 2018). This dissertation 
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exclusively focuses on claims where scientists are the clearly identified source (although 
relayed via the news media) for three reasons. First, content analyses of uncertainty frames 
identify scientists as the most frequently named source of information/opinion about 
scientific research (e.g., Rice et al., 2018). Second, scientists as sources of scientific 
information/opinion is the core focus of science communication literature. Third, constraints 
of resources and methodology preclude this dissertation from considering or comparing the 
effects of uncertainty frames across multiple types of sources. In sum, since it is unwise to 
conflate different types of sources (Rice et al., 2018), and since it seems most important to 
(first) develop our understanding of scientists as sources of science, relative to other entities, 
this dissertation investigates only science claims (with and without uncertainty frames) 
originating from scientists.   
1.2 Types of Uncertainty Frames 
These uncertainty frames occur in four distinct types, following from the cause of the 
uncertainty. For example, an uncertainty frame depicting a deep controversy in the scientific 
community over the validity of a key theoretical assumption is a much different type of 
uncertainty frame (certainly in nature, if not in effects) than an uncertainty frame depicting a 
range of expected values due to inescapable measurement error. The cause of the uncertainty 
frame drives the very meaning of the claim, and likely also determine what responses to that 
information are appropriate. The multitude of causes of uncertainty in science mentioned 
above (as identified by focus groups, scholarly theorizing, and empirical tests) are exhibited 
in science communication practice and research along four distinct types (or families, genres) 
of uncertainty frames. Following from the contrarian opinion frame types explicated by Rice 
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and colleagues (2018), I will refer to these as deficient, technical, scientific, and consensus 
uncertainty, respectively (Table 2). 
1.2.1. Deficient uncertainty. Discussions of science do not only focus on what is 
known, but also on what is not yet known — or not yet studied (Stocking & Holstein, 1993). 
Often, this takes the shape of a frame of what I call deficient uncertainty, emphasizing a lack 
of knowledge that exists because there is a lack of research on this question, or because that 
thing cannot ever be known, or because the problem space has expanded in a way that has 
exposed new unknowns (for example, as used by Kuhn, 2000; Rice et al., 2018; Zehr, 2000). 
Hacking (1975) describes an analogous concept of “epistemic uncertainty” — referring to the 
uncertainties that stem from gaps in knowledge, which can be reduced by accumulating 
additional knowledge. This type of uncertainty closely mirrors the colloquial use of 
“uncertainty,” such that high deficient uncertainty would indicate that there is little extant 
knowledge and much that is unknown or yet unstudied. For example, someone could express 
deficient uncertainty by saying “Scientists know very little about the complex, interrelated 
domino effects that climate change will have on ecosystems and their inhabitants, because 
change of this magnitude has never before been available for observation in the era of 
modern science.” Lower deficient uncertainty would indicate (relatively) greater knowledge 
and much less that is unknown. Either would be deficient uncertainty (rather than a different 
type) because they both possess the fundamental component of emphasizing that there is 
uncertainty because of the degree to which the current knowledge falls short of some (more) 
complete set. 
Table 2 
 
Four Uncertainty Types 
 
 Uncertainty Type 
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 Deficient Technical Consensus Scientific 
Exemplar 
phrasing 
“Scientists’ 
knowledge in ____ 
remains limited 
because most of the 
research needed to 
prove or disprove 
these ideas has not 
yet been 
conducted.” 
“Scientists’ best 
estimate is that 
the total increase 
in ___ could be as 
low as 6% or as 
high as 24%.” 
“Scientists remain 
divided on ____, with 
each side receiving 
strong support from 
leading scientists and 
research groups.” 
“Scientists are always 
striving to develop a 
better understanding 
of ___, so scientists 
fully expect to adjust 
their opinions about 
this issue as future 
research is 
conducted.”  
Defining 
properties 
Uncertainty caused 
by a lack of study, a 
lack of available 
evidence, or 
fundamental 
“unknowable” 
nature of the 
question. 
Uncertainty 
caused by the 
known properties 
of precise, 
quantified 
estimates; often 
derived from 
evidence or study. 
Uncertainty caused 
by disagreement, 
controversy, or 
discrepancy across 
expert opinion or 
across evidence.  
Uncertainty caused by 
the perpetual potential 
for future research to 
reform or reject the 
current assumptions or 
body of evidence. 
 
1.2.2. Technical uncertainty. Hacking (1975) also describes “aleatory uncertainty” 
— an effect of inherent complexity in a problem space, or inherent randomness in a 
phenomenon. Dieckmann and colleagues (2017) summarize that there is “irreducible 
uncertainty that is a feature of the world itself” (p. 327). Thus, most scientific claims are 
limited by measurement error, modeling approximations, statistical assumptions, or inherent 
imprecision of out-of-sample generalization (Broomell & Kane, 2017). All of these 
contribute to uncertainty about scientific claims. To account for this, and to promote 
transparency and accuracy, scientists frequently present findings as estimates couched in 
error bars or expected ranges of values. For example, a scientist might claim that “global sea 
level will rise between 7 and 10 centimeters sometime before 2100,” which would represent 
the 95% confidence interval of the distribution of estimations. I will call such portrayals 
technical uncertainty, although varied terminologies and references (usually just 
“uncertainty”) to analogous constructs are frequently employed in myriad epistemological 
discussions, content analyses, survey research, and experimental tests in the fields of science, 
environmental, and risk communication (e.g., Budescu, Kuhn, Kramer, & Johnson, 2002; 
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Cabantous, Hilton, Kunreuther, & Michel-Kerjan, 2011; Dieckmann, Gregory, Peters, & 
Hartman, 2017; Johnson & Nakayachi, 2017; Johnson & Slovic, 1995; 1998; Morton, 
Rabinovich, Marshall, & Bretschneider, 2011; Rabinovich & Morton, 2012; Rice et al., 2018; 
Smithson, 1999). Technical uncertainty can be high (e.g., wide error bars or broad estimated 
ranges in a prediction) or low (narrow, precise ranges). These diverse content analyses and 
experiments operationalize technical uncertainty as either a range in an estimate (e.g., 7-
10cm), as a probability estimate (e.g., a 65% chance), or as an estimated mean with a 
confidence interval (a political poll estimating a candidate’s support at 37% with a 95% 
confidence interval of +/-3 percentage points). The fundamental, identifying component of 
technical uncertainty (which differentiates it from other types) is a precise quantification of 
uncertainty that is derived from research and data, rather than due to a lack of them (Rice et 
al., 2018). 
1.2.3. Scientific uncertainty.  Statements of scientific uncertainty position 
uncertainty about a claim as a function and feature of the process or nature of good scientific 
research. While such statements often increase uncertainty, they can also increase accuracy 
— and thus are utilized widely in scholarly science communication (Hyland, 1996). For 
example, high scientific uncertainty has been operationalized as an explanation of the 
barriers to generalizability due to methodological limitations or the difficulty of the problem, 
or the qualification that substantial further research must be conducted to corroborate a 
preliminary claim (e.g., termed “more uncertainty” in Broomell & Kane, 2017; “evidentiary 
balance” in Clarke, Dixon, Holton, & McKeever, 2015; “hedging” in Jensen, 2008; the “high 
uncertainty” condition in Jensen et al., 2017). I will refer to this as scientific uncertainty. 
Like the other uncertainty types, scientific uncertainty exists on a continuum. Low scientific 
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uncertainty has been operationalized as emphasizing confidence in a research finding due to 
the existence of substantial supporting evidence, but still stipulating that future, forthcoming 
evidence could modify this body of knowledge (e.g., termed “individual uncertainty” in 
Binder, Hillback, & Brossard, 2016; the “context” condition in Corbett & Durfee, 2004; the 
“low uncertainty” condition in Jensen et al., 2017; “scientific uncertainty” in Nakayachi, 
Johnson, & Koketsu, 2018). As such, scientific uncertainty is similar to deficient uncertainty 
in that they both highlight that a claim is bounded by limited knowledge, but — like 
technical uncertainty — scientific uncertainty is distinct from deficient uncertainty by 
emphasizing a) the knowledge that has been acquired, and b) that uncertainty is a feature and 
function of the rigorous processes of science, rather than an undesirable state that must be 
rectified. 
Scientific uncertainty and technical uncertainty can be distinguished by their level of 
objectivity, quantifiability, and precision.  Technical uncertainty is expressed as being an 
objective quantity. Scientific uncertainty is often expressed as being a principle or 
perspective that should be used to interpret a claim. For example, I could say that there is 
uncertainty about my height because someone estimated that I am between 6’4” and 6’6” 
(technical uncertainty). Or I could say that there is uncertainty about my height because 
although I measured myself and found myself to be 6’5”, our understanding of human height 
is still evolving and measuring height with precision is not a simple task, so additional 
measurements by independent parties — and additional measurements over time — will 
likely change our current best estimations of my height (scientific uncertainty).  Of course, I 
could also state that there is uncertainty about my height because my height has not yet been 
measured (deficient uncertainty). 
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1.2.4. Consensus uncertainty.  The (un)certainty of any particular claim can also be 
described in terms of the collective discord/accord that exists about it — specifically, the 
degree of (dis)agreement among, or between, scientists or other relevant stakeholders (Aklin 
& Urpelainen 2014; Binder, Hillback, & Brossard, 2016; Broomell & Kane, 2017; Cobb & 
Elder, 1983; Dieckmann et al., 2017). Colloquially, this is referred to as disagreement or 
controversy. For example, much of the early research on the framing of climate change news 
investigated the frequency with which journalists emphasized the discord between opposing 
stakeholders (e.g., Boykoff, 2008; Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004). Similar operational definitions 
of uncertainty — portrayals of two or more entities with competing opinions about a claim 
— have been presented with other names (e.g., “conflict ambiguity” in Cabantous et al., 
2011; Smithson, 1999; or “conflicting information” in Carpenter et al., 2016) across diverse 
research in risk, science, and environmental communication. For example, Rice and 
colleagues (2018) explain two forms of consensus uncertainty for their content analysis — 
disagreement and controversy — noting that both denote mutually opposed opinions, but 
have some differences in meaning, such as their longevity and amount of shared agreement.  
Consensus uncertainty has widely been applied in definitions representing high 
uncertainty (disagreement or controversy; e.g., Antilla, 2005; Binder, Hillback, & Brossard, 
2016; Brossard, Shanahan, & McComas, 2004; Corbett & Durfee, 2004; Dispensa & Brulle, 
2003; Jensen & Hurley, 2012; McComas & Shanahan, 1999; Nan & Daily, 2015; Rabinovich 
& Morton, 2012; Stocking, 1999; Zhao et al., 2016) and also low uncertainty (strong 
consensus or collective agreement; e.g., Aklin & Urpelainen 2014; Bolsen & Druckman, 
2016; Ding et al., 2011; Kahan, 2017; Koehler, 2016; Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Vaughan, 
2013; van der Linden et al., 2017, 2018).  
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To round out the analogy given above, there is some uncertainty about how tall I am 
because my brother (who is, I am certain, 6’4”) and I have long been earnestly making 
competing claims. This is consensus uncertainty. 
1.2.5. Summary of uncertainty frames.  In sum, there is a robust record of the 
conceptualization and operationalization of uncertainty in science occurring in four types: 
deficient uncertainty (describing a lack of knowledge), technical uncertainty (quantifying the 
error around some acquired knowledge), scientific uncertainty (situating acquired knowledge 
within the nature and process of science itself), or consensus uncertainty (disagreement or 
controversy between stakeholders about a claim). 
Importantly, these distinct types of uncertainty have not been treated as distinct.  That 
is, it is common for studies that test the effects of one type of uncertainty frame to justify 
their hypotheses using prior literature that employed an entirely different conceptualization. 
Still, the extant conceptualizations and operationalizations of “uncertainty in science 
communication” exhibited in the extant literature — and reviewed in the next section — can 
be clearly placed into one of these four types that I have proposed.  
Therefore, as I review this literature, I will translate the assorted uses of uncertainty 
into the four types given above, with brief descriptions of their fit. In Section 1.4, Table 4 
and Table 5 also organize the extant experimental tests of uncertainty frame effects into 
categories of these four uncertainty frame types (regardless of the diverse names that the 
corresponding authors gave to their operationalizations). This translation and restructuring 
will contribute a new level of nuance and consistency, which will highlight patterns that can 
help explain the competing findings regarding the effects of uncertainty frames that exist 
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across diverse literature, as well as highlight patterns of empirical findings that emerge across 
and within uncertainty types. 
It is important to note that while these types of uncertainty are distinct concepts, they 
can be used together, or can even be applied to each other. That is, these uncertainty types 
can simultaneously function as uncertainty about a claim and as the claim itself. For example, 
there could be high consensus uncertainty about an uncertainty claim, such that some entities 
say there is much deficient uncertainty about some topic, and others say there is little.  
Similarly, there could be technical uncertainty about the quantified estimate of that consensus 
(e.g., the statement “97% of scientists agree” itself has error bars). A statement could even be 
in any one of the eight combinations of high/low consensus about their high/low technical 
uncertainty about their high/low deficient uncertainty about a claim. 
Some definitions for other, related concepts have also been assembled using these 
pieces in this fashion. For example, Bolsen and Druckman (2015) define politicization as the 
phenomenon where “an actor emphasizes the inherent uncertainty of science to cast doubt on 
the existence of scientific consensus” (p. 746). Translated to the vocabulary of this 
dissertation and its four uncertainty types, this is a source using the existence of scientific 
(and/or technical) uncertainty about a claim as evidence of consensus uncertainty about that 
claim (see also Stocking & Holstein, 2009). Interestingly, this rhetorical tactic for attacking 
scientific consensus is a fallacy precisely because it makes a false equivalence of scientific 
uncertainty and consensus uncertainty (i.e., an assumption that the existence of one implies 
the existence of the other, or, more deceptively, that one is the other). This further supports 
the need for developing these distinctions.  
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Finally, it is important to clarify that (un)certainty frames vary on a continuum of 
high uncertainty to low uncertainty (with a message emphasizing absolute certainty being at 
one end of the continuum; Chinn, Lane, & Hart, 2018). In this dissertation, references to high 
or low uncertainty should not be confused with the intensity, vividness, or explicitness with 
which that frame, or level of (un)certainty, is communicated. A valuable future direction for 
other framing research might be to develop measures of intensity (from weak to strong), 
because current content analyses and experimental manipulations of frames almost 
exclusively treat them as binary (either present or absent). But this additional distinction is 
not considered in this dissertation.  
1.3. Public Understanding of Uncertainty in Science 
In 2003, Frewer and colleagues assessed meta-cognitions — scientists’ perceptions of 
the public’s understanding of uncertainty. They found that scientists largely assume that the 
public is incapable of correctly understanding or interpreting uncertainty in science, and that 
scientists see this as a justification for avoiding uncertainty frames in public communication.  
However, they also investigated how the public actually perceives various 
uncertainties in science. Miles and Frewer (2003) probed a focus group to establish the 
emergent dimensions of uncertainty about the science of food safety. In a subsequent study, 
they summarized these emergent dimensions in a measure of public perceptions of the 
possible causes of uncertainty in food safety risk (Frewer et al., 2002). The causes of 
uncertainty represented in their items (Table 3) clearly include the present dissertation’s 
uncertainty types of deficient, consensus, and scientific uncertainty. While technical 
uncertainty is absent in this one study, the review above demonstrates that it is well-
represented in other communication research. 
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Importantly, Frewer and colleagues also investigated the public’s opinion of the 
“acceptability” of different causes (types) of uncertainty, regarding food safety risks. Quite in 
contrast to the assumptions of scientists, their data also indicated that the public expects, even 
desires, uncertainty information. Their results indicate that the causes that I would call 
scientific uncertainty were, by far, rated the most acceptable by the public, with the causes 
that map onto consensus uncertainty well below the midpoint of the scale, and the causes 
representing deficient uncertainty as the least acceptable of the three. Scientific and 
consensus uncertainty were also perceived as the most likely causes of uncertainty about 
food safety risks. While some types of uncertainties are more acceptable than others, 
respondents also reported a strong desire to be notified of all relevant uncertainty information 
immediately when a potential health risk arises. 
Table 3 
Uncertainty Statements (from Frewer et al., 2002) 
 
Scale item from Frewer et al., 2002 
Uncertainty Type, 
Translated 
The government lacks deﬁnite knowledge about the topic. Deficient 
It is not possible for scientists to have all the answers. Deficient 
The government’s statement is based on conﬂicting information. Consensus 
The information provided is the best available at present, but things may 
change in the future. Scientific 
The government is unsure about the extent of the problem. Deficient 
Scientists disagree with each other on the subject. Consensus 
The government is unsure whether there is a problem or not. Deficient 
More scientiﬁc work needs to be done on the topic. Deficient 
Note: Two items from this measure were omitted because they were specific to the study and do not reference 
general dimensions of uncertainty about science (“The government is withholding information from the public” 
and “There really is a major food safety problem”). 
 
These results are important to this dissertation, because they indicate that the different 
uncertainty types are in fact not unimportant or indistinguishable to the public, and are also 
not perceived with equal favorability. Uncertainty in science (and perceptual distinctions of 
its types) is not isolated to scientific discourse and/or the epistemological beliefs of the 
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scientific community. Rather, the public reports an expectation for uncertainty in science 
communication and is especially accepting of uncertainty that stems from the inherent 
complexity of scientific inquiry. These points cannot be understated, because they provide a 
springboard for the current investigation. 
However, it is important to keep in mind that public perceptions of, preference for, 
and responses to, uncertainty in science can vary significantly across issues (e.g., Broomell & 
Kane, 2017; Dieckmann et al., 2017; Jensen & Hurley, 2012) — and also (or especially) can 
vary across individual characteristics such as issue-relevant prior beliefs, values, or 
ideologies and worldviews (Borah, 2011; Chang, 2015; Chong & Druckman, 2007; 
Dieckmann et al., 2017; Frewer, Howard, & Shepherd, 1998; Nan & Daily, 2015). While this 
point will be a focus of Chapter 2, a brief example is the research by Dieckmann and 
colleagues (2017) that found that segments of the public that are low in cognitive ability 
and/or are high in self-reported knowledge believe that consensus uncertainty is primarily 
caused by researcher bias or deficient knowledge. Only those who score high in cognitive 
ability are prone to attribute consensus uncertainty to the nature of science or inherent 
complexity in the problem space. 
Much correlational data from surveys indicate that perceptions of uncertainty in 
science are related to attitudes about the scientific findings themselves. For example, 
individuals’ perceptions of the technical (im)precision of a scientific field is a significant 
predictor of their ratings of the overall quality of the science, support for funding, and 
perceived social benefit (Broomell & Kane, 2017). For climate change in particular, 
perceptions of consensus uncertainty are negatively related to support for climate policy and 
taking action to combat it (Ding, Maibach, Zhao, Roser-Renouf, & Leiserowitz, 2011). 
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1.4 Summary 
In sum, Chapter 1 has demonstrated how the concept of uncertainty can be, and has 
been, used in (at least) four distinct emphasis frames, each using a particular type of 
uncertainty to describe or qualify a claim. Chapter 1 argued that this is especially germane to 
the nature and goals of science and scientists, because of the centrality of uncertainty to the 
scientific method and of uncertain discourse to accurate science communication. Some 
research indicates that the public may be (somewhat) cognizant of the presence of 
uncertainty in science, and may also have different opinions about different types of 
uncertainty. But while survey research has made it clear that there is a correlation between 
perceptions of uncertainty surrounding a given claim and attitudes toward that claim, 
specifying the effects of these uncertainty frames in science is another matter entirely — and 
is a primary goal of this dissertation in particular. Thus, in the next chapter, I provide an in-
depth summary and reconciliation of the myriad, diverse, seemingly inconsistent findings of 
the experimental literature on the effects of uncertainty-framed science messages, and also 
discuss the important role of motivated processing in responses to uncertainty in science. 
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Chapter 2: The Effects of Uncertainty Frames: Competing Theory and Evidence 
Currently, there is some theory and evidence indicating that uncertainty frames 
(undifferentiated) in science communication generally have negative effects on source 
credibility, claim-specific beliefs, trust in science, and behavioral intentions.  However, there 
is also some theory and evidence indicating generally positive effects of uncertainty frames 
(undifferentiated). Here in Chapter 2, I survey the experimental literature that has tested the 
effects of uncertainty frames on individuals’ attitudes, beliefs, and behavioral intentions. 
Throughout this summary, when referring to the reported effects of uncertainty, I specify 
which one of the four uncertainty frame types were used in the operationalization according 
to my definitions (i.e., how the researchers presented “uncertainty” in their experimental 
manipulation) (to the extent that it was reasonably interpretable as such).  At the end of 
Chapter 2, after observing the rift between the two general perspectives, I reorganize this 
literature by separating the reviewed results into four categories corresponding with the four 
uncertainty frame types. This restructuring, presented in Tables 4 and 5, results in a clearer 
pattern of effects. That is, when the collective findings are grouped together as 
undifferentiated “uncertainty frames,” the group’s findings are inconsistent — containing 
positive, negative, and null effects. But when the results of the extant experimental tests are 
separated into the four distinct types of uncertainty frames, the findings are more consistent 
within each group, and there are tentative differences between groups. However, these are 
only tentative and subjective review observations, not the results of a statistical meta-
analysis. This, then, is a natural impetus for the controlled test of the relative effects of the 
respective uncertainty frame types that is presented in Chapter 3. 
2.1 Arguments for Expecting Negative Effects 
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There is diverse support for the expectation that — relative to frames of certainty — 
uncertainty frames will instigate, perpetuate, or exacerbate more negative attitudes toward 
science, scientists, and specific claims of science. Generally, states of uncertainty can often 
be unpleasant (Camerer & Weber, 1992), such that people seek to regulate the uncertainty 
they experience to maintain a desired level (Afifi & Weiner, 2004). Uncertain information is 
also inherently more difficult to understand than certain information, and ambiguity in 
general can cause confusion (Tversky & Shafir, 1992; van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2003). People 
are often ambiguity-averse (Ellsberg, 1961) and ambiguous information can spark negative 
reactions toward both the source and the claim (Han, Moser, & Klein, 2007). Uncertainty 
frames can also cause people to justify continuing in their current state rather than responding 
to information with adaptive action (Budescu, Rapoport, & Suleiman, 1990). Specific to 
science communication, people often expect experts to be precise and confident (Shanteau, 
1987), and non-scientists may not understand the language or purpose of uncertainty in 
science (Roth, Morgan, Fischhoff, Lave, & Bostrom, 1990). For these reasons, early science 
communication scholars often recommended that science communicators eliminate uncertain 
discourse and use, instead, more powerful, factive language (see review in Zehr, 1999). 
There is also some clear experimental evidence of negative effects of uncertainty-
framed science communication. When asked directly, people report being displeased by the 
(deficient) uncertainty caused by inadequate research (Frewer et al., 2002), and survey 
evidence indicates that perceptions of discord among scientists (consensus uncertainty) are 
negatively associated with support for climate change policies (Ding et al., 2011). Evidence 
also suggests that when people perceive uncertainty about environmental conservation 
threats, they tend to act according to self-interest, instead of engaging in collective action for 
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the greater good (Hine & Gifford, 1996). Nagler (2014) found that individuals who report 
higher exposure to consensus uncertainty about nutrition (e.g., benefits/risks of wine) also 
report higher confusion, negative reactions toward nutrition science and scientists, and lower 
intentions toward the recommended dietary behaviors.  Further evidence indicates that 
portrayals of consensus uncertainty about vaccine safety can lower behavioral intentions 
toward vaccination (Meszaros et al., 1996). Similarly, Dixon and Clarke (2013) report that 
portrayals of consensus uncertainty cause individuals to have greater doubts about vaccine 
safety and to perceive greater discord among scientists.  These findings are echoed by Chang 
(2015), who found that contradictory findings published in health news produce lower 
favorability ratings of health research, lower perceived credibility of the research, greater 
uncertainty about health research, and lower behavioral intentions toward healthy behavior. 
Regarding the effects of minimizing uncertainty, the gateway belief model (van der 
Linden et al., 2017) posits that messages emphasizing high consensus (that is, low 
uncertainty) will de-bias beliefs about consensus and successively change other attitudes and 
beliefs about climate science, and can also inoculate against misinformation. Similarly, 
Bolsen and Druckman (2015) report robust experimental evidence indicating that support for 
new technologies (fracking and carbon nanotubes) can be strengthened through the inclusion 
of specific inoculation against (before) or correction to (after) specious arguments that 
inherent scientific uncertainty implies consensus uncertainty. These perspectives rest upon 
the advantages of emphasizing certainty instead of uncertainty. Similar hypotheses have been 
repeatedly supported by empirical evidence (e.g., Lewandowsky et al., 2013; van der Linden 
et al., 2018). A full list of the relevant empirical literature is presented in Tables 4 and 5. 
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2.2 Arguments for Expecting Positive Effects 
There is also diverse theorizing and empirical support for the expectation that — 
relative to frames of certainty — uncertainty frames will have positive effects on attitudes 
toward science, scientists, and claims of science. The earliest and most programmatic body of 
literature on the nature and effects of uncertainty portrayals is in the field of risk 
communication. An early and persisting understanding in this literature was that portrayals of 
technical uncertainty about scientific claims of threat imminence and threat severity would 
enhance trust in the source and even increase behavioral responses toward risk mitigation 
(Habicht, 1992; Johnson & Slovic, 1995; McGregor et al., 1994; Slovic et al., 1984). As 
such, numerous scholars have encouraged scientists to more openly admit uncertainties when 
communicating to the public (Campbell, 2011; Leshner, 2003; Parascandola, 2000; Stocking, 
2010). The most common justification in this perspective is that the inclusion of uncertainty 
information increases credibility and accuracy perceptions because it communicates more 
honesty and transparency than statements of absolute certainty (Frewer et al., 2002; Johnson 
& Slovic, 1995). 
Further, the cultural cognition thesis argues that messages emphasizing strong 
consensus (low uncertainty) likely result in boomerang effects because those who strongly 
oppose that position will rationalize the consensus as evidence that scientists are corrupted 
and colluding, rather than as evidence that the claim is supported by rigorous body of 
consistent findings (Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, Braman, 2011). Bolsen and Druckman (2017) 
similarly report that consensus messages can have a boomerang effect in oppositional 
audiences that possess high knowledge. Such boomerang effects in oppositional audiences 
can even be considered a rational response if we consider that skeptical audiences expect 
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messages about consensus, but simply distrust the source (Cook & Lewandowsky, 2016). 
This in itself is not direct evidence of positive effects of uncertainty, per se, but it does 
present a rationale for not assuming that more certainty is always good and/or always best 
when communicating science, especially in contexts with oppositional audiences. 
There is diverse experimental support for this perspective. For example, Jenson and 
colleagues report experimental evidence that journalists and scientists are both perceived as 
more trustworthy when they “hedge” reports of scientific findings with caveats or limitations 
that describe scientific uncertainty (2008; 2011). Similarly, Clarke et al. (2015) found that — 
relative to consensus uncertainty frames — frames of (low) scientific uncertainty (hedging 
plus a weight of evidence statement) directly increased beliefs in scientists’ certainty about 
the vaccine-autism controversy and decreased beliefs of scientific discord, which in turn 
were directly and positively related to personal certainty. Frewer and colleagues (1998) 
found that people with initial negative attitudes toward GMOs were more accepting of 
proposed GMO applications if the information contained admission of scientific uncertainty, 
although individuals with initially positive attitudes were not inﬂuenced by admissions of 
uncertainty. 
Further evidence indicates that when participants are presented with high technical 
uncertainty about risk outcomes (e.g., a 20% likelihood), they trust scientists significantly 
more when the risk information also contains a frame of scientific uncertainty explaining the 
process and limitations of the estimate (Nakayachi et al., 2018). However, the frame of 
scientific uncertainty did not result in different source perceptions at more certain risk 
likelihood levels (e.g., 90% likelihood). This is intuitive. If there is zero technical 
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uncertainty, then a statement explaining reasons for uncertainty doesn't seem appropriate. If 
there is a great deal of technical uncertainty, then an explanation is appreciated.  
2.3 Findings of No Effect 
In addition, some experimental tests have observed no effect of uncertainty 
manipulations. For example, Bord and O’Connor (1992) found that individuals’ level of 
concern for risk was unchanged by portrayals of technical uncertainty about threat level.  
Further, a longitudinal experiment testing the effect of uncertainty framing on participants’ 
beliefs and trust in science found that uncertainty frames had no positive or negative effect 
on beliefs or trust (Retzbach & Maier, 2015). However, it could be that the topic 
(nanotechnology) and sample (German adults) do not involve as strong a sense of 
controversy as those used by other relevant research (e.g., climate change and American 
adults). Further, the operationalization of “uncertain science” was a condition in which 
benefits and harms of nanotechnology were mentioned. This is not uncertainty, necessarily. 
That is, such a message could mean that scientists are certain and in agreement that there will 
be both benefits and harms. In short, a “pros and cons” portrayal does not necessarily equate 
to (consensus, or any other) uncertainty. Thus, this evidence does not reduce the likelihood 
that uncertainty portrayals have significant effects in more contentious issues, in more 
opinion-polarized samples, and in more explicit portrayals of uncertainty. 
Finally, Kuhn (2000) found no difference in perceived risk or pro-environmental 
attitudes across four different uncertainty type message manipulations (which correspond to 
technical, consensus, deficient, and no uncertainty, respectively). This non-effect was 
expected, and the data supported the hypothesis of motivated reasoning in responses to 
32 
 
uncertainty frames. However, this experiment had 177 participants across 4 conditions, 
which makes detection of small message effects unlikely.  
2.4. Moderators of the Effect of Uncertainty Frames 
The extant literature strongly suggests that responses to uncertainty in science are 
largely dependent on combinations of the issue context, individuals’ prior beliefs about the 
particular claim, individuals’ beliefs about science and scientists, and/or their broader 
ideology and worldview. Many of these findings can be explained via confirmation-biased 
motivated reasoning. This section discusses these, and other, kinds of moderators. 
2.4.1. Motivated reasoning. It is widely understood that individuals’ selection and 
processing of information often follows patterns of motivated reasoning and confirmation 
bias (e.g., Bolsen, Druckman, & Cook, 2014b; Nickerson, 1998; Taber & Lodge, 2006), such 
that people tend to attend to, interpret, and respond to information in ways that are most 
congruent with their existing beliefs, values, or behavior. Diverging interpretations by 
different people of the same information is a fundamental effect of motivated reasoning, and 
is ubiquitous in human information processing.  
This phenomenon has significant and troubling implications for the effects of science 
communication campaigns. A growing cadre of science communication scholars have argued 
that relevant ideologies and prior issue beliefs moderate the relationship between diverse 
science communication messages and their effects on attitudes, credibility perceptions, and 
behavioral intentions. These conditional effects result in unintended outcomes such as a 
reinforcement of prior beliefs, polarization, boomerang effects, and cumulative advantage 
patterns over time (e.g., Corner, Whitmarsh, & Xenias, 2012; Gustafson & Rice, 2016; Hart 
& Nisbet, 2012; Hoffman, 2011; McCright & Dunlap, 2011; Pielke, 2007; Peters & Slovic, 
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1996; Sarewitz, 2004). Frewer and colleagues (1998) identify prior attitudes as a main driver 
of attitudinal responses, in general, summarizing that “people with negative initial attitudes 
receiving persuasive information from a distrusted source might become more negative… 
whilst those with positive attitudes receiving information from a trusted source might become 
more positive” (p. 17). 
Motivated reasoning is germane to this discussion of the effects of uncertainty 
because there are likely to be characteristics of individuals (and their attitudes, beliefs, or 
values) that drive interpretations of, and responses to, uncertainty portrayals. Importantly, 
uncertainty-framed information may be especially fertile ground for motivated reasoning 
because its ambiguity, controversy, doubt, or imprecision may inherently allow for diverse — 
even discrepant — interpretations across individuals and groups (Chang, 2011, 2012, 2015). 
Indeed, some misinformation campaigns have been successful in persuading large portions of 
the public that the scientific uncertainty about climate change should be interpreted as reason 
to doubt the scientific consensus certainty or the legitimacy of the evidence (Jacques, 
Dunlap, & Freeman, 2008; McCright & Dunlap, 2003; Oreskes & Conway, 2010). Still, it is 
important to note that motivated reasoning is not just associated with unintended, undesired 
effects. For example, those with preexisting beliefs or values favorable to the message or 
source will exhibit a positive bias in their interpretations and responses of uncertain (and 
other) information (Frewer et al., 1998).  
To date, very few studies have investigated the role of motivated reasoning in the 
effects of uncertainty frames.  The most direct test (Dieckmann et al., 2017) found that —for 
both climate change and gun control — individuals are likely to apply the most worldview-
consistent interpretation of technical uncertainty in scientific evidence. For example, 
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participants in the climate change conditions were told that scientists expect sea level to rise 
between 1cm and 5cm, and then were asked whether a) the values close to 1cm are more 
likely, b) all values between 1cm and 5cm are equally likely c) the values close to 5cm are 
more likely, or d) the values in the middle are more likely than the values on the ends.  Of 
course, the correct answer was “D” — a normal distribution. However, they found that prior 
support for climate science corresponded with a greater likelihood to choose either “C” 
(higher values) or “D” (normal distribution), and prior opposition to climate science was 
associated with a greater likelihood to choose either “A” (lower values) or “B” (uniform 
distribution).  
On an encouraging note, when the correct interpretation and explanation of the range 
(a normal distribution) were provided to participants, this significantly reduced the motivated 
reasoning effect for all worldviews — a clear inoculation effect. However, this dependent 
variable (interpretations of a probability distribution) is of limited utility to most science 
communication campaigns aimed at increasing public beliefs, attitudes, behaviors, and trust 
in science. Further, of course, this has only been tested in response to technical uncertainty. It 
may be that some uncertainty types mitigate motivated reasoning while others catalyze it.   
Investigating precisely this question, Kuhn’s (2000) experiment tentatively indicated 
differential motivated reasoning effects across different types of uncertainty frames. In 
particular, the results indicated that the discrepancy in risk perceptions between pro-
environmental and anti-environmental individuals was greatest when consensus uncertainty 
was portrayed, compared to the discrepancies associated with portrayals of deficient 
uncertainty or of technical uncertainty. That is, people were most prone to react to risk 
information in accordance with their pre-existing opinions when the risk information 
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contained consensus uncertainty. This makes sense, because while deficient, technical, and 
scientific uncertainty frames could conceivably allow leeway for motivated reasoning due to 
ambiguous or inconclusive evidence, consensus uncertainty is the only uncertainty type that 
extends to also explicitly providing (some) support for both competing sides. 
These preliminary studies provide a tantalizing preview into this valuable research 
question. At this point, the role of motivated reasoning in responses to uncertainty frames is 
still uncertain (deficient). Thus, further research is needed to identify the role of motivated 
reasoning in the effects of diverse uncertainty frames on widely applicable dependent 
variables like basic belief certainty about a claim and perceptions of source credibility. 
2.4.2. Prior beliefs and ideologies. Consistent with the motivated reasoning 
perspective, several studies have found that the effect of uncertainty frames on attitudes and 
behavioral intentions is contingent on prior issue opinions or ideological worldview. For 
example, Nan and Daily (2015) found that portrayals of high consensus uncertainty regarding 
vaccine safety resulted in more supportive attitudes for individuals with a supportive prior 
issue position, but less supportive attitudes for individuals with opposition. Similar research 
found that statements of low scientific uncertainty about vaccine safety can negate the effect 
of a high consensus uncertainty frame, albeit only for those who had prior support for 
vaccine safety (Dixon et al., 2015).  
Broomell and Kane (2017) found that scientific uncertainty frames about psychology 
research (as a field) produced negative credibility ratings from Republicans, but had no effect 
on credibility ratings from Democrats. Although it was not the focus of study, Kuhn’s (2000) 
small experiment found that individuals’ level of pre-existing environmental concern was 
positively related to the amount of perceived risk regarding an assortment of uncertainty-
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framed environmental threats. This finding held true in the technical uncertainty condition 
(numerical range of expected values), in the consensus uncertainty condition (where the 
uncertainty is attributed to competing expert biases), and in the zero-uncertainty condition (a 
specific, exact value). 
Often, political ideology is an important determinant of individuals’ opinions on 
science issues. It is salient to this dissertation, so here I briefly evaluate some common ways 
to measure it. While some researchers (e.g., Broomell & Kane, 2017) measure political 
ideology by simply asking participants to place themselves into discrete categories (e.g., 
Democrat or Republican), this approach has two important limitations. First, the use of two 
or three discrete categories is a reduction in information, so a continuous measure of political 
ideology would be much more robust. Second, even a continuous measure of political 
ideology — if it is explicit in its intent (e.g., “how would you rate your political beliefs on a 
scale from conservative to liberal?”) — is not necessarily ideal, because, for example, 
“somewhat conservative” or “somewhat liberal” mean different things to different people. In 
strongly conservative regions or cultures, “somewhat liberal” beliefs might equate to the 
same beliefs held by a person from a strongly liberal region or culture who reports that they 
are “somewhat conservative.” For these reasons, many scholars have moved away from 
categorical and/or direct measures of political ideology — favoring instead measures that 
target the ideology roots that underlie political opinion (e.g., Kahan et al., 2011). Leading 
among these is a measure of worldview that consists of two dimensions — one that assesses 
a continuum of hierarchical to egalitarian (HE) values, and one that assesses a continuum of 
individualist to collectivist (InCo) values (e.g., Bolsen & Druckman, 2011; Dieckmann et al., 
2017; Kahan et al., 2011). Each of these dimensions is a very strong predictor of political 
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party affiliation and of opinion on political issues. This dissertation will follow in this trend, 
such that all references to worldview/ideology are in reference to this two-factor construct 
composed of HE and InCo. In sum, it is clear that individuals’ differences in responses to 
science communication (and to uncertainty in particular) are often driven by the differences 
in each individual’s ideological worldview — particularly in politically charged issues (e.g., 
climate change).  
2.4.3. Trust in science and scientists. Several studies have reported evidence 
indicating that an individual’s deference to, and trust in, science is a significant predictor of 
their responses to science communication in general (Aklin & Urpelainen, 2014; Anderson, 
Scheufele, Brossard, & Corley, 2012; Ho, Brossard, & Scheufele, 2008; Lee & Scheufele, 
2006). Specific to the effects of uncertainty, Aklin and Urpelainen (2014) manipulated the 
degree of expert consensus (e.g., 60%, 80%, 98%) that was portrayed about environmental 
policy, and found that increases in consensus (more agreement, certainty) resulted in stronger 
policy support only for people who already reported high pre-existing trust in scientists. For 
those who reported low trust in scientists, those portrayals of higher consensus (more 
agreement, certainty) had a boomerang effect — decreasing the policy support — possibly 
because it confirmed expectations of systemic collusion. Similarly, Binder and colleagues 
(2016) found that portrayals of scientific uncertainty lead to lower perceived risk of 
nanotechnology than did portrayals of consensus uncertainty, but only in individuals with 
high deference to science. 
Of course, the influence of pre-existing trust in (or deference to) the source of the 
message is not limited to situations where scientists (specifically) are the source. Rather, 
these data simply evidence the human tendency toward confirmatory interpretations of 
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uncertainty based on prior beliefs — more evidence of motivated reasoning in the effects of 
uncertainty frames.  
2.4.4. Understanding of uncertainty in science. Intuitively, individuals’ opinions 
about the role or purpose of uncertainty in science seem to influence their responses to 
portrayals of uncertainty. For example, one study found that participants who view science as 
an ongoing debate that will always have inherent uncertainty report relatively higher 
behavioral intentions after viewing messages with technical uncertainty about climate change 
effects (Rabinovich & Morton, 2012). On the other hand, those who viewed science as a 
process that additively uncovers absolute truths reported relatively lower behavioral 
intentions after viewing messages with technical uncertainty about climate change effects. 
Similarly, Johnson and Slovic (1995) found that individuals’ belief that ranges around an 
estimate are an expected, natural characteristic of good science communication was 
positively related to their understanding of the information, certainty in the claim, and 
perceptions of scientific validity — and was negatively correlated with beliefs that the 
uncertainty indicated incompetent scientists. The authors also conducted a focus group, in 
which some participants reported that they expect scientific findings to have uncertainties, so 
portrayals of technical uncertainty are welcome and signal greater honesty, but lower 
competence. 
2.4.5. Issue context. Another experiment (Jensen & Hurley, 2012) found that 
portrayals of contradicting scientific reports (high consensus uncertainty) had effects on 
perceptions of source credibility that were conditional on the science issue that was 
presented. Consensus uncertainty about dioxin in sewage sludge diminished source 
credibility, while consensus uncertainty about the reintroduction of gray wolves to populated 
39 
 
areas increased credibility. The authors invoke the theory of motivated information 
management (Afifi & Weiner, 2004) to argue that responses to scientific discord or 
ambiguity are determined by an individual’s preferred level of uncertainty on that issue — 
such that participants felt that uncertainty about toxic dioxin sludge was much less acceptable 
than uncertainty about the conservation of gray wolves.   
2.5. Re-organizing the Literature 
As summarized above, the research is currently divided regarding whether 
uncertainty-framed science communication has — in general — negative, positive, or no 
effects, as there are theoretical and empirical justifications for each perspective. The body of 
extant findings primarily indicates that in some situations (combinations of issues, audience 
characteristics, or uncertainty types), uncertainty frames in science communication can 
produce negative effects, while in other situations they can produce positive effects, and null 
effects in yet others. Each perspective must reconcile supporting, opposing, and null findings. 
Due to the wide range of issues, methodologies, measures, and conceptualizations of 
the extant research, one of the most intuitive reasons for the mixed findings may be that the 
discrepant perspectives (negative, positive, null) arise from tests of different uncertainty 
types. Here, I demonstrate that a re-organization of the extant literature by uncertainty type 
may lead to better insights regarding their effects. Table 4 and Table 5 (above) present a 
summary of the results from controlled experiments that have tested the effects of 
uncertainty-framed science messages. The following sections summarize the general trends 
of results within each set of studies reorganized by the four types of uncertainty. 
2.5.1. Effects of consensus uncertainty. The prominent position taken by science 
communication researchers is that portrayals of disagreement and controversy are detrimental 
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because they instigate, facilitate, or perpetuate public skepticism of science. As such, 
consensus uncertainty has attracted the lion’s share of the content analyses that investigate 
frames in climate change news (e.g., Antilla, 2005; Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004; Brossard, 
Shanahan, & McComas, 2004; Dispensa & Brulle, 2003; Zhao, Rolfe-Redding, & Kotcher, 
2016). The experimental evidence strongly indicates that portrayals of high consensus 
uncertainty (controversy, disagreement, or balance) will likely have exclusively negative 
effects on beliefs about the claim, source credibility perceptions, personal certainty, 
perceived certainty of the scientists, and behavioral intentions (Table 4). There is no 
theoretical or evidential support to suggest that consensus uncertainty frames have positive 
effects. 
The gateway belief model — which claims that portrayals of strong consensus (low 
uncertainty) will have positive effects (van der Linden et al., 2015) — is contested by the 
cultural cognition hypothesis (Kahan et al., 2011), which argues that portrayals of consensus 
will be discounted by oppositional audiences via motivated reasoning, causing polarization 
(Bolsen & Druckman, 2017). However, the empirical literature in this vein has been largely 
commandeered by the van der Linden camp, and their robust findings strongly support their 
central hypothesis: relative to high consensus uncertainty and relative to control conditions, 
portrayals of strong consensus (low uncertainty) result in more supportive attitudes, higher 
perceived risk, greater perceived scientific consensus, and stronger behavioral intentions 
(Table 4). Together, this body of empirical work suggests that consensus uncertainty — 
portrayals of controversy, disagreement, or discord within the scientific community — is 
negatively associated with many of the key desired attitudinal and behavioral outcomes of 
public science communication. 
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2.5.2. Effects of technical uncertainty. The evidence suggests that communicating 
some technical uncertainty has been associated with positive effects (e.g., higher 
trustworthiness and behavioral intentions) (Johnson & Slovic, 1995; MacGregor et al., 1994; 
Morton et al., 2011; Slovic et al., 1984). Most of the risk communication research that found 
positive effects exclusively used portrayals of technical uncertainty. Still, though, negative 
effects have been observed on competence perceptions (Johnson & Slovic, 1995). Morton et 
al. (2011) found that gain-framed technical uncertainty increased behavioral intentions by 
increasing efficacy perceptions, while loss-framed technical uncertainty decreased behavioral 
intentions by decreasing efficacy perceptions (Morton et al., 2011).  
While this body of research indicates that technical uncertainty does not have the 
same undeniable negative effects of consensus uncertainty — and may even have positive 
effects — we must be cautious in generalizing these findings. Most of the risk 
communication research that has theorized about — and/or empirically tested — the effects 
of (technical) uncertainty has investigated apolitical science issues such as earthquake risk, 
cancer risk, or toxic waste (Table 5; McGregor et al., 1994; Slovic et al., 1984). Because 
uncertainty likely facilitates motivated reasoning, and because motivated reasoning effects 
are likely stronger in issues on which individuals have strong prior beliefs or salient values, it 
would not be surprising for technical (or any other) uncertainty to spark more distrust, 
uncertainty, or rejection than a portrayal of certainty amongst individuals with strong prior 
opposition to the issue/claim — an unlikely situation for earthquakes or cancer, though 
possibly less for toxic waste. Thus, it is important to extend these tests to climate change, 
GMOs, and other controversial science issues. 
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2.5.3. Effects of scientific uncertainty. Scientific uncertainty has largely resulted in 
positive responses, with some null findings — but never negative effects (Table 5). It should 
be no surprise that portraying low scientific uncertainty (e.g., stipulating that future research 
could, potentially, make small adjustments to the current wealth of supporting evidence) has 
positive effects (Corbett & Durfee, 2004). However, the evidence also indicates that 
highlighting strong scientific uncertainty can have positive effects as well. When Rabinovich 
and Morton (2012) gave participants a detailed explanation of the inherent role of uncertainty 
in science, participants responded more positively to subsequent portrayals of uncertainty. 
Explaining that there is — and why there is — significant scientific uncertainty that 
surrounds a claim can result in a better understanding of scientific uncertainty which in turn 
makes uncertain science more acceptable, trustworthy, and normal (Rabinovich & Morton, 
2012).  Similarly, Jensen and colleagues (2008, 2011) found that statements emphasizing 
scientific uncertainty (“hedging”) increased trust in cancer researchers and reduced fatalistic 
beliefs about cancer (i.e., that cancer is unavoidable, and any/everything can cause it). 
While the summary in Table 5 indicates that scientific uncertainty is sometimes also 
associated with effects that are no different than the control condition, this is itself a very 
informative finding because it indicates that (quite unlike consensus uncertainty) scientific 
uncertainty is never associated with undesirable effects (e.g., decreased trust, lower 
attitudinal support, lower behavioral intentions). Further, it appears that positive effects can 
be gained both from emphasizing scientific uncertainties and from assuring audiences of 
minimal scientific uncertainty — likely because they both encourage audiences to consider 
the broader context or process of science, which fosters confidence in the rigor of the system 
that produced the claim. 
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2.5.4. Effects of deficient uncertainty. The effects of portrayals of scientists (or 
sources) holding deficient uncertainty have not been studied with anywhere near the same 
frequency of consensus, technical, and scientific uncertainty. However, content analyses 
indicate that frames of deficient uncertainty are not absent in news reporting on prominent 
science issues such as climate change (Rice et al., 2018; Zehr, 2000). The lone experiment 
(Kuhn, 2000) found that when a probabilistic risk estimate is portrayed as being caused by 
deficient uncertainty, risk perceptions are no different than the control group (no 
uncertainty), and also no different than when the probabilistic risk estimate is portrayed as 
being caused by consensus uncertainty. In a survey, people reported being more displeased 
when scientists have deficient uncertainty than when they have uncertainty of other types 
(Frewer et al., 2003). Clearly, more research is needed to test the effects of frames of 
deficient uncertainty in both controversial and non-controversial science issues. 
2.6. Reconciling the Evidence on the Effects of Uncertainty Frame Types 
If Tables 4 and 5 did not (in general) separate the findings by uncertainty type, it 
would paint a very self-contradictory portrait of the effects of uncertainty-framed science — 
as it is filled with both positive and negative effects on (often) the same outcome variables. 
However, separating by uncertainty type reconciles some of this inconsistency. Thus, the 
most important takeaway from this reorganization of the literature is: the “competing” 
perspectives about expecting positive and negative effects of uncertainty frames (in general) 
are not necessarily in competition after all.  
That is, the above categorization of extant empirical literature indicates that different 
types of uncertainty frames can be seen as associated with different trends of effects 
(although still with some inconsistency) on a variety of attitudinal variables (Tables 4 and 5). 
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Generally, consensus uncertainty associates with the negative, undesirable effects such as 
lower internal and external certainty, distrust, and lower behavioral intention. In contrast, 
technical and (especially) scientific uncertainty have been found to associate with positive 
effects such as stronger beliefs, increased credibility perceptions, and higher behavioral 
intentions. While several studies have found that technical and scientific uncertainty have no 
effect on the outcome variables of interest, these are very valuable findings because they are 
in stark contrast to the largely negative effects of consensus uncertainty.   
 One potential explanation for these differences across types is that consensus 
uncertainty emphasizes that the state of the evidence does not yet constitute an answer, not 
even one that is tentative, preliminary, or roughly estimated.  On the other hand, scientific 
and technical uncertainty emphasize that the science has produced an answer, albeit one that 
might be qualified with some well-understood, clearly specified room for approximation 
error or future further revision.  
While there is little experimental evidence regarding the effects of deficient 
uncertainty, it resembles consensus uncertainty in that it communicates that the state of the 
evidence does not yet constitute an answer. Although we cannot be confident at this point 
that portrayals of deficient uncertainty produce similar negative effects as consensus 
uncertainty, some exploratory research has shown that people report being more displeased 
by scientists’ deficient uncertainty than by other types (Frewer et al., 2002). 
It is important to emphasize that this review does not constitute conclusive evidence 
that variations in uncertainty frame types are a significant cause of the disparate findings. 
This is, in part, because the extant findings have been produced across myriad 
methodologies, issues, topics, sources, measures, etc. While Table 4 and Table 5 are 
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informative, there are far from enough observations in each “cell” of the combinations of 
types, issues, and dependent variables to inform confident meta-analytic conclusions about 
the relative effects of each particular uncertainty type. Further, the studies were each 
recategorized into the four types of uncertainty based on interpretation of the information 
provided in the publications; but that does not guarantee that each recategorized study 
belonged solely or even necessarily to that category. Thus, we must be wary of assigning 
causality to variations in the uncertainty type. There are many methodological or contextual 
factors that could also be responsible for causing the observed differences across studies, 
such as different samples, methodologies, measures, and issues.  A meta-analysis of a much 
larger number of studies involving uncertainty and scientific communication would be 
necessary to make such fine-grained determinations. Unfortunately, a sufficiently large body 
of literature does not yet exist. Therefore, one of the most valuable contributions of this 
dissertation will be a controlled test that facilitates valid, robust comparisons of individuals’ 
responses to each of these four uncertainty types within one study.  
2.7. Comparisons of Relative Effects of Uncertainty Frames 
To date, exactly five studies have undertaken a direct empirical comparison of the 
effects of two or more uncertainty frame types in a controlled experiment (instead of, say, the 
comparison of one frame type to a control, or variations in the degree of uncertainty within 
one frame type). First, Corbett and Durfee (2004) report that individuals’ personal certainty 
about climate science finding in response to a consensus uncertainty frame was not 
significantly different than the control condition. However, it is important to note that the 
“context” condition (a portrayal of low scientific uncertainty — or, stated conversely, higher 
certainty) resulted in significantly more internal certainty than either the consensus 
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uncertainty condition or the control condition. Thus, this finding indicates a significant 
difference between uncertainty types in their effects on internal certainty. However, this 
conclusion is limited by the small, non-representative student sample. Further, the authors 
controlled for political ideology (muting its effect on the dependent variables), rather than 
testing for an interaction effect. Thus, for example, it may be that responses to consensus 
uncertainty were polarized by ideology, which is a very important question. In addition, this 
experiment compared a condition of very low uncertainty of one type (scientific) against a 
condition of high uncertainty of a different type (consensus), thus disabling any conclusions 
about whether the difference is due to the type itself.  
Second, Binder, Hillback, and Brossard (2016) found that news articles with 
portrayals of consensus and of scientific uncertainty, respectively, about the potential risks of 
emerging science (nanotechnology) only produced significantly different levels of perceived 
risk in individuals who scored high in deference to science. That is, those (and only those) 
individuals who reported strong trust and respect for science responded to consensus and 
scientific uncertainty differently, reporting higher perceived risk after the consensus 
uncertainty portrayal. However, these results are surrounded by a great deal of uncertainty 
(of all types).  First, the experiment was conducted using a very small student sample (some 
cells had 9, 11, or 16 observations). This disables the detection of small (or even moderate) 
effects, such as those that are most commonly observed in message/framing manipulations. 
Third, Kuhn (2000) used a similarly small student sample (n=177) and found that 
when technical uncertainty (a range of risk estimates) is portrayed as being caused by expert 
disagreement (consensus uncertainty), then individuals’ responses to the message are more 
likely to follow in line with pre-existing beliefs and values, as compared to individuals’ 
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responses to messages that had technical uncertainty alone. However, there was no main 
effect of variation in uncertainty portrayal type (which resembled technical, consensus, 
deficient, and no-uncertainty, respectively) on perceived risk. Sampling limitations aside, this 
is an important finding because it suggests that the effect of prior beliefs on post-message 
attitudes is a stronger effect than message variations, and that motivated reasoning is 
especially pronounced in response to consensus uncertainty portrayals. Still, as with the first 
two studies in this section, this piece of evidence leaves much unanswered about how other 
attitudinal variables prioritized in the science communication literature (e.g., credibility, 
behavioral intentions) would be affected in response to uncertainty frames in a polarized, 
contentious topic and/or in a nationally representative sample. 
Fourth, Rabinovich and Morton (2012) compared conditions of technical and 
consensus uncertainty frames, respectively, observing the effects of a message about the 
effects of climate change on behavioral intentions in a small (n=100) student sample.  There 
was no main effect of either uncertainty condition on behavioral intentions, and no difference 
in effects between the uncertainty manipulations. But (as mentioned previously), beliefs in 
the role of uncertainty in science was a significant moderator of both messages’ effect on 
behavioral intentions such that individuals who reported believing that the purpose of science 
is to find absolute truths reported lower behavioral intentions than those who believe science 
is a perpetual debate. This study did not investigate the role of ideology/worldview, despite 
using climate change as the issue context in the experiment.  
Fifth, and finally, Clarke and colleagues (2015) investigated the effect of two 
different uncertainty types on individuals’ internal certainty (their personal certainty 
regarding claim) and external certainty (their perception of how certain the scientists are) 
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about the vaccine-autism controversy. In one condition, they portrayed low scientific 
uncertainty by highlighting the substantial weight of evidence indicating no vaccine-autism 
link. In another condition, they portrayed high consensus uncertainty by highlighting both 
supporting and opposing opinions from multiple “experts,” indicating discord amongst 
scientists about the claim. Not surprisingly, the low scientific uncertainty condition resulted 
in higher IC and EC than the high consensus uncertainty condition. However, one of the 
limitations of this study is that it is comparing high uncertainty in one uncertainty type 
(consensus) with low uncertainty (scientific) in the other type. Thus, the observed difference 
may just be because of higher/lower uncertainty, rather than informing our knowledge about 
the relative effects of different uncertainty frame types. One of the important questions that is 
unanswered here is whether high scientific uncertainty (explaining that a finding is 
preliminary and needs replication, or stating the inherent limitations of the research) has any 
different effect than portraying a high degree of discord or controversy among experts 
(consensus) — or, for that matter, whether it is different than portraying large uncharted gaps 
in knowledge (deficient), or a wide range of imprecision in an estimate (technical).   
In sum, the extant literature has left a significant gap in our knowledge of the specific 
effects of these uncertainty types, despite a) their frequent appearance in content analyses of 
actual public science communication, and b) the theoretical consensus of science 
communication scholars about their potent role in influencing public interpretations and 
responses to science. While the above overview indicates that consensus uncertainty has 
especially negative effects and that technical and scientific uncertainty sometimes have 
positive effects — which are observations that resonate with intuitive and theoretical 
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expectations — such observations are far from being definitive, comprehensive, or even 
strictly objective. 
The few attempts at comparing the relative effects of different uncertainty types in 
experimental settings each have methodological shortcomings that dampen confidence in the 
generalizability of their findings. Further, each of these few studies compares some — but 
not all — of the four uncertainty types. It is clear that a study comparing the effects of all 
uncertainty types within one robust, controlled, consistent methodology is needed to finally 
generate useful, defensible data that inform the important question of the effects of 
uncertainty frames on outcome variables that are relevant to most science communication 
contexts. 
2.8.  Outcome Variables of Interest 
Several different positive and negative outcomes have been investigated in the 
research summarized above. In order clarify the context of interest of this dissertation, it is 
important to describe each of these outcome variables in more detail. Of these, this 
dissertation will test effects on internal certainty, external certainty, credibility, risk 
perceptions, and behavioral intentions.  
Naturally, the different research fields that have investigated the nature and effects of 
uncertainty have often been interested in different outcome variables. For example, the risk 
communication literature often associates portrayals of technical uncertainty in a risk 
estimate with, unsurprisingly, individuals’ perceived risk (e.g., Binder et al., 2016; Han et al., 
2011). Science communication research (e.g., Dixon & Clarke, 2013) often investigates the 
effects of consensus uncertainty on internal certainty (IC; an individual’s personal opinion of 
the certainty of a claim) and external certainty (EC; an individual’s estimation of how certain 
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the experts are). Research specific to environmental communication is often concerned with 
— beyond pro-environmental attitudes alone — behavioral intentions toward, say, a 
sustainable lifestyle or specific action (e.g., Morton et al., 2011). The selection of these 
individual pairings between fields of study and outcome variables of interest has largely been 
quite logical. However, the variations and inconsistencies across studies in methods and 
measures have disabled the potential for any meta-analytic conclusions about the relative 
effects of uncertainty frames on these different outcome variables, respectively. 
Table 4 and Table 5 demonstrate six recurring dependent variables. These are 
supportive attitudes/opinions toward the claim, source credibility, internal certainty, external 
certainty, perceived source credibility, perceived risk, and behavioral intentions. Of these, 
“supportive attitudes” have the greatest variation in their operationalization — naturally, 
since there are many distinct attitudes that one could hold in support/opposition to a claim, 
many claims within a topic, many topics within an issue, and many issues represented across 
the different studies. In fact, the remaining five variables all incorporate or infer a type of 
belief support for the claim (especially internal certainty, and also risk perceptions if the 
message was about a risk-related topic). Due to the overlapping, or nested, nature of these 
constructs I will only cover these latter five specific constructs in this dissertation and will 
leave out generalized attitude support in the remaining review, discussion, and analyses. 
Below, for each of these five variables, I mention tentative thoughts regarding differential 
effects of uncertainty types that are suggested by the extant (usually exploratory) research.  
2.8.1. Credibility. Credibility refers to an individual’s perception of the 
trustworthiness/honesty and the expertise/competence of the scientist(s) advancing the claim 
or research finding. These two distinct dimensions of credibility are well-established in a 
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longstanding body of literature (e.g, Hovland, Janis, & Kelly, 1953). For the current study, 
the distinction of these two subdimensions is important, because — as summarized above 
(Table 5) — research indicates that uncertainty frames may have differential effects on each 
dimension (Johnson & Slovic, 1995; Nakayachi et al., 2018). Consistent with this 
preliminary evidence and theorizing, we could imagine that deficient or consensus 
uncertainty might have negative effects on perceived expertise, while technical or scientific 
uncertainty might have positive effects on trustworthiness. As detailed in the methods 
sections, this dissertation recognizes this bipartite theoretical nature of this construct by first 
investigating the appropriate factor structure of a credibility scale, and also modifying the 
measurement model to allow correlated errors between two items within the trustworthiness 
subdimension. 
2.8.2. Internal certainty. Internal certainty refers to an individual’s opinion of the 
degree to which a claim or research finding is (un)certain (e.g., Binder et al., 2016; Chang, 
2015). For example, studies have operationalized this with Likert-style responses to 
statements such as “Please indicate how certain YOU are that _claim_” (e.g., Corbett & 
Durfee, 2004; Dixon & Clarke, 2013), or “I feel certain about the level of environmental risk 
posed by nanotechnology” (Binder et al., 2013). While the literature indicates that internal 
certainty is negatively affected by consensus uncertainty frames (Clarke et al., 2015; Dixon 
& Clarke, 2013), there is either no evidence or mixed findings regarding the other uncertainty 
types. It is difficult to say, at this point, how or if internal certainty would be differentially 
affected by the different uncertainty types. Thus, this is a central question of this dissertation.  
2.8.3. External certainty. External certainty refers to a 2nd-order opinion — an 
opinion about what someone else’s opinion is. Specifically, an individual’s perception of the 
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degree of certainty that scientists hold about a claim or research finding (e.g., Dixon & 
Clarke, 2013; Lewandowsky et al., 2013). This has been defined in two slightly different 
forms, one referring to an individual’s estimation of the internal certainty of an individual 
scientist or scientist group (e.g., Dixon & Clarke, 2013), and the other referring to an 
individual’s estimation of scientists’ consensus (e.g., Johnson, 2017; Koehler, 2016; 
Lewandwosky et al., 2013). For this dissertation, the measure of external certainty will 
encompass both dimensions by using a measure that targets each of the four uncertainty 
types.  
2.8.4. Behavioral intentions. Behavioral intentions refer to an individual’s self-
reported intentions to engage in a behavior that is demonstrates support for — or positive 
attitudes regarding — a claim. It is important to measure this construct not only because it is 
of frequent interest in the extant literature (e.g., Chang, 2015; Rabinobich & Morton, 2012), 
but also because behavior change is often an intended outcome of science communication 
campaigns and behavioral intentions are largely considered the best (though admittedly still 
weak) predictor of actual behavior (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2011).  
The extant literature (based on the reorganization in Table 5) suggest that consensus 
uncertainty has a negative effect on behavioral intentions (Chang, 2013; 2015; van der 
Linden, 2017; 2018), while technical and scientific uncertainty have no direct effect (Morton 
et al., 2011; Nakayachi et al., 2018). This dissertation uses a measure of behavioral intentions 
that explores a wide range of behaviors (e.g., sharing information with others, donating 
money to a cause, voting for legislation) that are all applicable to diverse science issues — 
with the goal of determining which of these behaviors group together to represent an attitude 
of general willingness to take real-life action as a positive response to scientific evidence.  
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2.8.5. Perceived risk. Perceived risk refers to an individual’s estimation of the 
likelihood, salience, and/or severity of a threat (e.g., Binder et al., 2016; Bolsen & 
Druckman, 2017; Han et al., 2011). Of course, this is more relevant in some messages about 
some issues/topics than others. While not applicable to all uncertainty-framed science, it 
included in this study because is important that this study is informative and applicable to the 
risk communication literature, due to the prominence of that field (and risk-related 
issues/topics) in the extant research on the effects of uncertainty frames. Some prior research 
indicates that technical uncertainty can boost risk perceptions because it increases the 
variance in possible outcomes, thus making unlikely threats seem more possible (Han et al., 
2011; Johnson & Slovic, 1995). In contrast, strong consensus (low uncertainty) is associated 
with higher perceived risk (which was consistent with the message; Bolsen & Druckman, 
2017) than a control condition, so we might infer that — unlike technical uncertainty — high 
consensus uncertainty would be associated with lower risk perceptions than a control 
condition. Thus, it may be that technical and consensus uncertainty affect risk perceptions 
differently.  
2.8.6. Manipulation check variables. All the above five attitudinal variables will be 
measured as dependent variables in the survey experiment proposed in Chapter 3. However, 
intuitively, the effects of portrayals of scientists’ own uncertainty (uncertainty frames) on 
perceptions of scientists’ own uncertainty (i.e., external certainty) will be used as a 
manipulation check. As with many experiments, the stimulus manipulations of this 
dissertation were pretested, pilot tested, and repeatedly revised to strategically affect the 
manipulation check items in a desired direction and degree in the main study. Thus, it would 
be tautological at best (and disingenuous at worst) to, then, propose and test hypotheses and 
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research questions about the effect of the manipulation on that manipulation check construct. 
Therefore, the hypotheses and research questions of this dissertation focus only on the four 
1st-order attitudes of internal certainty, risk, credibility, and behavioral intentions, and not on 
external certainty.  
2.9. A Conceptual Model of the Effects of Uncertainty Frames 
The language of this dissertation, thus far, has reflected the extant literature’s focus 
on testing the effect of a message manipulation that uses one or more uncertainty frames. 
This dominant perspective views the message variations as the principal causal force (or at 
least the most interesting one), with individual variables such as motivated reasoning, 
ideology, general worldview, science attitudes, and credibility perceptions positioned as 
moderators of that main effect. 
Despite this being the normative structure, most scholars agree that prior beliefs and 
ideologies, not message characteristics, are the best predictors of responses to persuasive 
messages, especially when those messages are regarding claims in value-laden, politically 
charged, or identity-salient issues (e.g., Kahan et al., 2012). Even in the empirical research on 
the effects of uncertainty frames, several studies have found fully-crossed interactions 
(Tables 4 and 5; e.g., Aklin & Urpelainen, 2014; Nan & Daily, 2015) — suggesting that 
individuals’ prior issue position directly or indirectly affects whether their responses are 
positive or negative, while the uncertainty frame manipulation determines either the 
emergence or the extent of those effects. While it is true that, mathematically, an interaction 
effect can be viewed from either perspective, our choices in modeling these relationships are 
not inconsequential and should be justified by theory and extant findings. Rather, presenting 
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these as moderator effects instead of as interaction effects emphasizes which is the modeled 
direct effect and which is the modeled moderating effect. 
For example, Dieckmann and colleagues (2017) decided to break from the norm and, 
instead, approach their investigation of motivated reasoning in interpretations of uncertainty 
from this latter perspective. Their findings confirm that individuals’ position on 
hierarchical/egalitarian and individualist/collectivist worldview scales (which underlie many 
political beliefs) predict existing opinions about the issue (in this case, climate change), 
which in turn predicts responses to uncertain science. Similarly, Kuhn (2000), in studying 
responses to environmental risk, hypothesized that uncertainty information manipulations 
will not result in overall mean differences in risk perceptions. Rather, Kuhn argued “a pro-
environmental attitude will correlate positively with perceived risk, but the strength of the 
relation will vary according to the presence and type of uncertainty information” (p. 43). This 
hypothesis was supported in a small student sample. 
Importantly, when describing and displaying the conceptual and structural models of 
the constructs relevant to this dissertation, I will follow this non-normative perspective, such 
that the uncertainty frame type is a variable that moderates the main effect of an individuals’ 
prior issue beliefs on their response to information about new scientific research. As such, in 
this study, the “motivated reasoning effect” is the linear relationship between one’s general 
prior opinions about an issue and their subsequent attitudinal responses to a new, specific 
piece of information about a science claim relevant to that issue. However, still, some of the 
analyses do test mean differences in outcome variables across conditions of uncertainty 
frame types (which implicitly takes the normative perspective). 
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 Figure 1 displays a full theoretical model that depicts the relationships of the major 
constructs that have emerged thus far in the literature review, using the perspective of 
Dieckmann et al. and Kuhn (uncertainty frames as a moderator of the effect of prior opinion 
on attitudinal responses). Needless to say, this model is complex. The reader should, at this 
point, be warned that this dissertation will not attempt to test all of these relationships. The 
boundaries of the present investigation will be discussed shortly.  
The following is a brief synthesis of the overall meaning of Figure 1. The relationship 
between worldview and general issue position is dependent on, of course, which science 
issue/topic it is (A). Regarding the three topics investigated in this dissertation, we can expect 
that worldview predicts individuals’ pre-existing general issue position on climate change, 
but not on labeling of GMO foods (Pew Research Center, 2015, 2016) or on the occupational 
hazards (mechanical vibrations) of farming. The latter two issues do differ significantly from 
each other — specifically, in the strength and variance of public opinion — but are both 
distinct from climate change by being apolitical.  
Individuals’ general prior issue position predicts their responses to a message/claim 
of science (B), which is motivated reasoning. It is reasonable to expect that this relationship 
will be stronger in issues where pre-existing issue positions are strong and entrenched (e.g., 
climate change and GMO foods), compared to a more “neutral” issue where people do not 
have strong, entrenched pre-existing issue positions (occupational hazards of farming). 
Any effect of the presence or type of uncertainty frame used in the message would 
moderate (C) the motivated reasoning effect (B). The literature review suggests that 
individuals’ deference to science also predicts responses to messages/claims of science (D), 
but that the uncertainty frame likely would moderate this effect as well (E). Finally, 
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regarding positivist understanding of science (F, G), the degree to which an uncertainty 
frame has a moderating effect is dependent on the degree to which the individual believes 
uncertainty is an inherent, integral component of the scientific process.  
 
Figure 1. Full theoretical model implied by the literature review. 
 
Despite its complexity, this model — like most other theoretical models in our 
discipline — is in fact massively and deceptively over-simplified. For example, it is intuitive 
that deference to science would likely also moderate the effect of worldview on general issue 
position (A), as would positivist understanding of science. In truth, attitudinal responses and 
communication in general just are not amenable to two-dimensional, directional path models. 
However, it is helpful to remember that such models are not intended to be exhaustive 
descriptions of how the brain works, but rather function as a visual aid to help us understand 
theory and contextualize empirical findings. Thus, the caption of Figure 1, which reads 
“implied by the literature review” is quite purposeful.  These relationships are displayed 
because they are suggested by the literature review in Chapters 1 and 2, with the open 
admission that this model — and all others like it —should only be used as a visual aid and 
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not as a mechanistic schematic of human thought. When writing a dissertation about the 
uncertainty attached to science, it is imperative to be open about such uncertainties attached 
to communication science. 
Further, the time and space constraints of one dissertation do not allow a 
comprehensive test of this entire model. As a reminder, the fundamental question facing the 
extant literature is whether and how uncertainty frames affect responses to messages of 
science, and whether different types do so differently. Therefore, this dissertation will 
address this question and break new ground by specifying the relative effects of various 
uncertainty frame types, and the role of motivated reasoning, in a controlled experiment. 
Portions of the model that are not necessary for these purposes will not be tested in this 
dissertation. 
For example, in the full theoretical model, significant conceptual and analytic 
complexity is introduced with the inclusion of positivist understanding of science as a 
moderator (F, G) of interaction effects. Therefore, for this dissertation, this construct will be 
used only as a control variable. Similarly, the role of deference to science as a predictor of 
the outcome variables — and its interaction with uncertainty frame type — is implied by 
extant theory and evidence, but quantifying the effects of deference to science is not the 
primary aim of this dissertation. As such, it will also be used as a control variable. The scope 
of this dissertation is displayed in Figure 2. Figure 2 also displays the hypotheses discussed 
in the next section. 
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Figure 2. Conceptual model for this dissertation, with the hypothesized relationships and research questions 
presented in Chapter 2. 
 
Note. IC=internal certainty; Risk=perceived risk; Cred=credibility; BI=behavioral intentions. 
HE=hierarchical/egalitarian; InCo=individualist/collectivist; CC = climate change; GMO = genetically modified 
foods; VM = vibrating machinery.  
Def=Deficient; Tec=Technical; Sci=Scientific; Con=Consensus; Ctrl=Control (no uncertainty frame). 
 
2.10. Summary, Hypotheses, and Research Questions 
2.10.1. Prior opinions as predictors of responses to science. This review has 
illustrated that prior issue beliefs predicts responses to science (via motivated reasoning), and 
in some science issues, those prior issue beliefs are predicted by broader worldviews. 
Further, the literature suggests that different types of uncertainty frames may result in 
significantly different responses to science messages, that uncertainty frames in general are 
fertile ground for motivated reasoning, and that some uncertainty frame types may facilitate 
more motivated reasoning than others. Thus, in this section, I first offer hypotheses that 
specify the effect of prior beliefs (and sometimes worldview) on attitudinal responses to new 
science findings (via motivated reasoning). I then pose research questions about how these 
responses might differ across variations across the four uncertainty frame types (that is, how 
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the motivated reasoning relationship between prior beliefs and attitudinal responses is 
moderated by uncertainty frame type). Specifically, consistent with the motivated reasoning 
literature, I expect that: 
H1: Individuals’ prior general issue position will predict attitudinal responses to a new 
claim of scientific research, such that support (opposition) in general prior issue positions 
will be positively (negatively) associated with the attitudinal response variables of internal 
certainty, risk perceptions, credibility, and behavioral intentions. 
As briefly previewed in Chapter 1.1, this dissertation tests these, and other, 
relationships separately in three distinct issues: one socially contentious issue (climate 
change) that is divided by political partisanship, one socially contentious issue (GMO foods) 
that is not divided on party lines, and one issue (occupational hazards of farming) that is — 
to the best of our knowledge — neither widely contended nor is divided on party lines. 
In the context of climate change specifically, we can expect worldview to be 
correlated with attitudinal responses to messages about climate change, as is well 
documented in prior research. But a more immediate cause of these responses is the existing 
issue beliefs that an individual already holds (H1). This is because in a politicized issue like 
climate change, prior opinions about the specific issue likely follow from individuals’ 
worldview. But a persons’ prior issue opinions are more closely and directly linked to 
attitudinal responses to information about that issue than their general values of, say, 
egalitarianism are — and may even be a literal consequent of those broad worldviews. 
Dieckmann and colleagues (2017) advance this argument and find that, indeed, prior issue 
position mediated the effect of worldview on attitudinal responses to science messages. Thus, 
we can expect also expect that, specific to climate change: 
61 
 
H2a: Individuals’ prior general issue position about climate change will mediate the effect of 
worldview on attitudinal responses of internal certainty, risk perceptions, credibility, and 
behavioral intentions. 
and 
H2b: In the case of climate change, more egalitarian and collectivist worldviews will be 
associated with more supportive prior issue positions, relative to more hierarchical and 
individualist worldviews. 
It is not clear, though, whether the mediation predicted in H2a can be expected to be 
full mediation or partial mediation. That is, while we can expect prior issue position about 
climate change in general to explain a significant amount of the effect of worldview on the 
attitudinal responses, it may or may not explain all the effect. Still, though, because of 
motivated reasoning and the partisan politicization of climate change (specifically), we can 
expect that: 
H2c: In the case of climate change, any effect of worldview on attitudinal responses not 
explained by prior issue position will be such that more egalitarian and collectivist 
worldviews are associated with more supportive attitudinal responses, relative to more 
hierarchical and individualist worldviews.  
Unlike climate change, the issues of GMO foods and occupational hazards of farming 
(the dangers of vibrating machinery) are not associated with partisan liberal or conservative 
politics. Therefore, because the worldview dimensions of hierarchical/egalitarian (HE) and 
individualist/collectivist (InCo) are proxies for political ideology and party affiliation (in the 
American two-party system), we can expect that: 
62 
 
H3: The effect of worldview dimensions on prior issue position is dependent on the issue, 
such that the relationship between the worldview dimensions (HE and InCo) and prior issue 
position will be stronger in a partisan-politicized topic compared to science topics that are 
not attached to partisan politics. 
2.10.2. Relative effects of uncertainty types. It is clear that a) uncertainty is inherent 
in accurate science communication, b) uncertainty is often framed in four distinct types, c) 
there are discrepant perspectives and evidence about the effects and ideal uses of uncertainty 
frames, and d) little regard has been given to distinguishing the nature and effects of these 
disparate frames that reside under the generalized monolith of uncertainty. Thus, it is 
incumbent upon researchers to investigate whether, when, and/or why different uncertainty 
types correspond with increases or decreases in attitudinal support for a science claim, and 
how they interact with other variables that been identified as predictors of responses to 
uncertainty (e.g., prior issue position, trust in science). This must be done within the controls 
of a large experiment, where differences in effects of all uncertainty types can be observed 
across a constant methodology (issue, sample, dependent measures, etc.). However, there 
have been very few scholarly inquiries to inform such questions.  
While this dissertation structures prior issue position as the main effect on attitudinal 
responses, it is still important to use this opportunity to first observe any mean differences in 
attitudinal responses across the uncertainty frame types — in part because the question has 
been a consistent focus of the extant literature.  
Of the four uncertainty frame types, the type with the most (and most clear) 
experimental evidence supporting causal effects is consensus uncertainty. Table 5 indicates 
significant support for expecting that, relative to a control condition of no uncertainty frame, 
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portrayals of consensus uncertainty will result in less supportive attitudinal responses (e.g., 
lower certainty, lower perceived credibility). This is also supported by the theoretical 
interpretation that consensus uncertainty portrays an absence of an identifiable answer or 
verdict; in fact, it does not even convey a tentative or vague answer. Due to these arguments 
and the extant experimental evidence, it can be expected that: 
H4a: Overall (controlling for relevant individual prior attitudes and demographics), a claim 
of scientific research containing a consensus uncertainty frame will correspond with lower 
internal certainty, perceived risk, credibility, and behavioral intentions, compared to claims 
portrayed without any uncertainty frame. 
While it is still unclear from the review of Chapter 2 whether scientific and technical 
uncertainty frames have positive effects on attitudinal responses that are significantly 
different than the control, it seems clear that they do not have significant negative effects.  
Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that responses to consensus uncertainty will be different 
than responses to scientific or technical uncertainty, such that: 
H4b: Overall, (controlling for relevant individual prior attitudes and demographics) a claim 
of scientific research containing a consensus uncertainty frame will correspond with lower 
internal certainty, perceived risk, credibility, and behavioral intentions compared to claims 
containing a technical or scientific uncertainty frame. 
As reviewed above, deficient uncertainty has not been studied often in experimental 
contexts, but it is quite similar to consensus uncertainty in that it communicates that there is 
currently no clear answer, not even a tentative or vague one. Further, exploratory focus group 
data suggests that the public views deficient uncertainty as the least preferred type of 
uncertainty for experts to have (Miles & Frewer, 2003). As such, it would not be surprising 
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to observe less supportive attitudes in response to claims containing a deficient uncertainty 
frame, compared to a claim containing scientific uncertainty, technical uncertainty or no 
uncertainty. However, the current theorizing and scant empirical evidence does not justify a 
hypothesis.  
Similarly, experimental evidence and theory suggests that technical and scientific 
uncertainty frames can be associated with responses of heightened credibility perceptions, 
and confidence in the findings. This would fit the explanation that technical and scientific 
uncertainty frames communicate that scientists have produced an answer that is trustworthy, 
and the uncertainty frame offers more specificity to that answer.  However, due to mixed and 
minimal evidence, a hypothesis is not justified at this time. Thus, I also ask: 
RQ1:  Overall (controlling for relevant individual prior attitudes, behaviors, and 
demographics), how do individuals’ responses to uncertain science (by way of internal 
certainty, perceived risk, credibility, and behavioral intentions) compare across claims 
containing different types of uncertainty frames (four types and no-uncertainty), within each 
of the three issues? 
Kuhn (2000) found that portrayals of consensus uncertainty cause individuals’ 
environmental risk perceptions to be most polarized — and aligned more closely with their 
pre-existing environmental ideology.  This motivated reasoning effect was strongest in the 
consensus uncertainty and the no-uncertainty condition, and weakest in the deficient 
uncertainty and technical uncertainty condition. As summarized above, a reasonable 
theoretical argument to explain this finding is that consensus uncertainty (unlike the other 
uncertainty types) actually provides support for dissenting opinions (in the form of dissenting 
expert opinion), rather than only providing room for doubt. Thus, I expect that  
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H5: Attitudinal responses (internal certainty, perceived risk, credibility, and behavioral 
intentions) to a claim of science will be more strongly predicted by prior issue position when 
the claim is portrayed with a frame of consensus uncertainty, than when it is portrayed with 
any of the other (deficient, technical, or scientific) uncertainty frame types.  
The potential differential motivated reasoning effects of other frame types are less 
clear. Tables 4 and 5 indicate that there are very few instances where one particular 
combination of uncertainty type, issue, and dependent variable has been tested more than 
once. Therefore, due to the theoretical support for competing perspectives on the effects of 
general uncertainty, and due to scant empirical evidence about the relationship between each 
uncertainty type and each dependent variable, it is not prudent to offer confident hypotheses 
about how the other three uncertainty types compare with each other (or the control) in their 
respective moderating effects on the relationships between prior opinion and the outcome 
variables. Thus, for deficient, technical, and scientific uncertainty frame types, I pose the 
following research questions regarding the relationship between the uncertainty types, prior 
opinion, and the three attitudinal outcome variables. 
As discussed in the review above, the specific type of uncertainty frame (or lack 
thereof) that is used to portray this claim may result in different responses to the message, 
thereby moderating the relationship between prior issue position and attitudinal responses. To 
assess this interaction (or, stated differently, to compare the motivated reasoning effect across 
uncertainty types), I ask: 
RQ2:  How do the relationships between prior issue position and the attitudinal responses 
(internal certainty, perceived risk, credibility, and behavioral intentions) compare across the 
four different frame types (and the no uncertainty frame)? 
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It is also important to determine whether uncertainty frames, overall, do in fact 
facilitate or catalyze motivated reasoning relative to the absence of uncertainty frames. While 
we cannot yet make confident predictions about comparisons between each frame type 
regarding this effect, we can expect in general — due to the heightened ambiguity of 
uncertainty frames — that: 
H6: The motivated reasoning effects presented in H1 will be stronger in science news that 
contains (any) one of the four uncertainty frames, compared to science news without (i.e., 
science news with no uncertainty frame). 
An investigation of these questions will clarify the relative (potentially different) 
effects of the four uncertainty frames in science communication — and their interplay with 
individuals’ prior general issue positions — across a consistent and robust methodology. 
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Chapter 3:  Methods 
The hypotheses and research questions presented in Chapters 1 and 2 were 
investigated through an online survey experiment. Here in Chapter 3, I outline the design, 
sampling, measures, and analyses involved in this study. Each of the measures of the 
outcomes variables was assessed in a pilot test in order to check the reliability and 
dimensionality of the measures (reported in Section 3.4), and to guide any necessary 
revisions. Further, the experimental manipulations (described in Section 3.5) were pilot-
tested to check for appropriate strength and validity (results reported in Chapter 4). 
3.1. Design 
3.1.1. Conditions. In a between-subjects three (issue) by five (frame type) factorial 
experimental design, participants (n=2247) responded to demographic and attitudinal self-
report items and also read a simulated news article that reported on scientists’ summary of a 
new scientific finding.  This news article was the experimental manipulation, and as such it 
was manipulated to vary across three issues/claims (the effect of climate change on farmers, 
the effect of GMO labeling laws on farmers, and the effect of exposure to vibrating 
machinery on farmers) and five types of uncertainty portrayals (deficient uncertainty frame, 
technical uncertainty frame, scientific uncertainty frame, consensus uncertainty frame, and a 
control condition with no uncertainty content). All pre-test measures (demographic and 
attitudinal predictor variables) and post-test measures (responses to the stimulus message) 
were administered in each of the conditions. 
Table 6 
 
Conditions by Uncertainty Type and Issue 
 
Frame Type Deficient Consensus Technical Scientific Control 
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Condition # 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Note: CC=climate change effects; GMO=GMO labeling effects; VM=vibrating machinery 
effects. 
 
As previewed in Chapter 1, the purpose of using three separate issues is test the 
hypotheses and research questions in diverse contexts, since many effects may be issue-
specific. Due to this dissertation’s focus on motivated reasoning, this experiment uses three 
issues that might vary with respect to what (and how) prior opinions and ideologies influence 
responses to claims of science. Specifically, the issues include a science issue in which much 
of public has strong prior opinions driven by political ideology (climate change; Kahan et al., 
2011), a science issue in which much of the public has strong prior opinions that are not 
driven by politics (GMO foods; Hassell & Stroud, 2018; Pew, 2015), and a science issue in 
which most of the public does not have strong prior opinions and is also not driven by 
politics (occupational hazards of farming — vibrating machinery in particular). Overall, from 
a motivated reasoning standpoint, this set of three issues is quite heterogeneous. The 
relationships between worldview and prior issue position on these issues is also hypothesized 
in H2a,b and is reported in Chapter 4. 
In addition to the strategic ways in which they differ, these three issues were also 
chosen because of how they are alike. That is, each of the three claims that were presented in 
the news articles has a strong level of actual scientific support in the real world, and each of 
the three claims was a scientific finding that suggested tangible risk to farmers and 
agriculture workers. In the climate change conditions, the claim was of the negative effects of 
climate change on farmers and agriculture workers. In the GMO conditions, the claim was of 
the negative effects of GMO labeling laws on farmers and agriculture workers. In the 
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farming occupational hazards conditions, the claim was of the negative effects of vibrating 
machinery on farmers and agriculture workers. Regarding the latter topic, while scientists are 
confident (and alarmed) that extended contact with vibrating machinery (tractors, power 
tools, etc.) is extremely damaging to musculoskeletal health (e.g., Langer, Ebbesen, & 
Kordestani, 2015; Lings & Leboeuf-Yde, 2000), there is no indication that significant 
portions of the general public have strong (or any) pre-existing opinions about this issue, and 
the opinions that do exists are likely not politically motivated. Even occupational health and 
safety professionals are largely unaware of the large body of evidence regarding this 
occupational hazard, as one survey found that 70% of a sample of almost 3,000 occupational 
safety professionals had a “less than basic” understanding of the health risks of long-term 
exposure to whole-body vibration (Paschold & Sergeev, 2009). 
The use of four different uncertainty frame types, as well as a control condition, 
enables tests that inform H4a,b, H5, H6, RQ1, and RQ2. These tests make comparisons of the 
levels of post-stimulus attitudinal responses across the uncertainty type conditions, 
respectively, within each of the three issues. 
3.1.2. Procedure. In each of the 15 conditions, participants first were informed of the 
general nature and purpose of the study, and were given the opportunity to indicate their 
consent to participate. They also were reminded that they could cease participation at any 
time and still receive their full compensation. After consenting to participate, participants 
were reminded that their careful attention to each individual item on each question was very 
important, and then were asked to respond to a set of pre-stimulus demographic and 
attitudinal questions.  Some of these were used to build a quota-based sample that 
approximated current U.S. proportions (age, education, gender, political party affiliation), 
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some of these were used as control variables and predictor variables in various analyses 
(education, gender, political party affiliation, general issue position, hierarchical/egalitarian 
worldview, individualist/collectivist worldview, deference to science, and frequency of news 
media consumption), and some of these were used as distractor items (ethnicity, family size) 
to obfuscate the true focus of the study and dilute any priming effect of the measures that 
were most salient to the later measures. 
Then, the main stimulus message — a news article (which varied by the three issues 
and the five framing manipulations) — was displayed. The stimulus is described in detail in 
Section 3.6 and exemplar stimuli from each of the three issues are available in Appendix A. 
After participants read the news article, they responded to a series of questions that measured 
the outcome variables. The full list and operational details of these variables is given in 
Section 3.5. After completing these measures, participants were directed to a debriefing page 
that explained the true nature of the study, provided contact information for the principal 
investigator, and thanked them for their participation.  
3.2. Sample 
3.2.1. Sample sourcing. Participants were recruited using Qualtrics 
(www.qualtrics.com/online-sample), a 3rd-party survey recruitment, software, and 
management service that offers a “Panels” product that assembles custom-ordered samples 
for survey research by selecting the participants recruited by a large assortment of other, 
traditional market research panels to fill the particular requirements of any desired 
proportions of demographics (e.g., age, education) or attitudinal characteristics (e.g., political 
opinion). The participant recruitment is usually done via ads on social media, traditional 
websites, and via email — usually offering incentives such as gift cards or money in 
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exchange for participation. Opt-in online panels are frequent in social science research and 
participants in them perform similar to nationally-representative probability samples and 
much better than student convenience samples (Bartneck, Duenser, Moltchanova, Zawieska, 
2015; Hauser & Scwartz, 2015; Kees, Berry, Burton, & Sheehan, 2017; Leeper & Mullinix, 
2015). Also, Qualtrics claims that the participants they recruit are more naïve to academic 
survey research and experimental manipulations, compared to the “professional survey-
takers” that flood the worker pools of platforms like Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (Mturk). 
Further, as described in Section 3.2.3, Qualtrics enables many different methods of ensuring 
data quality that are either not feasible or not economical in data collection platforms like 
Mturk tasks, random-digit dialing, and paper-and-pencil surveys. For these reasons, many 
other scholars have used Qualtrics panels to conduct survey research, including survey 
experiments — like the present one — that specifically tested the effects of message 
variations on attitudinal responses in the contexts of climate change (Feldman & Hart, 2016) 
and GMO foods (Yue, Zhao, & Kuzma, 2015). 
Because Qualtrics Panels procures participants from a variety of other market 
research panels — each with their own terms and agreements for participation — the 
compensation and incentives for participation vary within the sample. That is, some 
participants were paid slightly more or less than others. The project managers at Qualtrics 
estimated that the value of the compensation for each of the participants in the final sample 
ranged in value between $1.50 and $5.00. 
3.2.2. Sample size required by PROCESS and SEM. The literature suggests that 
framing manipulations often exhibit small effects (e.g., η² <.059, as defined by Cohen, 1988). 
Because I will be using Hayes’ PROCESS (see Chapter 3.7; Hayes, 2017) to test interaction 
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effects, the required sample size can be estimated with G*Power’s recommendation for linear 
multiple regression. Detecting effects as small as r²=.02 with two predictor variables with 
power (1-ß) at .80 requires 485 observations per test. The PROCESS tests using the smallest 
portions of the sample (H5, RQ2) will include the participants from five unique conditions 
(one of each uncertainty frame type), which equates to a minimum of 97 observations per 
condition (a total n of 1455). To err on the side of caution — anticipating the possibility of 
missing data, speeding, insufficient attention, and/or η²<.02 — the full sample (after filtering 
and cleaning) consisted of about 150 participants per condition (target n=2250, resulting in a 
final total n of 2247 valid cases for analysis in the main study; or about 750 observations in 
each PROCESS model test), as well as a prior, additional 622 participants for the 15-
condition pilot test of the scales and manipulations (Section 3.4). 
The SEM portions of the analyses use 37 indicators to comprise the latent factors and 
observed variables. A general best-practice convention is to have at least 10 observations (in 
this case, participants) per observed indicator in the model – which sets the minimum sample 
size for testing the SEM model at 370 participants. The sample size mentioned above (target 
n=2250; 150 per condition) allowed for the test of SEM model fit with the fewest participants 
(containing only participants who were in a control condition) to have 443 participants. All 
other SEM models were tested using subsamples varying from 740 to 2247 participants. 
3.2.3. Sample demographics. Both the pilot test and the main study used quotas set 
to match educational attainment levels of the 2010 census, an even split in gender, and an 
even split in political party affiliation (to ensure varied worldviews). The specific resulting 
proportions of several demographic characteristics within the main study sample are 
displayed in Table 7. 
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Table 7 
Demographics for Main Study Sample 
Age 18-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65 66-75 75+ 
% 6.5 13.7 12.1 16.0 27.2 20.0 4.5 
Ethnicity AmInd Asian Black/AA Hisp/Lat Haw Wh/Eur  
% 1.6 3.3 8.7 5.1 0.1 83  
Education <H.S. H.S. Some U AA/AS BA/BS Ma./Dr.  
% 2.4 25.5 22.4 11.7 22.8 15.2  
Field* HardSci SocSci Human Bus Comp Arts Voc Other 
% 9.7 15.0 7.3 15.4 7.1 5.4 5.5  
Gender Female Male Other No Answer    
% 49.8 49.8 0.4 0.0    
Political Con Lib      
% 50 50      
Note: AmInd= American Indian; Black/AA= Black or African American; Hisp/Lat=Hispanic or Latina/o; 
Haw=Hawaiian or Pacific Islander; Wh/Eur=White, European, Middle East; <H.S.= less than high school 
diploma; H.S. = high school diploma; Some U = some college, no degree; AA/AS = associate’s degree; BA/BS 
= bachelor’s degree; Ma./Dr. = Master’s or Doctorate; HardSci=traditional sciences; SocSci= social sciences; 
Human=humanities; Bus=applied business; Comp=computational and informational sciences; Arts=fine arts; 
Voc=technical/vocational training; Con=conservative; Lib=liberal. 
 
3.2.3. Design features ensuring data quality. In the main study, several steps were 
taken to ensure that only high-quality data (i.e., participants who gave thoughtful, honest 
responses and attention to the stimulus) entered the sample. Naturally, those who did not 
agree to the consent form (n=354) did not participate in the study. Further, immediately prior 
to the main stimulus message (a simulated newspaper article), participants were asked to 
indicate whether they agreed to read the news article in full. Those who did not agree 
(n=154) were automatically eliminated from the sample. 
For further data quality, after advancing past the stimulus, participants were required 
to respond to two comprehension check questions that asked about a) the topic of the 
stimulus news article, and b) the directionality of the effect found by the study that was 
reported in the stimulus news article. Qualtrics filtered out 800 participants that failed this 
test by answering at least one of these questions wrong. It is worth noting that these questions 
were not just “attention checks” (e.g., “Please select answer choice “B””), but required an 
74 
 
understanding of the stimulus news article. Also, the survey program did not allow 
participants to navigate back to the news article when answering the comprehension checks. 
The stimulus (described in detail in Section 3.6; exemplars presented in Appendix A) 
was presented on a page by itself, and the Qualtrics’ software automatically required 
participants to spend at least 15 seconds viewing that page. The software also tracked the 
time spent viewing the stimulus, which is a metric that was then used for post-hoc data 
cleaning (Section 3.3). Further, Qualtrics also timed participants’ total elapsed survey 
participation time, and filtered out participants passed the attention checks but completed the 
study too quickly (“speeding”). The cutoff for minimum total survey time was set by the 
industry standard method — which is finding the median elapsed time (13.1 minutes) of the 
first 10% of the sample, and then filtering out the participants (from both the first 10% and 
all future participants) who completed the survey in less than 1/3 of that median time (4.3 
minutes). This step eliminated 82 participants. Lastly, Qualtrics assessed the response 
patterns of each remaining participant and deleted 34 participants who exhibited “straight-
lining” — where item responses follow a repetitive pattern (e.g., all 7s or all 4s). 
In sum, Qualtrics filtered out 1070 participants who did the following: consented to 
participate in the study and would have filled one of the demographic quotas (education, 
political affiliation, gender, etc.), but then failed to pass one of the screening processes and 
quality filters that were implemented either during or after their participation. These 1070 
participants were each replaced until the demographic quotas were filled with valid 
observations that passed all the screening processes and quality checks. Thus, the participants 
who comprised the Qualtrics sample (n=2435) that was delivered to the principal investigator 
for analysis each satisfied all of the requisite characteristics set by Qualtrics: stated a promise 
75 
 
to read the news article in full, spent at least 15 seconds viewing the news article, correctly 
responded to each of two comprehension checks, had a total elapsed survey time greater than 
1/3 of the median, and did not exhibit a straight-lining response pattern.  
3.3 Data Cleaning 
Section 3.2.3 explained Qualtrics design features that were employed before and 
during data collection to ensure data quality, including a promise to read the whole news 
article, two comprehension checks (requiring 100% accuracy on both), a speeding check 
(enforcing minimum total completion time of 260 seconds), and an automatic algorithm-
based “straight-lining” detection. In total, 2,435 participants completed the study, filled the 
demographic quotas, and passed all of these a priori Qualtrics filters.  
This dataset was then cleaned via several additional quality checks. First, I manually 
checked the entire dataset for patterns of straight-lining in all or part of each participant’s 
responses that may have been missed by the automatic Qualtrics filter. As a result, 23 (about 
1%) of the participants were removed from the sample for exhibiting straight-lining patterns 
in their responses, leaving 2,412 responses. 
Next, I removed outliers in total study completion time and in time spent viewing the 
stimulus. This is important because outliers on the low end of these two variables likely 
indicate lower attention to the items and/or the stimulus, and outliers on the high end likely 
indicate that the participant completed the study in more than one sitting and/or with 
distractions. Either type of outlier would likely contaminate the study results.  
Of the 2,412 remaining cases, the total time of study completion was right-skewed 
due to a few high outliers (mean=1,306 sec.; median=1,020; SD=1,353; min=268; 
max=18,813), with 22 participants taking less than 6 minutes (360 sec.) to complete and 74 
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taking more than 1 hour (3600 sec.) to complete. In order to guide estimations of a) a 
reasonable total time of study completion and b) a reasonable total time spent viewing the 
stimulus — specifically amongst respondents who are carefully attending to each survey item 
and the stimuli — an informal pretest of the study procedure was conducted among a 
convenience sample of 35 non-scientist acquaintances of the principal investigator. For this 
informal pretest, participants were evenly distributed between the five GMO labeling 
conditions. The mean total elapsed time of study completion was 14.4 minutes (864 sec.), 
with the two shortest completion times being 8.2 minutes (492 sec.) and 8.7 minutes (522 
sec.), and the two longest completion times being 19.8 minutes (1188 sec.) and 22.3 minutes 
(2,338 sec). 
It seems clear from the informal pretest and the distribution of the main study sample 
that completion times over 1 hour (3600 sec.) likely indicate interrupted participation. Thus, 
these 74 participants were removed. Also, the 22 participants who completed the study in less 
than 360 seconds (6 minutes) were removed. 
Of the remaining 2,316 participants, the time spent viewing the stimulus was also 
right-skewed due to a few high outliers (mean=128 sec.; median=103; SD=120; min=16; 
max=2191), with 54 participants viewing the article for less than 20 seconds (<5 seconds 
more than the required minimum) and 15 participants viewing the article for between 600 
seconds (10 min.) and 2200 seconds (36 minutes). In the informal pretest, the mean time 
spent viewing the stimulus (reading the news article) was 143 seconds (2.4 min.), with the 
two shortest being 32 and 46 seconds and the two longest being 303 and 343 seconds. 
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It seems clear from the informal pretest and the sample distribution that stimulus 
viewing times less than 20 seconds and greater than 10 minutes are not reasonable. To 
increase data quality, these 69 participants were removed from the sample, leaving 2,247.  
It is possible that some participants could “speed” through the questions but take a 
long time viewing the stimulus, resulting in a total study completion time of >360 seconds. 
To check for this, each participant’s total time spent answering questions was computed by 
subtracting their stimulus viewing time from their total study completion time. Of the 
remaining 2,247 cases, none had a total time spent answering questions that was less than 
300 seconds (5 minutes). None were deleted for this cause.  
These data cleaning steps left 2,247 participants in the sample, for which the total 
completion times ranged from 363 to 3,586 seconds (mean = 1,130 seconds; median = 1,014; 
SD = 526) and the stimulus viewing times ranged from 20 to 598 seconds (mean = 124 
seconds; median = 106; SD = 83). These 2247 participants are the sample used for all 
analyses in the main study.  
3.4. Pilot Test 
Before the main study, a pilot test was conducted to assess the stimulus 
manipulations, and to verify the reliability of each of the multi-item scales. Another purpose 
was to determine via exploratory factor analysis (EFA) whether the items in each measure 
group into single factors (or, instead, each measure is better explained by multiple factors) 
that are distinct from the other measures/factors (discriminant validity).  
For this pilot test, 622 participants, also obtained from Qualtrics, were randomly 
assigned to one of the 15 conditions, and completed study procedures that were identical to 
the main study (described in Section 3.1), with a few minor differences. First, the pilot test 
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did not require participants to promise to read the entire news article, did not eliminate 
participants who exhibited straight-lining response patterns, and did not eliminate 
participants based on study completion time, and did include participants who viewed the 
stimulus for 15-20 seconds. These modifications were implemented in the main study at the 
suggestion of a research adviser to increase data quality. Second, the pilot test contained a 
pre-stimulus four-item Likert-type measure of positivist understanding of science — due to 
its relevance to the present topic and its observed effects in prior literature — with the intent 
of using it as a control variable in the analyses. This measure was not administered as a pre-
stimulus independent variable in the main study because it did not demonstrate adequate 
reliability (Cronbach’s α=.59), was not correlated with the outcome variables, and came 
under suspicion of priming participants to think about the inherent role of uncertainty in 
science. Instead, it was included at the very end of the main study, and is not used in this 
dissertation’s analyses. All other differences between the pilot test and the main study were 
adjustments made to the measures and are discussed in detail in Section 3.5. 
The full results of the pilot test are interspersed in Section 3.5, Chapter 4, and 
Appendix B. Specifically, the results of the analyses indicating the reliability and factor 
structure of each scale are reported in Table 8, Table 12, and are also explained individually 
in greater detail in Section 3.5 (Measures) alongside the description of each respective 
measure. The results of the manipulation check are presented in Chapter 4. 
3.5. Measures 
These sections describe the content and structure of the measures used in this study. 
Each measure was identical across all conditions, with the exception of prior issue position 
(explained below), and the measures are presented in the order that they appeared in the 
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survey. For some measures, the results of the pilot test prompted small changes to some scale 
items. All of these instances are discussed here, alongside the description of those measures. 
Appendix B contains the full list of individual items in each measure, as well as the means 
and standard deviations for each scale and individual items, and also the factor loadings of 
each item as indicators of their respective latent variables. 
The multi-item scales in this study were used for two purposes. The first purpose is to 
create mean scales that were used as individual variables in linear regression analyses (see 
Section 3.7 for a full description of the analyses). Therefore, in the next section (3.5.1) — to 
justify creating mean scales — the description of the format of each multi-item scale is 
accompanied by a mention of its reliability and basic evidence for the dimensionality of that 
scale. The dimensionality of each scale will be informed by a preliminary set of EFAs 
performed within each scale separately. I will refer to these as “local EFAs.” 
The second purpose of the multi-item scales is to determine whether the items load 
into groups where each item is a strong indicator of the latent variable (convergent validity), 
and whether the items are only indicators of one latent variable (discriminant validity). This 
is the exploration and confirmation of the measurement model. To do this, I first perform an 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) on a random split-half of the sample and then a 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) on the remaining half. This EFA, unlike the local EFA, 
uses all items of the measures of all variables that are included in the structural model 
hypothesized in H1 and H3. I will refer to this as the “global EFA.” The latent variables 
indicated by this sequence of analyses will —together — be used in testing the basic 
structural model via SEM.  
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Therefore, in Section 3.5.2, I report the methods and results of the global EFA, which 
explores a measurement model including all of the items of (only the) variables used to test 
hypotheses and research questions regarding the basic structural model (i.e., variables used in 
the SEM). For example, the deference to science scale is examined for its own reliability and 
dimensionality in Section 3.5.1, using a local EFA, in order to justify the creation of a mean 
scale. But deference to science is not used in the tests of the structural model informing H1 
and H3, so its scale items are not included in the global EFA used to specify that larger 
measurement model. Similarly, local EFA results for the ECgen and EU type scales 
(individually) are presented in Section 3.5.1, but because they are not used to inform the 
hypotheses about the structural model (or any hypotheses, for that matter), they are not 
included in the global EFA of the measurement model in Section 3.5.2. 
Descriptions of the measure of family size (a filler or distractor measure) and of 
positivist understanding of science (not administered in the main study) are withheld for 
space considerations. 
3.5.1 Measure format, structure, and reliability. Of the measures described in this 
section, several are multi-item scales that are intended to measure one construct. The 
reliability (Cronbach’s α) of the full (all items) version of each of these multi-item scales — 
for both the pilot test and the main study — is presented in Table 8. Also, Table 8 presents 
basic evidence of the degree to which each full, unmodified scale can reasonably be 
considered to be unidimensional. As a result of these analyses, some scales were slightly 
modified. The corresponding values of the modified versions are given in Table 12. 
Evidence of dimensionality was provided using Mplus (version 7.11; Muthen & 
Muthen, 2013) to perform individual local EFAs with 100% of the pilot test sample and, 
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separately, a random 50% split of the main study sample (Table 8). Each local EFA includes 
all of one scale’s items and employs maximum likelihood (ML) estimation with oblique 
(geomin) rotation, since emerging factors would likely be correlated. Inferences about 
dimensionality were guided by Kaiser’s eigenvalue criteria, Catell’s scree plot, and parallel 
analysis (i.e., eigenvalue Monte Carlo analysis with 50 iterations). Other fit criteria 
applicable to EFAs with ML estimation – like chi-square test of model fit, root-mean-square 
error of approximation (RMSEA), comparative fit index (CFI), and standardized root-mean-
square residual (SRMR) – are not provided in Mplus for two-factor solutions emerging from 
four or fewer indicators. To remind the reader, Section 3.5.2 will provide in-depth validation 
(using RMSEA, CFI, and SRMR) of a combined measurement model by reporting the results 
of a global EFA performed with all items used to measure the latent variables involved in the 
structural model, followed by a CFA reported in Section 4.1.  
Table 8 
Reliability and Basic Structure of Full Unedited Multi-Item Scales 
 
 Main Study  Pilot Test 
 α ev1 ev2 f1var f2var  α ev1 ev2 f1var f2var 
Prior(cc) .90 3.60 0.66 73% 12%  .87 3.35 0.79 67% 16% 
Prior(gmo) .88 3.47 0.60 69% 12%  .82 2.93 0.89 58% 18% 
Prior(vm)* .74 2.61 0.84 49% 18%  .53 1.79 1.11 36% 22% 
Def2Sci .76 2.36 0.65 59% 16%  .70 1.98 0.94   
IndiColl .78 2.98 1.04 48% 17%  .79 2.92 1.11 49% 18% 
HierEgal .90 4.00 0.76 66% 13%  .87 3.68 1.00 61% 17% 
ICgen .84 2.29 0.48 77% 16%  .80 2.16 0.56 72% 19% 
Risk .85 3.44 1.09 57% 18%  .83 3.30 0.96 55% 16% 
Credible .93 5.33 0.80 67% 10%  .92 5.17 0.78 64% 10% 
BehaveIn .76 2.58 1.14 51% 22%  .78 2.68 1.00 54% 20% 
Note: α= Cronbach’s alpha; ev1= initial eigenvalue for one factor; ev2= initial eigenvalue for second factor; 
f1var= variance explained by one factor; f2var= additional variance explained by second factor; Prior= prior 
issue position; Def2Sci= deference to science; IndiColl= individualist/collectivist; HierEgal= 
hierarchical/egalitarian; ICgen= general internal certainty; Risk= six-item perceived risk scale; BehaveIn= five-
item behavioral intentions scale; Credibility= perceived credibility; Full list of all items in each scale is 
available in Appendix B; *= scale items changed between pilot test and main study.  
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Demographics. Participants provided their age by choosing one option (with one 
option for 18-25, response options in five-year increments from 25 to 75, one option for 76+, 
and one option for Prefer Not to Answer), indicated their ethnicity by choosing one or more 
options (with response options of “American Indian, First Nation, or Alaska Native,” “Asian 
or Indian subcontinent,” “Black or African American,” “Hispanic/Latino,” “Native Hawaiian 
or Pacific Islander,” White/European/Middle Eastern,” or Prefer Not to Answer), and 
indicated their gender by choosing one option (Male, Female, Other/Non-conforming, or 
Prefer Not to Answer).  
Political affiliation. For sampling purposes, participants were asked “How would you 
describe your own personal political opinions?” with response options of “Conservative,” 
“Moderate,” “Liberal,” and “Choose not to answer.” Responses on this question were not 
used for the study’s analyses, but rather were used by Qualtrics to assemble a sample that 
was 50% self-reported conservative and 50% self-reported liberal.  
Education. Participants’ general educational attainment was assessed by asking them 
to indicate their highest level of completed coursework, with response options of “Less than 
a high school diploma,” “High school diploma or equivalent (e.g., GED),” “Some college, no 
degree,” “Associates degree (e.g., AA, AS),” “Bachelor’s degree (e.g., BA, BS),” and 
“Advanced degree (e.g., MA, MS, MBA, JD, PhD).” For the purpose of identifying 
participants who had science-specific higher education, all participants who reported an 
education level of “Some college, no degree” or higher were given an additional question 
that asked them to indicate which category — from a list of categories with examples — best 
fit their major or focus of study (e.g., traditional sciences, social sciences, humanities, 
applied business, informational sciences, fine arts, technical/vocational training). Educational 
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attainment was used as a control variable in many analyses in this study, and was also used 
by Qualtrics to assemble a sample that approximated U.S. census proportions of educational 
attainment.  
Relevant behaviors. Since the stimulus in each condition was a newspaper article and 
was about risks to farmers and agriculture workers, it is important to assess two participants’ 
news media consumption, and association with farming. To assess news media consumption, 
participants were asked to indicate how often they “read a news article (either in print or 
online articles)” and how often they “watch video from the news (either on TV or online).” 
Response options for each item were “Never,” “About once per year,” “About once per 
month,” “About once per week,” “About once per day,” “More than 5 per day,” and “More 
than 15 per day.” These two scale items did not demonstrate strong reliability (α=.64), and 
thus they are treated as separate variables rather than as two items in a scale of news 
exposure. These variables are used as covariates in the analyses.   
Then, participants were asked to indicate whether they or a close family member “has 
ever worked in the agriculture/livestock industry, for example, as a farmer, rancher laborer, 
etc.” Response options were “No, neither myself nor a close family member,” “I myself have 
not, but a close family member has,” “I myself have, but no other close family members 
have,” and “Both myself and close family member(s) have.” 
Also, because personal exposure to vibrating machinery might affect responses to the 
stimulus in the occupational hazards of farming (vibrating machinery) conditions, 
participants reported their frequency of tool use. Specifically, how often they use power tools 
(e.g., power drill, chainsaw) or operate heavy machinery (e.g., riding lawn mower, tractor, 
snow blower, backhoe, plow). Response options were “Never,” “Around 1 time per year,” 
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“Around 5 times per year,” “Around 10 times per year,” “Around 1 time per week,” and 
“Almost every day.” It was expected that these measures of tool use and of association with 
farming would be used as covariates, but they did not correlate well (no r > .08) with any of 
the outcome variables in any condition. Therefore, they are not used in any analyses. 
Prior issue position. Naturally, participants were given a measure of prior issue 
position that corresponded with the issue condition they are in. That is, the measure of prior 
issue position was different (although very similar in structure and style) between the three 
issues, but was identical within each issue’s five frame conditions.   
In the five climate change conditions, prior issue position was assessed with a five-
item measure adapted from Dieckmann et al. (2017). This measure asked participants to 
respond to statements such as “Humans are the main cause of climate change” and “The 
climate change we see today is part of a natural cycle of warming and cooling” (reverse 
coded) on 7-point Likert-type scales with anchors of “Strongly Disagree” and “Strongly 
Agree.” The scale demonstrated strong reliability in the pilot test (α=.87) and main study 
(α=.90) and is best described as comprising one factor (Table 8). Therefore, participants’ 
responses on the five items were combined to create a mean scale, with higher values 
indicating greater support for the ideas that climate change exists and is primarily caused by 
human activity. 
Similarly, for all five GMO foods labeling conditions, participants’ general issue 
position was assessed with a five-item measure adapted from Frewer and colleagues (1997; 
1998). This measure asked participants to respond to statements such as “GMO foods are 
beneficial to society” and “It is morally wrong to be changing nature with genetic 
engineering” (reverse coded) on 7-point Likert-type scales with anchors of “Strongly 
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Disagree” and “Strongly Agree.” This scale demonstrated good reliability in both the pilot 
test (α=.82) and main study (α=.88) and the items comprised one factor (Table 8). Therefore, 
participants’ responses on these five items were combined to create a mean scale, with higher 
values indicating greater support for the production and consumption of GMO foods.  
For all five occupational hazards of farming (vibrating machinery) conditions, 
participants’ prior issue position about the hazards or healthiness of farming and agriculture 
work was assessed with a five-item measure styled to resemble its counterpart measures in 
the climate change and GMO conditions. In the pilot test, this measure asked participants to 
respond to statements such as “Farmers and agriculture workers could get hurt easily” and “A 
career in farming or agriculture work is healthy” (reverse coded) on 7-point Likert-type 
scales with anchors of “Strongly Disagree” and “Strongly Agree.” As indicated in Table 8, 
this measure was not reliable in the pilot test (α=.53) and the scale items comprised more 
than one factor.  
Upon closer examination of the items, it was apparent that they referenced disparate 
issues (such as the general harmfulness of manual labor and the safety of machinery, which 
are distinct ideas), which increases the likelihood that individuals will score some items quite 
differently than others — decreasing reliability. To focus the measure more clearly and 
consistently on opinions about the occupational hazards/health of farming and agriculture 
work, a wholly revised scale was employed in the main study. For this revised scale (five 
items), participants responded to three statements about perceptions of careers in farming and 
agriculture (“a career in farming or agriculture work is dangerous,” “…is safe,” and “…is 
healthy”) and two statements about perceptions of the safety of farmers and workers 
(“farmers and agriculture workers could get hurt easily” and “…should fear for their 
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health”). Responses were given on 7-point Likert-style scales with anchors of “Strongly 
Disagree” and “Strongly Agree.” 
This revised measure tested in the main study achieved adequate reliability (α=.74) 
and the scale items comprised one factor (Table 8). Therefore, participants’ mean responses 
on the items of the revised measure were combined to create a mean scale, with higher values 
indicating greater support for the idea that farming and agriculture work is a physically 
dangerous, generally unhealthy career. 
Deference to science. Deference to science was assessed with the four-item measure 
developed by Binder et al. (2016). While they report a Cronbach’s α of only .66, they also 
argue that all other studies that have attempted to measure this construct (with other items) 
reported similar reliability (ranging from .65 to .69). This measure asks participants to 
respond to statements such as “Public opinion is more important than scientists’ opinions 
when making decisions about scientiﬁc research” (reverse coded) on a 7-point Likert-type 
scale with anchors of “Strongly Disagree” and “Strongly Agree. 
This scale demonstrated adequate reliability in its original four-item form (pilot test 
α=.70; main study α=.76) and comprised one factor (Table 8). An individual’s mean score on 
these four items was used to construct a mean scale indicating deference to science. 
Individualist-collectivist worldview. As briefly described in Section 2.4.2, ideological 
worldview is sometimes operationalized as an individuals’ political party affiliation (e.g., a 
categorical measure of Republican / Democrat / Independent) or political ideology (e.g., a 
continuous scale ranging from conservative to liberal). However, many science 
communication scholars have preferred to measure ideological worldview on two separate 
(although correlated) dimensions: hierarchical-egalitarian and individualist-collectivist (e.g., 
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Dieckmann et al., 2017; Kahan et al., 2011). One of the advantages of this approach is that it 
is subtle. That is, it avoids the potential limitation of influencing politicization in individuals’ 
interpretations or responses by priming political partisanship. Another advantage is that it is a 
significantly more nuanced (two continuous dimensions) and valid (measuring the underlying 
values that characterize worldview) measure than a simple categorical measure of party 
affiliation. For these reasons, ideology/worldview was assessed with the short form of the 
cultural cognition measure (Bolsen & Druckman, 2011; Kahan et al., 2011) which contains 
six items measuring egalitarian worldview attitudes and six items measuring collectivist 
worldview attitudes. 
Sample items from the collectivist worldview scale are “The government needs to 
make laws that keep people from hurting themselves” and “The government should stop 
telling people how to live their lives” (reverse coded). Responses to these statements were 
given on 7-point scales with anchors of “Strongly Disagree” and “Strongly Agree”. This six-
item scale (InCo) exhibited good reliability (pilot test α=.79; main study α=.78).  
However, the local EFA indicated that the InCo factor structure was ambiguous, with 
the scree plot and parallel analysis indicating only one factor (Figure 3), but the eigenvalue of 
the second factor being greater than 1 (Table 8). Further, when the factor structure was 
probed as part of the full global EFA, the inclusion of the sixth scale item (“The government 
should put limits on the choices individuals can make…”) destabilized the collectivist 
worldview factor — and the item cross-loaded with the behavioral intentions factor. When 
this item is removed, it not only results in clear unidimensionality within the scale — 
resolving the ambiguity (second factor eigenvalue = 0.89; Figure 3; Table 12) — but also 
results in a unique factor (indicating discriminant validity) in the measurement model 
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(Section 3.4.2). Therefore, the five-item variant of this scale (pilot test α=.76; main study 
α=.76) was used for all analyses. Participants’ mean scores on the five items used to create 
mean scales indicating collectivist worldview and egalitarian worldview. 
 
Figure 3. Scree plots and parallel analyses of the six-item (left) and five-item (right) variants of the collectivist 
worldview scale. 
 
Hierarchical-egalitarian worldview. Sample items from the egalitarian worldview 
scale are “Our society would be better off if the distribution of wealth was more equal” and 
“We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country” (reverse coded). Responses to 
these statements were given on 7-point scales with anchors of “Strongly Disagree” and 
“Strongly Agree”. This six-item scale exhibited good reliability (pilot test α=.87; main study 
α=.90) and the local EFA indicated that they comprised one factor (Table 8).  
However, this scale became a perfect illustration of the point made earlier in this 
section about the importance of distinguishing between dimensionality within a scale and 
dimensionality as determined by a comprehensive measurement model that includes 
measures of other constructs and their factors. Each item in any scale/factor varies on how 
much it could be belonging to more than one factor. So, while the scale might be reliable and 
unidimensional (and thus well-suited for creating a mean scale), one or more of its items 
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might also be strongly related enough to another construct/factor to justify exclusion in the 
interests of establishing a valid measurement model. 
In this case, specifically, the initial global EFA (Section 3.5.2) exploring the full 
measurement model demonstrated that the inclusion of the first item (“We have gone too far 
in pushing equal rights in this country”; reverse coded) caused cross-loading on multiple 
factors. However, excluding this item results in a cohesive and unique factor in the 
measurement model (Section 3.4.2). In sum, the full set of six items does not comprise a 
factor that is unique from the rest of the items and factors in the measurement model, but the 
set of five items does. Therefore, the five-item variant of this scale (pilot test α=.84; main 
study α=.88) was used for all analyses. Participants’ mean scores on the five items used to 
create mean scales indicating collectivist worldview and egalitarian worldview. 
External certainty. General external certainty has most commonly been measured 
with one-item self-report measures (e.g., “how certain are scientists that…”) (e.g., Corbett & 
Durfee, 2004; Dixon & Clarke, 2013; Johnson, 2017; Koehler, 2016). However, since the 
external certainty measure is used as a manipulation check, a measure of general external 
uncertainty would be inadequate because it would not determine whether participants were 
sensitive to the variations in distinct types of uncertainty that were portrayed across the 
manipulations. Thus, to see if participants reported differences across conditions in the types 
of uncertainty that they believed experts had, —a measure of external uncertainty types was 
administered. This measure contained four items, each of which corresponded to one of the 
four types of uncertainty (deficient, technical, consensus, scientific; Table 9). I will refer to 
this group of four items as the “EUtype” measure. 
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These items are not intended to be combined as a multi-item measure, but rather each 
of the individual items is used for the respective manipulation check. In fact, low reliability 
would be evidence of participants making desired conceptual and perceptual distinctions 
between the distinct types of uncertainty represented in the items. Indeed, when treated as a 
single four-item measure (which it is not), the EUtype items exhibit low reliability (α=.63), 
and the manipulation check (Section 4.3) demonstrates clearly that participants are sensitive 
to the variations in uncertainty types across the four EUtype items. 
The pilot test contained a slightly different wording for the technical uncertainty item 
(“…findings of this research are precise and exact.”). After finding no effect (relative to the 
control) of the technical uncertainty manipulation on that technical uncertainty EUtype item 
in the pilot test manipulation check, the wording was changed — for the main study (Table 
9) — to more specifically reference the type of verbiage found in the technical uncertainty 
stimuli (“…findings of this research are rough estimates that could vary by a large margin.”) 
Table 9 
 
Items in External and Internal (Un)Certainty Measures 
 
External Uncertainty Types (EUtype) 
Deficient These scientists think that there is still a lot that they don’t know about this subject. 
Technical These scientists think that the findings of this research are rough estimates that could vary by 
a large margin. 
Consensus These scientists think that they often disagree with each other or have controversy about this 
subject. 
Scientific These scientists think that their findings and opinions about this topic will significantly 
change as future research progresses. 
Internal General Certainty (ICgen) 
 I myself am very certain that _claim_. 
 I myself tend to be skeptical of the idea that _claim_. 
 I myself think there is very strong evidence for believing that __claim__. 
Note. Responses were given on 7-point Likert-type scales (1=Strongly Disagree, 7=Strongly Agree). 
 
Internal certainty. General internal certainty has most commonly been measured with 
self-report Likert-style measures that often contain only one item (e.g., “I am certain that...”) 
(e.g., Binder et al., 2016; Chang, 2015; Clarke et al., 2015; Corbett & Durfee, 2004; Dixon & 
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Clarke, 2013). The measure employed in this study was similar, but expanded on the typical 
one-item measures by including three different phrasings of internal certainty, with one 
reverse-coded item. Table 9 displays all three items in this measure. I will refer to this 
measure of general internal certainty as “ICgen.” Participants were asked to indicate their 
level of agreement with each statement on 7-point Likert-type scales (1=Strongly Disagree, 
7=Strongly Agree). The three-item ICgen measure demonstrated good reliability (pilot test 
α=.80; main study α=.84) and comprised one factor (Table 8). Therefore, each participant’s 
scores on these three items was used to calculate a mean scale indicating general internal 
certainty about the claim presented in the stimulus news article. 
Alternative (un)certainty measures. The preceding measures targeted distinct types of 
external certainty (EUtype) and general internal certainty (ICgen). Naturally, it is interesting 
to also measure types of internal certainty (IUtype) and general external certainty (ECgen). 
Therefore, these alternative measures were also administered in the pilot test and in the main 
study, but they are not used in any of the analyses.  
The IUtype measure mirrored the EUtype measure (Table 9), with the only 
differences being references to one’s own opinion (“I myself think that…”) instead of 
scientists’ opinions (“These scientists think that…”). Like the EUtype items, the IUtype 
items are not intended to represent a single construct — and thus are not used to create a 
mean scale for use in any analyses. Unlike the EUtype items, the IUtype items are not ideal 
for a manipulation check, because they do not represent perceptions of what was portrayed in 
the manipulations (the uncertainties of scientists). Rather, they represent personal opinions 
that may or may not reflect what was portrayed in the manipulations. For these reasons, and 
for space constraints, IUtype is not considered as an outcome variable in this dissertation. 
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The ECgen measure mirrored the ICgen measure (Table 9), with the only differences 
being that each item referred to the opinion of scientists (“It seems to me that these scientists 
think that…”) instead of to one’s own opinion (“I myself think…”). This three-item measure 
was not included in any analyses for three reasons. First, ECgen is very close in concept to 
ECtype — which is the manipulation check variable, and should be not confounded as being 
a hypothesized outcome variable. Second, the ECgen scale (unlike ICgen) demonstrated poor 
reliability (pilot test α=.61; main study α=.66). Third, when included in the global EFA that 
tests the measurement model, the ECgen items did not load together — indicating that the 
ECgen items are not distinct from other factors that emerge from the items of other scales. 
For these reasons, it is not considered as an outcome variable of interest in this dissertation.  
Perceived risk.  Perceived risk regarding the threat presented by the finding/claim of 
the study reported in the stimuli was assessed with a six-item measure in which participants 
responded to statements such as “I think (issue) poses serious dangers to agriculture workers” 
on a 7-point Likert-type scale with anchors of “Strongly Disagree” and “Strongly Agree.” 
Three of these items referred to the severity of the threat posed to farmers and agriculture 
workers — which was the focus of the claim. The other three items referred to the severity of 
the threat posed to the study participant personally.  
For each set of three, the items are adapted from the risk measure used by Binder and 
colleagues (2016; α=.79), which assesses threat severity and concern. Bolsen and Druckman 
(2015; no alpha reported) use a similar measure. In sum, the six-item scale represented both 
perceived risk to others and to self. One of the purposes of these analyses is to determine 
whether these two sets should be treated separately and which should be used in this study. 
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These six items demonstrated strong reliability (pilot test α=.83; main study α=.85) 
and the preliminary evidence for dimensionality (local EFAs; Table 8) indicated that a 
single-factor interpretation is reasonable, due to the scree plot and parallel analysis (Figure 
4). However, with an eigenvalue of 1.09 for the second factor, it is reasonable to entertain the 
possibility of a two-factor structure. Not surprisingly, the loadings for two factors 
demonstrated that the three “risk to others” items loaded clearly on to the first factor (Table 
10), while the three “risk to self” items comprised the second factor, with the “first risk to 
self” item cross-loading on the first factor.  
Table 10  
 
Risk Scale (6 Items) Factor Loadings for Local EFA 
 
 Risk to Others Risk to Self 
1. “…poses serious danger to agricultural workers.” .890  
2. “…farmers and workers should be worried…” .897  
3. “…farmers and workers will be…unaffected.” (r) .580  
4. “…poses serious danger to me and my loved ones.” .282 .612 
5. “…people like myself do not need to be worried…” (r)  .650 
6. “…will affect my life or lifestyle…”  .901 
Note. Factor loadings > .40 are in boldface; Loadings < .15 are suppressed; (r)=reverse coded; maximum 
likelihood estimation and geomin (oblique) rotation. 
 
 
Figure 4. Scree plots and parallel analyses of the six-item (left) and three-item (right) variants of the perceived 
risk scale.  
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While these test results give some justification for treating the two sets of three items 
as distinct, the strongest argument is a conceptual one. Intuitively, the claims in each 
stimulus described risk that is far-removed from most people (i.e., risk to farmers and 
agriculture workers). Thus, the items targeting perceived risk to self are significantly less 
relevant than the items targeting perceived risk to farmers and agriculture workers. For these 
reasons, only the three “risk to others” items were used in the analyses, including for the 
creation of a mean scale indicating perceived risk (pilot test α=.80; main study α=.84). 
Perceived credibility. Perceived credibility of the scientists who produced the 
claim/finding was assessed using a measure constructed from items from foundational (e.g., 
Berlo et al., 1969; McCroskey, 1966) and contemporary (e.g., Jensen & Hurley, 2010) 
credibility scales. Using seven-point semantic differential scales, participants responded to 
the question “Based on the article, how would you describe the scientists who produced the 
research?” with four response items measuring expertise (competent / incompetent; 
knowledgeable / ignorant; skilled / unskilled; intelligent / unintelligent) and four response 
items measuring trustworthiness (trustworthy / untrustworthy; honest / dishonest; biased / 
unbiased; withholding information / telling the whole truth). The full eight-item credibility 
scale demonstrated high reliability (pilot test α=.92; main study α=.93) and constituted one 
factor (Table 8). An individual’s mean score on these items was used to construct a mean 
scale indicating perceived credibility of the scientists quoted in the news article. 
Behavioral intentions. The measure of behavioral intentions was not designed to be a 
measure of intentions to perform a specific behavior. Rather, the goal was to measure an 
attitude of general willingness to engage in behaviors that indicate supportive attitudes 
toward the claim. Therefore, each of the five items on the behavioral intentions measure 
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referenced a different behavior. The first two items asked participants “In the future, if you 
saw another newspaper article about this topic, how likely would you be to read it?” and 
“…how likely would you be to share it with others?”. Responses were given on 7-point 
Likert-type scales with anchors of “Extremely Unlikely” and “Extremely Likely.” The third 
item presented the participants with a hypothetical scenario of being given the option to 
donate part of their compensation for this survey to non-profit groups raising money to 
provide financial assistance to the farmers and workers who are being affected by _issue_. 
Then the item asked “how much of it do you think you would give?” Responses were 
provided on a 7-point scale with response options of 0%, 17%, 33%, 50%, 67%, 83%, and 
100%.  
The fourth and fifth items presented participants with hypothetical scenarios where 
the area in which they live was considering legislation that would generate funds to provide 
financial assistance to the farmers and workers that the research study claimed have been 
affected by _issue_. The fourth item described proposed legislation that was a consumer tax 
on agricultural products, which would fund the assistance to farmers. The fifth item 
described proposed legislation that was a tax break that would be given to farmers directly. 
These two variants were included so that this measure would not unevenly favor liberal or 
conservative worldviews. For each of these two items, participants were asked how likely 
they would be to vote Yes in favor of this legislation. Responses to these two items were 
given on 7-point Likert-type scales with anchors of “Certainly Not (0%)” and “Certainly Yes 
(100%”). 
Overall, the five items demonstrated adequate reliability (pilot test α=.78; main study 
α=.76), but the local EFA did not produce convincing evidence of unidimensionality (main 
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study second eigenvalue = 1.12; Table 8). This, of course, is not surprising for an exploratory 
measure that is explicitly designed to encompass a suite of different behaviors. It was 
expected prior to the analyses that this group of items would be pared down to a cohesive set 
that represents one construct. The factor loadings demonstrated that, for a two-factor 
solution, the first two items loaded together, and the last three items loaded together. Either 
(or both) of these sets would be reasonable to use as measures of behavioral intentions. 
However, the first set only had two items, and Mplus requires a minimum of three indicators 
for identifying a factor. Therefore, the second set — the third (donations), fourth 
(legislation), and fifth (legislation) items from the behavioral intentions measure — is the set 
that is best suited for assessing behavioral intentions in this study. These three items 
demonstrate adequate reliability (pilot test α=.71; main study α=.73) and comprised one 
factor (Figure 5; Table 11). Therefore, each participant’s mean score on these three items was 
used to create a mean scale indicating intention to engage in behaviors that demonstrate 
support for the claim.  
Table 11  
 
Behavioral Intentions Scale (All 5 Items) Loadings from Local EFA 2-Factor Solution 
 
 Risk to Others Risk to Self 
1. Read a similar news article in the future 0.735  
2. Share a similar news article with others in the future 0.984  
3. Donate a portion of survey payment to help the farmers  0.434 
4. Vote in favor of a tax that funds assistance to the farmers  0.942 
5. Vote in favor of a tax break given to the farmers  0.679 
Note. Factor loadings > .40 are in boldface; Loadings < .15 are suppressed; (r)=reverse coded; maximum 
likelihood estimation and geomin (oblique) rotation. 
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Figure 5. Scree plots and parallel analyses for the five-item (left) and three-item (right) variants of the 
behavioral intentions scale.  
 
Table 12 
Reliability, Descriptives, and Eigenvalues of Modified Multi-Item Scales 
  Main Study  Pilot Test 
 Final Items α M SD ev1 ev2  α M SD ev1 ev2 
IndiColl 1, 2 ,3, 4, 5, 6 .76 3.43 1.20 2.67 0.89  .76 3.38 1.23 2.56 0.98 
HierEgal 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 .88 4.58 1.69 3.40 0.68  .84 4.47 1.61 3.11 0.91 
Risk 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 .84 4.69 1.43 2.29 0.50  .80 4.69 1.38 2.14 0.65 
BehaveIn 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 .73 3.55 1.44 1.98 0.69  .71 3.62 1.45 1.93 0.76 
Note: “Final Items” lists the number of items in each scale and depicts which items were excluded from the 
final scale in strikethrough. α= Cronbach’s alpha; ev1= initial eigenvalue for one factor; ev2= initial eigenvalue 
for second factor; f1var= variance explained by one factor; f2var= additional variance explained by second 
factor; IndiColl= individualist/collectivist; HierEgal= hierarchical/egalitarian; Risk= perceived risk scale; 
BehaveIn= behavioral intentions scale; Full list of all items in each scale is available in Appendix B. 
 
3.4.2. Global EFA. The hypotheses imply a structural model in which the two 
worldview dimensions predict prior issue position, which in turn predicts the four outcome 
variables (internal certainty, perceived risk, credibility, and behavioral intentions) (Figure 2). 
Section 3.7 describes how and why SEM will be used to test some of the hypotheses and 
research questions. However, prior to testing the structural model, the measurement model 
must be validated via EFA and CFA. It is important to note that although individual scales 
(and their local EFAs) largely appear to demonstrate reliability and single-factor structures 
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(convergent validity; Section 3.5.1), this does not mean that those factors are also necessarily 
distinct from each other (discriminant validity) or would be unidimensional when analyzed 
simultaneously. 
So, to investigate the factor structure and discriminant validity of the items indicating 
the latent variables in the structural model, a global EFA using ML estimation was performed 
using the same random selection of 50% of the main study sample that was used for the 
individual local EFAs (Section 3.5.1). Differing from the individual local EFAs, the initial 
global EFA included all (34) items in the collectivism worldview (six items), egalitarian 
worldview (six items), prior issue position (five items), internal certainty (three items), risk 
(three items), credibility (eight items), and behavioral intentions (three items) scales. Because 
emerging factors would likely be correlated, oblique (geomin) rotation was used. 
For EFAs with ML estimation, there are several methods of determining the 
appropriate number of factors comprising a scale, such as Kaiser’s eigenvalue criteria, 
Catell’s scree plot, parallel analysis, RMSEA, CFI, SRMR, as well as the size and alignment 
of factor loadings (with a minimum threshold of .30; Brown, 2006). Kaiser’s eigenvalues and 
Catell’s scree plot techniques can gave preliminary insight, but are arguably the least precise 
methods. When there is uncertainty in interpreting the eigenvalues and the scree plot, parallel 
analysis can add more confident suggestions. Chi-square tests that are significant (for 
solution with j factors) recommend a rejection of the null hypothesis that there is no 
difference between the observed data and the j-factor model. However, with a large sample 
such as this one, this test is almost always significant simply as an artifact of sample size 
(Fabriger et al., 1999). Therefore, to choose the appropriate number of factors, I 
supplemented the information provided by the eigenvalues, scree plot, and parallel analysis 
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with that of the RMSEA, CFI, and SRMR values. The RMSEA index indicates good fit if the 
upper bound of the 90% confidence interval is <.08 (Hu & Bentler, 1998), the CFI indicates 
good fit if the value is >.95 (Hu & Bentler, 1998), and the SRMR index indicates good fit if 
the value is <.08 (Hu & Bentler, 1999). 
The first iteration of global EFA testing included all items from all measures, and the 
fit indices (Table 13) indicate that the first solution to achieve good fit on two of the three fit 
indices was the six-factor solution. As discussed in Section 3.5.1, the preliminary local EFAs 
revealed that the collectivism worldview scale had an ambiguous structure, which was 
further evidenced in this first iteration of the full global EFA. The removal of the sixth item 
resolved cross-loadings between the two worldview dimensions and the behavioral intentions 
scale. All three of these scales have items that target individuals’ preferences for the roles 
and responsibilities of government and the individual in ensuring a better society. Therefore, 
it is not surprising that items on these three scales might load on to more than one factor. The 
sixth collectivism item may be responsible for much of this overlap — sitting on the fence 
between factors — because its removal enables the five remaining collectivism items to 
group together as one unique factor. 
Table 13 
Model Fit Indices by Global EFAs and Factor Solutions 
 
Item Excluded RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI CFI SRMR 
None     
   1 Factor .149 [.147, .149] .45 .128 
   2 Factors .131 [.129, .133] .60 .101 
   3 Factors .107 [.104, .109] .75 .070 
   4 Factors .091 [.089, .094] .83 .056 
   5 Factors .079 [.076, .082] .88 .036 
   6 Factors .070 [.068, .073] .91 .031 
   7 Factors .063 [.060, .066] .94 .024 
InCo #6     
   1 Factor .151 [.149, .153] .46 .128 
   2 Factors .132 [.129, .134] .61 .100 
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   3 Factors .105 [.103, .108] .77 .067 
   4 Factors .088 [.086, .091] .85 .050 
   5 Factors .078 [.076, .081] .89 .035 
   6 Factors .069 [.066, .071] .92 .029 
   7 Factors .060 [.058, .063] .94 .022 
InCo #6, HE #1     
   1 Factor .151 [.149, .153] .47 .125 
   2 Factors .130 [.127, .132] .64 .107 
   3 Factors .107 [.104, .109] .77 .067 
   4 Factors .089 [.086, .091] .85 .049 
   5 Factors .078 [.076, .081] .89 .036 
   6 Factors .072 [.069, .074] .92 .029 
   7 Factors .062 [.059, .065] .94 .022 
Note. Chi-square test of model fit is not reported because all 2 values were significant at p<.001 in all factor 
solutions of all model variants due to sample size. RMSEA = root-mean-square error of approximation; CI = 
confidence interval; SRMR = standardized root-mean-square residual.  
 
The second iteration of a global EFA included all 33 items except that sixth 
collectivism item. The fit indices suggested that the first strong solution — achieving good fit 
on two of three indices — was again the six-factor solution (Table 13). Similar to the first 
iteration, one of the worldview items (the first item on the egalitarian scale: “We have gone 
too far in pushing equal rights in this country”, reverse coded) caused some of the egalitarian 
items to comprise two factors that cross-loaded with each other and with the behavioral 
intentions scale. Removing this item resolved all cross-loading, leaving only unique factors. 
These unique factors are exhibited in the third iteration of a global EFA, which 
included all 32 remaining items. The fit indices again suggested the six-factor solution (Table 
13). All emerging factors were unique — with no cross-loadings above 0.2 (Table 14). This 
clear and robust six-factor solution was, of course, unexpected because the global EFAs 
included measures of seven constructs. 
Table 14 
Final Measurement Model EFA Item Factor Loadings 
 
 Prior Issue 
Position 
Collectivist 
Worldview 
Egalitarian 
Worldview 
Perceived 
Credibility 
Belief in 
Claim 
Behavioral 
Intentions 
Prior1 0.847      
Prior2 0.839      
Prior3 0.578      
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Prior4 0.759      
Prior5 0.658      
InCo1  0.665     
InCo2  0.455     
InCo3  0.623 0.157    
InCo4  0.816     
InCo5  0.434     
HE2   0.828    
HE3   0.910    
HE4   0.715    
HE5   0.662    
HE6  0.171 0.552    
ICgen1     0.830  
ICgen2     0.612  
ICgen3     0.887  
Cred1    0.717   
Cred2    0.810   
Cred3    0.723   
Cred4    0.818   
Cred5    0.875   
Cred6    0.916   
Cred7    0.494   
Cred8    0.710   
BI3      0.484 
BI4      0.880 
BI5      0.647 
Risk1     0.778  
Risk2     0.789  
Risk3     0.613  
Note. Geomin (oblique) rotated factor loadings. Loadings > .40 are in boldface; Loadings < .15 are suppressed; 
(r)=reverse coded. 
 
The two measures that group together to comprise a single and unique factor are 
internal certainty and perceived risk. Considering that the claim presented in the stimuli was 
precisely that farmers and agriculture workers were being harmed by either climate change, 
GMO labeling laws, or vibrating machinery, this finding is not surprising at all. In fact, it 
should have been expected. Internal certainty about a claim of risk to farmers is very close to 
the same thing as perceived risk to farmers.  
There is, however, a very slight difference between the two constructs. The items on 
the internal certainty scale represent threat likelihood, and items on the perceived risk (to 
farmers) add threat severity. Both of these are often included as dimensions of risk perception 
in science communication research and beyond (e.g., Han et al., 2011). In sum, the nature of 
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the claim (risk to farmers and workers) resulted in a close association between internal 
certainty about the claim and perceived risk to farmers and workers. When treated as one six-
item scale, it exhibited strong reliability (α=.91). Thus, for all the analyses in this 
dissertation, internal certainty and perceived risk was treated as one construct: claim belief. 
Therefore, claim belief is an outcome variable in the model, alongside credibility and 
behavioral intentions, and will be referred to as such for the remainder of this dissertation. In 
addition to being a latent variable as identified by the global EFA, claim belief was also 
operationalized by creating a mean scale from the six items.  
This type of finding is one of the central reasons why global EFAs are important. 
Even in cases where strong theory and prior empirical research support a particular factor 
structure, a measurement evaluation is always necessary to capture slight variations. One 
question that remained open before these analyses were conducted was whether the two 
worldview dimensions would emerge as distinct factors (they did). Similarly, it was uncertain 
whether the two often-theorized dimensions of credibility — expertise and trustworthiness — 
would emerge as distinct factors (they did not). The results of the global EFA were 
subsequently tested using a CFA performed on the remaining random 50% split of the main 
study data. The CFA results are reported in Section 4.1. 
3.6. Stimuli 
3.6.1. Main message. The main stimulus message consisted of a simulated news 
article reporting the results of scientific research — a claim of science — in one topic of one 
issue (Table 1). The language of the news article was held constant across all 15 conditions, 
except for references to the claim (which of course varied across the three issues) and the 
clauses that comprised the uncertainty frame manipulation (which of course varied across the 
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five uncertainty frame type conditions). The content and form of the uncertainty frame 
manipulations, as well as the visual structure and discursive style of the news article itself, 
were adapted from actual news articles published in The New York Times, The Washington 
Post, and The Wall Street Journal between 2009 and 2015 (as defined in Chapter 1; as 
exemplified in Table 2; as coded by Rice et al., 2018).  However, the publication was not 
specified, so as to not trigger confounding preconceptions or attitudes regarding any 
particular publication. The article directly quoted the scientists who produced the research 
and identified them as such. All 15 conditions referenced the names of the same fictional 
scientists. The length of the 15 news articles — including the text of the headline, sub-
headline, and break-out box — ranged from 275 words in the climate change control (no 
uncertainty) condition to 411 words in the vibrating machinery scientific uncertainty 
condition (M=357.07; SD=40.54). Three exemplar stimuli news articles (conditions: climate 
change consensus uncertainty, GMO labeling technical uncertainty, and vibrating machinery 
scientific uncertainty) are available in Appendix A. 
3.6.2. Uncertainty type manipulation. The manipulation of uncertainty frame types 
took the form of several statements attributed to scientists within the article that specified a 
particular type of uncertainty (at the article level) that qualified both the finding itself and 
therefore its risk implications for farmers and agriculture workers. These uncertainty 
statements resemble the operationalizations of substantial prior literature (reviewed in 
Chapter 1) and each satisfied the key operational components of high uncertainty in each 
uncertainty type (Chapter 1.2; Table 2) and the key points of differentiation (Chapter 1.2; 
Table 2). Four of these uncertainty statements appeared throughout each article, in order to 
emphasize the uncertainty frame in multiple ways in multiple locations. The first appeared in 
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the sub-heading, the second appeared in the middle of the body text, the third used a break-
out box to repeat the second uncertainty statement, and the fourth appeared at the conclusion 
of the article. Table 15 provides the specific wording of the clauses used to construct each 
article-level uncertainty frame in each condition. These manipulations were pilot tested 
(Section 3.4) to verify their effect on perceptions of the corresponding EUtype item. 
Table 15 
 
The Four Uncertainty Statements Positioned in Each News Article 
 
 Uncertainty Type 
Position Deficient Technical Consensus Scientific 
Sub-
heading 
New evidence says 
the effects of __ are 
a threat to millions 
of agriculture 
workers, although 
much is still 
unknown. 
New evidence says the 
effects of __ are a 
threat to millions of 
agriculture workers, 
__ somewhere 
between 5% and 22%. 
New evidence says the 
effects of __ are a 
threat to millions of 
agriculture workers, 
although some experts 
disagree. 
New evidence says the 
effects of __ are a threat 
to millions of agriculture 
workers, although future 
research may change 
this. 
Body text, 
3rd 
paragraph 
 
The impact of __ 
appears to include 
damage to the __ of 
working-class 
farmers and 
laborers, although 
much remains 
unknown and more 
research is still 
needed. 
The impact of __ 
appears to include 
damage to the __ of 
working-class farmers 
and laborers, with 
estimated decreases in 
__ varying between 
5% and 22%. 
The impact of __ 
appears to include 
damage to the __ of 
working-class farmers 
and laborers, although 
this is in contrast to 
the research of some 
other scientists. 
The impact of __ appears 
to include damage to the 
__ of working-class 
farmers and laborers, 
although — like with all 
science — we expect 
further research to 
clarify, or even change, 
these preliminary 
findings. 
Break-out 
box Same as 3rd par. Same as 3rd par. Same as 3rd par. Same as 3rd par. 
Conclusion When considering 
the findings reported 
in this study, it is 
important to note 
that scientists’ 
understanding of the 
effects of __ on 
agriculture workers 
remains limited 
because, so far, very 
little research has 
been conducted on 
this issue. 
When considering the 
findings reported in 
this study, it is 
important to note that 
the effect of __ on 
agriculture workers 
can vary widely, and 
that researchers use 
their data to form an 
estimated range of 
possible amounts. 
When considering the 
findings reported in 
this study, it is 
important to note that 
there is continued 
controversy in the 
scientific community 
about the effects of __ 
on agriculture 
workers, with some 
scientists contending 
that __ is not causing 
the observed pattern of 
__ for farmers and 
laborers. 
When considering the 
findings reported in this 
study, it is important to 
note that the effects of 
__ on agriculture 
workers is a highly 
complex process that 
requires repeated study 
before any strong 
conclusions. Therefore, 
scientists fully expect 
that future research 
could cause their current 
understanding of this 
issue to change as more 
data become available. 
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3.6.3. Manipulation check. One of the purposes of the pilot test was to include a 
manipulation check — indicating whether the different stimuli across conditions were 
perceived by participants as being, in fact, different. The best variable to use as a 
manipulation check is the individual items in the EUtype measure, because they assess 
participants’ perceptions of scientists’ opinions. These 2nd order opinions reflect whether the 
different types of uncertainty portrayed by scientists in the stimulus articles are noticed by 
participants. For example, if — in the consensus uncertainty condition — the mean score on 
the consensus uncertainty item in the EUtype measure is significantly lower than the mean 
score on the consensus uncertainty item in the control condition, then this indicates that the 
consensus uncertainty manipulation affected perceptions of scientists’ consensus uncertainty 
to a significant degree.  
A separate analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) for each EUtype item — controlling 
for education, prior opinion, deference to science, individualist worldview, hierarchical 
worldview, and news media consumption for each test — was used to observe differences in 
mean items scores across conditions.  SPSS does not allow for post-hoc tests with 
ANCOVAs, but the marginal means and upper/lower bound (95% confidence interval) are an 
adequate stand-in. The results of these analyses, for both the pilot test and the main study are 
reported in Section 4.3. 
3.7.  Analyses for Hypotheses and Research Questions 
Overall, the literature review and subsequent hypotheses indicate the conceptual 
model displayed in Figure 2. This model is one where the effects of X1,2 (two worldview 
dimensions) on Y1-3 (DVs) are (at least partially) mediated by M (prior opinion), and 
whatever direct effects X1-2 have on Y1-3 are moderated by W1-3 (Issue). W1-3 also moderates 
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the effect of X1,2 on M.  Z1-5 (frame type) moderates the effects of M on Y1-3. Throughout this 
section, I will refer to these variables with this notation, for consistency and simplicity 
(Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6. Basic hypothesized structural model. 
 
Note: Figure adapted from “Model 22” in Hayes, 2017. 
 
In many cases, the most intuitive and elegant method of testing a moderated 
mediation model is via structural equation modeling (SEM). However, a feature of this 
dissertation’s hypothesized model (Figure 2) that adds complexity and difficulty is the fact 
that both of the moderators are multi-categorical (three levels of issue and five levels of 
uncertainty frame type — which together constitute the experimental conditions). Still, many 
other researchers have tested model differences in model path coefficients across the levels 
of multi-categorical moderators in SEM, so this in itself is not an insurmountable roadblock. 
The greatest difficulty for testing the fit of this model all at once is introduced by the 
fact that these interaction effects involve two worldview dimensions (X1 and X2) and three 
distinct attitudinal responses (Y1-3). Simultaneously estimating interaction effects of multi-
categorical moderator W (three levels) on the relationships between X1,2 and M, as well as 
multi-categorical moderator Z (five levels) on the relationships between M and each of Y1-3, 
and comparing those interaction effects between models (conditions), is not feasible as a 
Z 
Y X 
W 
M 
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method for hypothesis testing. This is in part due to the intercorrelation of variables, shared 
error, and insufficient power. Therefore, it was necessary to sacrifice some elegance and 
parsimony in the interests of achieving the specificity needed to inform the hypotheses and 
research questions. Specifically, a piecemeal approach was adopted – with some hypotheses 
being tested with SEM in Mplus and others with Hayes’ PROCESS in SSPS.  SEM is used 
whenever possible, due to the numerous advantages of SEM over the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression approach used in PROCESS, such as the ability of SEM to model error 
terms and specify causal effects (Bollen & Pearl, 2013). As such, the analytic strategy 
consisted of the following steps. The results are presented in Chapter 4. 
3.7.1. Step 1: Test the fit of the basic model. First, after observing the results of the 
global EFA and subsequent CFA, I used structural regression with maximum likelihood 
estimation in Mplus to test the overall model fit without the moderating variables W (issue) 
and Z (frame type) — that is, the proposed theoretical structure of the two worldview 
dimensions as exogenous variables, prior issue position as the lone mediating variable, and 
(now, three) attitudinal response outcome variables in all conditions combined. Moderator W 
(issue) is not relevant in this test because it only involves one issue (i.e., one level of W), and 
moderator Z (frame type) is not of interest to this hypothesis of the overall test of basic 
model structure. This test informed H1, which represents one piece of the overall model – 
positing that, overall, prior issue position predicts the attitudinal response variables which the 
factor analyses determined to be best described as claim belief, perceived credibility, and 
behavioral intentions. 
A very important consideration is that this overall model is expected to not fit 
(equally, anyways) in all issues, as implied by the moderation effect of the “Issue” variable. 
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Specifically, the hypothesized relationship between the two worldview dimensions and prior 
issue position are only expected to be (although not “expected only to be”) significant in the 
climate change conditions. This is why the H2a prediction that individuals’ prior issue 
position will (at least partially) mediate the relationship between worldview and the 
attitudinal response variables is limited to climate change conditions. To test this proposed 
mediation path in climate change conditions specifically, a CFA was first conducted in 
climate change conditions only in order to verify that the measurement model validated by 
the CFA across all conditions was also valid in the climate change conditions alone (Section 
4.1). Next, an SEM identical to that used to test H1 was used to test the fit of the data from 
the climate change conditions to the overall basic model of X1,2MY1-3. This test of 
mediation informed H2a. 
H2b predicted that, in climate change conditions, each Xi has a significant positive 
effect on M (controlling for the effect of the other Xi and of education, age, deference to 
science, and news media consumption). H2c predicted that, in the climate change conditions, 
any observed effects of X1 and X2 on Y1-3 not explained by M (that is, any direct effects) will 
be positive (also accounting for those covariates). 
The predictions of H2b and H2c are limited to the climate change conditions, and thus 
involve only one level of moderator W (issue). Thus, no moderation effect of W is 
considered for these tests. These predictions also do not involve the MY1-3 relationships, 
and thus do not (neither theoretically nor statistically) involve the levels of moderator Z 
(frame type). Therefore, hypotheses H2b,c are making predictions about a set of exactly eight 
direct paths (two combinations of X1,2 to M; and all six possible combinations of X1,2 to Y1-3) 
within the climate change conditions. All of these paths are estimated in the structural 
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regression model that tests H2a, and the path coefficients displayed in the results of the SEM 
will already account for covariates mentioned above. In sum, H2b,c can be informed by the 
SEM model when it is fit to the data of only the climate change conditions. 
3.7.2. Step 2: Test the interactions. H3, H4, H5, H6, RQ1, and RQ2 each explore 
interaction effects in the model (Figure 2). Here, I will progress through each sequentially, 
explaining the analyses that informed each research question or hypothesis. 
Tests of H3. H3 predicted that the effects of the worldview dimensions (X1, X2) on 
prior issue position (M) are dependent on the issue (W1-3) – that is, Xi*W1-3M. 
Specifically, that the relationship between Xi and M is stronger in climate change issue 
conditions (W1), compared to either GMO issue conditions (W2) or vibrating machinery (W3) 
issue conditions. To test this hypothesis, it is not necessary to involve Y1-3 and Z1-5, as their 
values and variations do not affect the variables and relationships in H3 (neither theoretically 
nor in terms of the study design, because all of the measures of variables in H3 were 
administered before the stimulus manipulations Z1-5 and before Y1-3). So H3 is a question of 
simple moderation (Xi*W1-3M), not a question of the moderated mediation that 
characterizes the full theoretical model (Figure 6). This can be tested in PROCESS. 
The presence of multiple independent variables (X1,2) adds a small amount of 
complexity for analyses done in PROCESS. That is, Hayes (2017) explains that PROCESS 
can specify the effect of each of k independent variables, but it must be done by running k 
tests, with each test taking turns identifying a different independent variable as being the 
independent variable of interest and listing the rest as covariates. Thus, the presence of two 
independent variables (X1,2) requires running two tests of Xi*WiM: one that structures 
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collectivist worldview (X1) as the independent variable and egalitarian worldview (X2) as a 
covariate, and a second test that does the converse.  
H3 is not necessarily interested in comparing the XiM relationship between W2 and 
W3. Therefore, the tests of H3 need only to make two pair-wise comparisons of the XiM 
relationship: first, between W1 (climate change) and W2 (GMO labeling) and, second, 
between W1 (climate change) and W3 (vibrating machinery). To test this hypothesis, two 
separate tests (one for each Xi) of multi-categorical moderation (three levels of W) were 
performed in Hayes’ PROCESS (Model 1) in SPSS, controlling for education, deference to 
science, age, news media consumption, and the other Xi. Each test identifies the model’s R2 
change from the inclusion of the Xi*W interaction term and the significance of that 
interaction. These tests all used standardized versions of the variables (M=0; SD=1), 
resulting in standardized regression coefficients (β). All tests employed a heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard error estimator (HC3 in PROCESS; Long & Ervin, 2000) which is 
recommended by Hayes and Cai (2007) because large samples can cause even slight 
heteroskedasticity to affect the outcomes of hypothesis tests. 
While these are informative, Robinson and colleagues (2013) demonstrate that when 
testing the moderating effect of a categorical W on the linear relationship between X and Y, 
comparisons of simple slopes are superior to tests of the significance of the interaction term. 
Therefore, it is important that each PROCESS test also produces simple slopes for XiY for 
each level of W, accompanied by 95% confidence intervals for the β coefficient. These 
coefficients of these simple slopes can also be compared pair-wise with z-tests, which then 
provides a precise p-value for the difference in β. These latter methods were used to inform 
H3.  
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However, there has been some confusion and controversy regarding the specific 
formula used to compare regression coefficients. Paternoster and colleagues (1998) 
demonstrate that the denominator of the often-used formula for the z-statistic 
𝑧 =
(𝑏ଵ − 𝑏ଶ)
𝜎ො௕ଵି௕ଶ
 
is negatively biased (inflating the probability of rejecting the null). They demonstrate that the 
appropriate way to de-bias the test statistic is to instead use 
𝑧 =
(𝑏ଵ − 𝑏ଶ)
ඥ𝑆𝐸𝑏ଵଶ + 𝑆𝐸𝑏ଶଶ
 
Paternoster and colleagues (1998) find that the latter formula for the estimated 
standard error of the difference between coefficients is likely to make the most difference 
(have the largest debiasing effect) in the final test statistic when there is a large disparity in 
group sample sizes. While this is decidedly not the case in the test of H3 (which makes 
comparisons between groups of almost exactly a 1:1 ratio in size), this is a legitimate concern 
in the test of H5 (which makes comparisons between groups with a 4:1 ratio in size). 
Therefore, to ensure a rigorous test that avoids Type 1 error, I will use the latter formula – as 
recommended by Paternoster et al (1998).  
Other points of discussion on this issue have been the dangers of comparing 
standardized coefficients that originated from subpopulations with significantly unequal 
variances for an exogenous predictor, because standardized coefficients are a function of the 
variance of the predictor(s) (Buchner, 2014). For example, if the effect of yearly medical 
expenses on perceived quality of healthcare was compared between subpopulations of age, 
the massive inequality in variance in medical expenses between age groups would bias the 
standardized coefficient. However, due to random assignment in the current study, and 
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because the variables of interest are measured on 1-7 scales, there is no reason to expect that 
the variance of the variables included in any z-tests in this dissertation to vary significantly 
across comparison groups. 
Tests of RQ1 and H4. While the theoretical model implies that prior issue position is 
the key driver of the outcome variables, it is still interesting and informative to observe 
simple mean differences after controlling for these diverse attitudinal and demographic 
predictors. Specifically, RQ1 and H4a,b explore how attitudinal outcome variables (Y1-3) vary 
across uncertainty frame types, when controlling for demographic variables such as 
education and age, behavior patterns such as news media consumption, and prior attitudes 
such as worldview, prior issue position, and deference to science. This differs from the 
perspective of RQ2 and H5, which explore how the relationship between prior issue position 
(M) and Yi vary across uncertainty frame type conditions. 
To inform RQ1 and H4a,b, a one-way MANCOVA tested mean differences in each of 
the attitudinal outcome variables across the five uncertainty frame type conditions, while 
controlling for the covariates mentioned above. This test was repeated separately for each of 
the three issues. 
Tests of RQ2 and H5. RQ2 and H5 each explore how the effects of M (prior issue 
position) on Y1-3 differ across levels of Z (uncertainty frame type). As mentioned above, the 
full model (Figure 6) includes two multi-categorical moderators (W1-3 and Z1-5) that each 
moderate multiple paths. Therefore, it is not feasible to simultaneously estimate all of these 
effects in SEM. However, these relationships can be tested via PROCESS with a piecemeal 
approach. This is where the analysis reached into the lowest levels of parsimony in order to 
arrive at specificity.  
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Overall, testing H5 and RQ2 involved running a separate test of a moderated 
mediation model (Model 14 in Hayes’ PROCESS; Figure 7) for each of the three outcome 
variables in each of the three issues – a total of nine model tests. In these models, the 
moderator Z is multi-categorical (five levels of frame type). The Figure 7 model differs from 
the model displayed in Figure 6 by excluding the moderator W (issue). Considering different 
levels of W (issue) is not applicable because each test occurs within only one issue. 
These tests did not estimate the effect of both X1 and X2 on M, but rather set one as 
the modeled exogenous variable X and the other as a covariate so as to control for its effect 
on Yi. This decision was made because the indirect and direct effects of X1,2 on Y1-3 through 
M were estimated (better) by the SEM analyses of the overall basic model. The purpose of 
including X1,2 is simply to account for their effects on Yi. These tests each also controlled for 
education, gender, age, deference to science, news media consumption, and the other two 
outcome variables not modeled as Y in the test (e.g., tests of M*ZiY1 controlled for Y2 and 
Y3). All tests employed the HC3 heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error estimator in 
PROCESS, and all used standardized versions of the variables (M=0; SD=1), resulting in 
standardized regression coefficients (β). 
 
Figure 7. Moderated mediation. 
Note. Figure adapted from Hayes’ PROCESS (Model 14). 
M 
Z 
Y X
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Similar to the test of H3, the levels of Z (uncertainty frame type) were labeled with 
indicator coding (“dummy coding”), enabling the estimations of multi-categorical 
moderation effects in PROCESS. As with H3, these tests produce two options for observing 
interaction effects. First, the significance of the interaction term in the overall model (M* Yi). 
Second, the simple slopes (β) of M Yi in each specific frame type condition – any two of 
which can be compared with a z-test (Paternoster et al., 1998; Robinson et al., 2013).  
If the overall interaction term of M*Z is significant, this is evidence that the effect of 
M (prior issue position) on Yi (an outcome variable) differs between at least two of the five 
levels of Z (uncertainty frame type) included in that test. If this is the case, then individual z-
tests can be used to make post-hoc pair-wise comparisons to identify which combination(s) 
of frame types was responsible for creating the significant overall interaction term. If a z-test 
is significant, this indicates a significant difference between those two specific frame type 
conditions in their respective β of M Yi. For both, a non-significant result indicates that the 
effect of M on Yi did not vary across the levels of Z that were included in that test. Overall, 
these tests informed H5 and RQ2. 
There are some limitations to this piecemeal method. First, it does not simultaneously 
consider all the outcome variables. Thus, it does not account for shared variance among the 
outcome variables, and thus each test is somewhat inefficient. However, controlling for the 
two outcome variables not included in each test mitigates this concern. Also, to the degree 
that the CFA and SEM find that the outcome variables are independent constructs, we can 
have some confidence in taking each individual test at face value (i.e., that there is little 
shared variance among the outcome variables). However, it is important to reiterate that 
while this approach does facilitate, for each outcome variable, a test of whether each 
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uncertainty frame has a different effect than the control condition (and to compare 
uncertainty frames against each other), it does not determine whether the three outcome 
variables are differentially affected by a given uncertainty frame. 
Tests of H6. H1 describes motivated reasoning effects, such that prior issue position 
predicts attitudinal responses to the science claim. H6 posits that these motivated reasoning 
effects will be stronger in conditions with an(y) uncertainty frame than in conditions without 
(i.e., control conditions). Because the motivated reasoning effect was calculated as a 
standardized regression coefficient (the effects of M on Y1-3), H6 was tested with a z-test 
comparing standardized coefficients from a model that included only participants who 
received an uncertainty frame with the standardized coefficients from a model consisting 
only of participants in control conditions (who did not receive an uncertainty frame). This z-
test used the formula for the standard error of the difference recommended by Paternoster et 
al. (1998). 
Table 16 presents a summary of each hypothesis and research question alongside their 
corresponding tests. 
Table 16 
Hypotheses, Research Questions, and Their Corresponding Analytical Approaches 
 
 Hypotheses and Research Questions 
Analytical 
Approaches 
H1 Prior issue position predicts the outcome variables.  SEM 
H2a,b,c In climate change conditions, worldview predicts prior issue position, 
and prior issue position mediates the effect of worldview on the 
outcome variables. 
SEM 
H3 The relationship between worldview and prior issue position is 
dependent on the issue.  
PROCESS, z-tests 
RQ2 
H4a,b 
How the means of the outcome variables compare across the five 
uncertainty frame conditions, when controlling for relevant attitudinal 
priors. 
MANCOVA 
H5 The effect of prior issue position on the outcome variables is strongest 
in consensus uncertainty, relative to the other uncertainty frame types. 
PROCESS, z-tests 
RQ2 Interaction effect of uncertainty frame type condition on relationship 
between prior issue position and the outcome variables. 
PROCESS, z-tests 
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H6 The motivated reasoning effect (H1) will be stronger in conditions 
with an uncertainty frame than in conditions without. 
SEM, z-test 
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Chapter 4: Results 
4.1 Confirmatory Factor Analyses 
The remaining 1,106 cases of the random 50% split of the main study sample were 
used to confirm the measurement model identified by the global EFAs described in Section 
3.5.2. To do this, a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted in Mplus with ML 
estimation. The fit indices used to determine appropriate fit were chi-square test of model fit, 
RMSEA, CFI, and SRMR. Like with the EFAs, the chi-square test is expected to be 
significant due to the large sample size. The fit indices indicated good fit, with only the CFI 
falling outside the recommended bounds (Table 17). 
Table 17 
Values of Fit Indices from CFAs Across All Topics 
Modification Δ2 2 df p RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI CFI SRMR 
None - 2783.72 449 .000 .069 [.066, .071] .89 .047 
C5 - C6 187.91 2595.81 448 .000 .066 [.063, .068] .90 .047 
InCo1- InCo4 178.42 2417.39 447 .000 .063 [.061, .066] .91 .049 
HE2 - HE3 293.28 2124.11 446 .000 .058 [.056, .061] .92 .049 
Note. Modification= the modification to the base model, indicating allowed correlated errors between items. 
Δ2=change in chi-square test statistic from previous model; 2 = chi-square test of model fit; df = degrees of 
freedom; RMSEA = root-mean-square error of approximation; CI = confidence interval; SRMR = standardized 
root-mean-square residual. 
 
Next, modification indices, associated estimated parameter changes, and standardized 
residuals were inspected for any estimations of substantial improvement in model fit that also 
aligned with theoretical explanations or expectations. Three suggested modifications stood 
out. In particular, three of the scales (credibility, collectivism worldview, and egalitarian 
worldview) contained pairs of items that were near-synonyms with each other. Specifically, 
the fifth (C5; Trustworthy-Untrustworthy) and sixth (C6; Honest-Dishonest) credibility items 
were one such pair. The first (InCo1; “The government interferes far too much in our 
everyday lives”) and fourth (InCo4; “The government should stop telling people how to live 
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their lives”) collectivism items were another pair. The second (HE2; “Our society would be 
better off if the distribution of wealth was more equal”) and third (HE3; “We need to 
dramatically reduce inequalities between the rich and the poor…”) egalitarian items were 
another pair. Structural features like this can produce a measurement effect such that values 
for these items vary for reasons other than their common membership in the “credibility,” 
“collectivism,” or “egalitarian” factor, respectively. 
Therefore, new CFAs were conducted — allowing correlated errors between each 
pair mentioned (C5 with C6; InCo1 with InCo4; HE2 with HE3). These modifications were 
made iteratively, testing the model for fit and re-checking the modification indices after each 
test. After each iteration, the largest of the remaining modification indices was the next of the 
pairs listed above. Each modification significantly improved the overall model fit (Table 17), 
and the final model demonstrated good fit. The loadings of all parameters, factor correlations, 
and their significance are reported in Appendix C. 
Because H2 makes predictions about the climate change conditions specifically, and 
because SEM is used to test H2, an additional CFA for just the climate change conditions 
was performed with the same methods and fit indices as the full CFA. This CFA used the 372 
climate change cases contained in the second 50% random split of the main study sample (so, 
all of the climate change cases that were in the sample for the full CFA). As reported in 
Table 18, the unmodified measurement model demonstrated adequate fit, and the 
modification indices recommended – each in turn – the same modifications made to the CFA 
that used all topics. After these modifications, the fit indices demonstrated that the 
measurement model was a good fit for data from the climate change conditions. 
Table 18 
119 
 
Values of Fit Indices from CFAs in Climate Change Conditions 
Modification Δ2 2 df p RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI CFI SRMR 
None - 1241.39 449 .000 .069 [.064, .073] .91 .049 
C5 - C6 56.20 1185.19 448 .000 .067 [.062, .071] .92 .050 
InCo1- InCo4 74.71 1110.48 447 .000 .063 [.059, .068] .93 .054 
HE2 - HE3 45.64 1064.84 446 .000 .061 [.056, .066] .93 .049 
Note. Modification= the modification to the base model, indicating allowed correlated errors between items. 
Δ2=change in chi-square test statistic from previous model; 2 = chi-square test of model fit; df = degrees of 
freedom; RMSEA = root-mean-square error of approximation; CI = confidence interval; SRMR = standardized 
root-mean-square residual. 
 
4.2 Variable Descriptives 
4.2.1. Means and correlations. All means and standard deviations of each measure’s 
mean scale and those of each measure’s individual items are provided in Appendix B, along 
with skewness and kurtosis statistics for each mean scale. Notably, participants reported 
more supportive prior opinions in the climate change condition (Table 19) compared to the 
GMO labeling or vibrating machinery conditions. As expected, prior opinions about 
occupational hazards of farming (i.e., the vibrating machinery conditions) varied the least of 
all issues (Table 18), such that the standard deviations of prior opinions about climate change 
and GMO labeling were each more than 50% higher. This indicates that extreme high or low 
prior opinions regarding the issue of occupational hazards of farming (i.e., the vibrating 
machinery conditions) are very infrequent relative to the issues of climate change and GMOs. 
This is important because it is hypothesized that strong prior opinions (whether positive or 
negative) are what drive the motivated reasoning effects.  
Across issues, ratings of credibility were also significantly above the midpoint of the 
seven-point scale (Table 19). Worldview correlates with prior opinion on climate change (as 
expected), but does not have a strong relationship with prior opinion on GMOs or vibrating 
machinery (as expected). 
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Table 19 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of Multi-Item Mean Scales 
Scale M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Prior (cc) 5.08 1.52 - - - .45* .52* .74* .85* .51* .61* 
2. Prior (gmo) 3.80 1.49 - - - .42* .12* -.01* .27* .04* .30* 
3. Prior (vm) 3.96 0.94 - - - .03* .02* .10* .31* .06* .09* 
4. Def2 4.57 1.36    - .25* .35* .24* .35* .37* 
5. InCo 3.35 1.16     - .48* .27* .31* .27* 
6. HE 4.60 1.70      - .37* .39* .37* 
7. Belief 4.78 1.49       - .45* .53* 
8. BI 5.41 1.25        - .35* 
9. Cred 5.29 1.27         - 
Note: *=p<.001; all scale items and item means listed Appendix B; n = 2,247. 
M=scale mean. SD=standard deviation; Prior=prior issue position; Def2=deference to science; Posi=positivist 
understanding of science; InCo=individualist/collectivist; HE=hierarchical/egalitarian; ECgen=general external 
certainty; ICgen=general internal certainty; Cred=perceived credibility. 
 
4.2.2. Normality. Every mean scale — the variables constructed from multi-item 
attitudinal measures — rejected the null hypothesis of the Shapiro-Wilk test (p<.001), 
indicating a deviation from a normal distribution. This is expected, as large samples make 
minor deviations significant — and there is no reason to expect that self-reported opinions 
about something are necessarily normally distributed. Although the tests used in this 
dissertation assume normally-distributed variables, the parametric tests and the large sample 
used in this dissertation are fairly robust against detrimental effects of non-normality (Rasch 
& Guiard, 2004; Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). 
Still, it is worth specifying which (and to what degree) variables are not normally 
distributed. A common convention is that skewness values above |1| are considered highly 
skewed, and values between |0.5| and |1| can be considered moderately skewed. By these 
standards, prior issue position about climate change, deference to science, and credibility 
perceptions are moderately left-skewed. Perhaps the best way to reason about normality is to 
observe the distribution(s) (Figure 8).  
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Figure 8. Distributions of each mean scale used as variables in the analyses.  
 
4.2.3. Transformations. To reduce multicollinearity in tests of interactions and to 
increase the interpretability of intercepts and results, each mean scale was mean-centered 
before conducting the analyses reported in the remaining sections. Some tests used fully-
standardized scales (M=0; SD=1), and are noted as such in the future sections.  
4.3 Manipulation Checks 
4.3.1. Pilot test manipulation check. A series of ANCOVAs in the pilot test 
suggested that, overall, participants’ ratings of the distinct types of uncertainty held by the 
scientists in each news article were somewhat sensitive to the manipulations of the articles’ 
portrayals of those distinct types of uncertainty. Because post-hoc tests for ANCOVAs are 
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unavailable in SPSS, the marginal means and 95% confidence intervals are used for 
indication of significant mean differences.  
Figure 9 portrays four cluster bar graphs — each showing the mean scores on one of 
the items of the EUtype measure (e.g., perceptions of scientists’ level of deficient 
uncertainty). Each graph contains 3 pairs of bars, which are the results shown for each 
separate issue (e.g., climate change).  The pairs within each issue compare the EUtype items 
scores between the control condition and the treatment condition (that is, the treatment 
condition that corresponds with that item’s uncertainty type).  The scores are oriented such 
that higher values indicate more certainty, less uncertainty. 
For example, for climate change, scores on the consensus item (bottom left graph) are 
significantly lower in the consensus uncertainty conditions than in the control conditions (as 
shown by the error bars indicating the 95% confidence interval). This comparison approaches 
significance in the other issues, likely restricted by the low pilot test cell size (ranging from 
n=37 to n=45). Because lower scores represent more uncertainty, this is tentative indication 
that when participants are exposed to portrayals of scientists having consensus uncertainty, 
they report slightly higher perceptions of scientists having consensus uncertainty. 
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Figure 9. Pilot test manipulation check results with 95% confidence interval. 
 
Note: Each box represents one item (uncertainty type). The bars show, for each issue, the estimated marginal 
means for EUtype items (higher scores indicate more certainty) in control conditions and the treatment 
conditions that match the uncertainty type referenced by that EUtype item. Values are calculated with 
ANCOVAs controlling on prior issue position, deference to science, collectivist worldview, egalitarian 
worldview, education, and news media consumption.  
 
Similarly, for deficient and scientific uncertainty — across issues — the item means 
exhibit a trend in the expected direction with consistent, but non-significant, differences 
between the treatment condition and the control condition. The vibrating machinery 
conditions were most sensitive to the manipulation.  
In the pilot test, despite the repeated emphasis of technical uncertainty in the 
conditions with technical uncertainty-framed articles, perceptions of scientists’ technical 
uncertainty were clearly no different in those conditions compared to the control conditions. 
As mentioned in Section 3.5.3., after observing no difference, the technical uncertainty 
EUtype item was modified — for use in the main study — to more specifically reflect the 
technical uncertainty manipulation.  
To strengthen all of the manipulations and/or to ensure quality attention to the 
stimulus in the sample, the main study included the filtering question asking participants 
whether they promised to read the entire article. Also, in the main study, participants who 
completed the study and/or stimulus too slowly or too quickly were eliminated — thereby 
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reducing poor responses in the sample. Also, in the main study, a clause was added to the 
instructions that prefaced the main study stimulus that reminded participants that their careful 
attention was important to the study.  
4.3.2. Main study manipulation check. In much more convincing fashion than the 
pilot test, the manipulation check in the main study demonstrated quite clearly that 
participants were sensitive to each frame type manipulation in each issue. A series of 
ANCOVAs in the main study indicated that reported perceptions of the types of uncertainty 
held by the scientists in each news article were significantly affected by portrayals of those 
same distinct types of uncertainty. In all analyses, Levene’s test of equality of error variances 
was non-significant, indicating no evidence to reject the null hypothesis that error variances 
in the respective EUtype items are equal across groups.   
Figure 10 displays the results of the main study manipulation check, where (as in 
Figure 9) higher scores on each EUtype item indicate more certainty, and lower scores 
indicate more uncertainty. For example, for climate change, scores on the consensus item 
(bottom left graph) are significantly lower in the consensus uncertainty conditions than in the 
control conditions (as shown by the error bars indicating the 95% confidence interval). 
Figure 10 compares treatment conditions to control conditions. While not displayed in 
Figure 10, each of the mean EUtype item scores in the corresponding treatment condition 
were almost always also significantly different than the mean score of that EUtype item in 
the other treatment conditions. For example, for climate change, scores on the consensus 
uncertainty EUtype item were significantly lower (more uncertainty) in the consensus 
uncertainty conditions than in any of the other conditions. That is, the manipulations were not 
only distinguished from the control condition, but were also uniquely distinguished from the 
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other uncertainty types. The only exception is that scores on the technical uncertainty EUtype 
item in the technical uncertainty conditions did not (quite) differ significantly from that 
item’s scores in the deficient and scientific uncertainty conditions. 
  
  
Figure 10. Main study manipulation check results with 95% confidence interval. 
 
Note: Each box represents one item (uncertainty type). The bars show, for each issue, the estimated marginal 
means for EUtype items (higher scores indicate more certainty) in control conditions and the treatment 
conditions that match the uncertainty type referenced by that EUtype item. Values are calculated with 
ANCOVAs controlling on prior issue position, deference to science, collectivist worldview, egalitarian 
worldview, education, and news media consumption.  
 
As displayed in Figure 10, all differences in item scores between control conditions 
and treatment conditions are significant — for each issue. This is largely a function of the 
large number of observations per condition. However, the absolute differences in marginal 
means are much greater than those observed in the pilot test. Further, Table 20 displays all 
ANCOVA model statistics, which describe the degree to which EUtype item scores (within a 
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specific Issue) can be explained by variations in (any) stimulus frame condition. Table 20 
shows that the effects of variations in frame condition (on the individual EUtype items) in the 
main study are moderate to large (i.e., η² values from .05 to .21).  
Table 20 
ANCOVA Model Statistics: Effect of Frame Condition on EUtype Items 
 
EUtype Item Main Study  Pilot Test 
      (ISSUE) df F p η²  df F p η² 
Deficient 
 
 
  
     
      (CC) [4, 731] 46.27 .000 .20  [4, 225] 3.03 .018 .05 
      (GMO) [4, 737] 47.49 .000 .21  [4, 179] 1.56 .187 .03 
      (VM) [4, 743] 49.70 .000 .21  [4, 182] 3.84 .005 .08 
Consensus          
      (CC) [4, 731] 16.72 .000 .15  [4, 225] 5.00 .001 .08 
      (GMO) [4, 737] 15.43 .000 .07  [4, 179] 1.72 .148 .04 
      (VM) [4, 743] 50.17 .000 .21  [4, 182] 2.02 .094 .04 
Scientific          
      (CC) [4, 731] 25.07 .000 .06  [4, 225] 1.52 .196 .03 
      (GMO) [4, 737] 27.25 .000 .13  [4, 179] 2.08 .085 .04 
      (VM) [4, 743] 10.59 .000 .05  [4, 182] 2.17 .074 .05 
Technical          
      (CC) [4, 731] 17.56 .000 .09  [4, 225] 0.60 .667 .10 
      (GMO) [4, 737] 16.52 .000 .08  [4, 179] 0.80 .524 .02 
      (VM) [4, 743] 23.07 .000 .11  [4, 182] 0.05 .996 .001 
Note. df=degrees of freedom; η²=partial eta squared; 
Model statistics describe the degree to which variations in an EUtype item (within a specific issue group) can be 
explained by variations in (any) stimulus frame condition. Controlling for education, prior issue position (an 
issue-specific covariate value), egalitarian worldview, individualist worldview, deference to science, and media 
consumption.  
 
These findings demonstrate that variations in uncertainty frame types were noticed by 
participants and clearly affect their perceptions of the specific types of uncertainty that the 
scientists held. As such, these findings provide crucial context when interpreting the results 
of the tests of the hypotheses and research questions, and instill confidence in the validity and 
rigor of the findings. 
4.4 Basic Model Structure 
4.4.1.   Structural regression model. Overall – that is, aggregated across all frame 
types and issues – prior issue position was hypothesized to predict claim belief, credibility, 
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and behavioral intentions (H1) as evidence of motivated reasoning in response to scientific 
evidence. Having found the measurement model to be well-fitting to the data – and in order 
to inform H1 – the relationships between latent variables of collectivist worldview, 
egalitarian worldview, prior issue position, claim belief, credibility, and behavioral intentions 
were then tested in a structural regression model (Figure 11) with ML estimation using 100% 
of the main study data (n=2247) and 1,000 bootstrapped samples. Overall, the model 
achieved adequate fit (Table 21) such that the RMSEA (<.08), CFI (>.95), and SRMR (<.08) 
all either approach or exceed the “good fit” criteria (Hu & Bentler, 1999). 
Table 21 
Values of Fit Indices from SEM Variants 
Issues  2 df p RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI CFI SRMR 
All Issues Combined  4741.64 586 .000 .056 [.055, .058] .91 .07 
Climate Change Only  2289.35 586 .000 .063 [.060, .065] .91 .08 
Note. Δ2=change in chi-square test statistic from previous model; 2 = chi-square test of model fit; df = degrees 
of freedom; RMSEA = root-mean-square error of approximation; CI = confidence interval; SRMR = 
standardized root-mean-square residual. 
 
Figure 11 displays selected paths of interest – suppressing many direct and indirect 
effects that are not relevant to H1 or are not meaningful when issues are combined. A figure 
displaying all direct and indirect paths with their standardized coefficients is available in 
Appendix D, and the individual item loadings and error terms are displayed in Appendix C. 
As predicted by H1, the results indicate that – aggregated across three diverse science 
issues and controlling for a plethora of other potential effects – individuals’ prior opinion 
toward a general science issue predicts their attitudinal responses to reports of new scientific 
evidence. This is a clear motivated reasoning effect and appears to be strongest for claim 
beliefs and weakest for behavioral intentions. H1 is supported by these results.  
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Figure 11. SEM path model of all conditions combined. 
Note: Standardized path coefficients; ***= p<.001; hidden covariates in the model are education, age, deference 
to science, and news media consumption. A full model displaying all direct and indirect paths, their 
standardized coefficients, factor loadings, and error terms is available in Appendix D. 
It is interesting to note that while collectivist (X1) and egalitarian (X2) worldview 
dimensions relate strongly to each other, Figure 11 displays a weak effect on prior issue 
position (M). Accordingly, the standardized indirect effects (not displayed; see Appendix D) 
of X1 and X2 on Y1-3, respectively, range from a minimum of .018 to a maximum of .073. 
These findings have a simple explanation. Namely, this analysis was conducted using the full 
main study dataset, which includes all three issues (Appendix D displays a separate full 
model for each separate issue). Only in the climate change issue (Figure 14) was it 
hypothesized that the worldview dimensions would predict prior issue position. In the GMO 
(Figure 12) and vibrating machinery (Figure 13) conditions, respectively, these relationships 
are much different from each other and from the climate change conditions.  
One of the purposes of selecting these three particular science issues was that they 
differed in the nature and strength of the link between worldview and prior issue position, 
and in the strength of prior issue position itself (which determines the motivated reasoning 
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effect). As reported in Section 4.2.1, extreme high and low prior issue positions are more 
likely in the climate change and GMO labeling conditions, and less likely in the vibrating 
machinery conditions. In theory, strong prior opinions are what produce motivated reasoning 
effects. Figure 14 shows that, in climate change conditions, the motivated reasoning effects 
of prior issue position on each of the outcome variables are strong and significant. Figure 12 
shows that, in GMO labeling conditions, the motivated reasoning effects on claim beliefs and 
credibility perceptions are strong and significant, but the effect of prior issue position on 
behavioral intentions is not significant. Figure 13 shows that, in vibrating machinery 
conditions, the motivated reasoning effect on claim beliefs is significant, but the effects of 
prior issue position on credibility perceptions and behavioral intentions are not. These 
findings are consistent with the assumptions that were made in choosing this assortment of 
issues for analysis in this dissertation. 
 
Figure 12. SEM path model of GMO labeling conditions only. 
Note: Standardized path coefficients; ***= p<.001; hidden covariates in the model are education, age, deference 
to science, and news media consumption. A full model displaying all direct and indirect paths, their 
standardized coefficients, factor loadings, and error terms is available in Appendix D. 
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Figure 13. SEM path model of vibrating machinery conditions only. 
Note: Standardized path coefficients; ***= p<.001; hidden covariates in the model are education, age, deference 
to science, and news media consumption. A full model displaying all direct and indirect paths, their 
standardized coefficients, factor loadings, and error terms is available in Appendix D. 
H2a,b,c focus on the climate change conditions, specifically (Figure 14). In particular, 
H2a predicts that in the climate change conditions, prior issue position (M) will (at least 
partially) mediate the effect of the worldview dimensions (X1,2) on the outcome variables 
(Y1-3). The SEM testing this climate-change-specific hypothesis used the same methods and 
measures as the SEM testing H1 in the full dataset. As reported in Table 20, the model 
demonstrated adequate fit. Figure 14 displays all direct and indirect paths, the standardized 
coefficients of the direct paths, and the indirect effects. A full model complete with factor 
loadings and error terms is available in Appendix D. 
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Figure 14. SEM path model of climate change conditions. 
Note: Standardized path coefficients; ***= p<.001; **=p<.01; hidden covariates in the model are education, 
age, deference to science, and news media consumption. Break-out boxes identify the specific indirect effects of 
Xi on Yi by way of M; A full model displaying all direct and indirect paths, their standardized coefficients, 
factor loadings, and error terms is available in Appendix D. 
As predicted by H2b, the results indicate that in the climate change conditions, the 
effect of hierarchical-egalitarian worldview (X2) on climate change prior issue position (M) 
is significant and positive. As predicted by H2a, prior issue position on climate change 
accounts for a significant portion of the effect of hierarchical-egalitarian worldview (X2) on 
each of the attitudinal outcome variables. The standardized coefficients of the indirect effects 
are listed in the break-out boxes on the right side of Figure 14. These indirect effects 
represent the effect of Xi on Yi that is explained by M. 
However, contrary to H2a, prior opinion did not mediate the effect of individualist-
collectivist worldview (X1) on Y1-3. This is because, contrary to H2b, there was no effect of 
collectivist worldview on prior issue position – as well as almost no direct effect of 
collectivist worldview on Y1-3. It is clear from these results that hierarchical-egalitarian 
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worldview plays the dominant role in explaining prior general opinions about the broad issue 
of climate change. It is also very interesting to note the strong motivated reasoning effect 
within the context of climate change, with M being a strong predictor of Y1-3 – most notably 
of claim beliefs (β=.811). That is, an individual’s prior general opinion on climate change 
affects their subsequent claim beliefs, scientist credibility ratings, and behavioral intentions 
measured as responses to a new scientific finding about the effects of climate change. 
H2c predicted that any significant residual direct effects of X1 and X2 on Y1-3 would 
be positive in direction, not negative. This hypothesis is supported by the results, as the 
residual direct effects that exist – those of egalitarian worldview on each Y1-3, and of 
collectivist worldview on behavioral intentions – are indeed positive in direction. 
4.5 Conditional Effects 
4.5.1. H3: Moderating effect of issue. H3 predicted that the relationship between X 
(worldview) on M (prior issue position) is moderated by W (issue), such that the effect of X 
on M would be stronger in climate change conditions compared to either GMO labeling 
conditions or vibrating machinery conditions. Table 22 reports the results of two separate 
tests (one for each Xi) of multi-categorical moderation performed in PROCESS (Model 1) 
using SPSS. The simple slopes for XiM for each level of W are displayed in Table 22, 
accompanied by 95% confidence intervals for the standardized β coefficient. As 
recommended by Robinson et al. (2013), these differences in β between levels of W were 
also compared using z-tests – using the formula recommended by Paternoster et al. (1998) – 
resulting in a z-statistic and p-value for each pair-wise comparison (Table 22). 
Table 22 
The Moderating Effect of Issue 
 Model (Xi*WM)   Xi*W Interaction 
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 R2 F df1 df2 p  ΔR2 F p 
X1 (collectivist) .33 165.61 11 2235 .000  .04 74.77 .000 
X2 (egalitarian) .40 244.78 11 2235 .000  .11 203.47 .000 
           Simple Slopes   z-test of difference from XiM in CC 
Collectivist β t SE P LLCI ULCI  βdiff z SEdiff p n 
        X1M in CC  .384 12.02 .032 .000 .322 .447  - - - - - 
        X1M in GMO  .025  0.61 .041 .541 -.055 .105  .435 6.91 .052 .000 1492 
        X1M in VM -.109 -3.42 .0315 .001 -.170 -.046  .596 10.98 .045 .000 1498 
Egalitarian             
        X2M in CC  .629 20.55 .031 .000   .569   .689  - - - - - 
        X2M in GMO -.112 -2.80 .040 .005 -.190 -.034  .741 14.71 .050 .000 1492 
        X2M in VM -.052 -1.82 .029 .070 -.108   .004  .629 16.27 .036 .000 1498 
Note. All analyses included covariates of education, deference to science, age, news media consumption, and 
the other Xi; CC = climate change conditions; GMO = GMO labeling conditions; VM = vibrating machinery 
conditions; R2 = variance in prior issue position explained by the model; df = degrees of freedom; ΔR2 = change 
in R2 from the interaction term; LLCI = lower limit of 95% confidence interval; ULCI = upper limit of 95% 
confidence interval; βdiff = difference in β from the β of XiM in CC; n = combined samples size of compared 
groups; z = z-statistic from z-test comparing standardized β coefficients; SEdiff = denominator of z-test formula 
as prescribed by Paternoster et al. (1998).  
 
Table 22 demonstrates that the respective effects of collectivist worldview and 
egalitarian worldview on prior issue position differ by issue. Specifically, the z-test 
comparisons of standardized coefficients indicate a significant difference between climate 
change conditions and GMO conditions, and also a significant difference between climate 
change conditions and vibrating machinery conditions. That is, both worldview dimensions 
have a stronger effect on prior issue position about climate change than about either GMOs 
or occupational hazards of farming (vibrating machinery). Thus, H3 is supported. 
4.5.2. H4a,b and RQ1: Means of outcome variables across conditions. H4 and RQ1 
explore the ways in which individuals’ reported claim belief, credibility perceptions, and 
behavioral intentions vary (or are invariant) across uncertainty frame type conditions. 
Specifically, H4a predicts that Y1-3 will each be lower in conditions with a consensus 
uncertainty frame than in control conditions. H4b predicts that Y1-3 will each be lower in 
conditions with a consensus uncertainty frame than in conditions with technical or scientific 
uncertainty frames. For the remaining uncertainty frame types, RQ1 asks how Y1-3 compare 
across uncertainty frame conditions. One way to inform H4 and RQ1 is to combine the cases 
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of an uncertainty frame from all three issues and compare it to the control condition cases 
from all three issues. This would evidence whether – irrespective of issue – Y1-3 differed 
between uncertainty frame conditions. Another way is to separate the analyses by issue, so 
that issue-specific effects might become apparent. That is, it is reasonable that, for example, 
Yi could differ significantly between two frame conditions in the context of climate change, 
but not differ significantly between those same two conditions in the context of GMO 
labeling or vibrating machinery. The former method – which combines all three – would 
mask that important and interesting interaction effect that occurs only within climate change. 
However, the findings of the latter method might not be generalizable to other issues. 
Therefore, this dissertation employed both approaches.  
To inform H4a,b, Figure 15 displays the results of MANCOVAs with LSD post-hoc 
pair-wise comparisons that show how the marginal means (with 95% confidence intervals) of 
Y1-3 in the consensus uncertainty condition(s) compare to the marginal means of Y1-3 in each 
of the other frame type conditions. Table 23 reports the test statistics of the interaction term. 
This analysis is repeated four times – once with all issues combined (top left) and once in 
each of the three issues separately. In Figure 15, the y-axis reflects non-standardized units on 
the 7-point scale used to measure each outcome variable, and the point where y=0.00 
represents the Yi value in each other frame type condition(s), respectively. Thus, confidence 
intervals that do not reach the x-axis (y=0.00) indicate a significant difference (p<.05) in the 
value of Yi between the consensus uncertainty condition(s) and the other uncertainty frame 
type condition(s) that is referenced. Confidence intervals that cross the x-axis (y=0.00) 
indicate a non-significant difference  (p≥.05). For example, within climate change conditions 
(top right), claim belief is significantly lower in consensus uncertainty conditions than in 
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technical uncertainty conditions (yellow box) and also significantly lower than in scientific 
uncertainty conditions (blue box). 
  
  
Figure 15. Comparing the consensus uncertainty marginal means of DVs to those in each other frame type. 
 
Note. Values displayed are differences between the estimated marginal mean of that DV in the consensus 
uncertainty condition(s) and the estimated marginal mean of that DV in another frame type condition(s). Values 
are marginal means (and 95% confidence intervals) in non-standardized units, reflecting points on the 7-point 
mean scales measuring each attitudinal outcome variable. All values produced by MANCOVAs controlling for 
education, deference to science, prior issue position, collectivist worldview, egalitarian worldview, age, and 
media consumption. 
 
Figure 15 indicates partial support for H4a,b, displaying a pattern where claim belief 
and credibility perceptions are slightly, but significantly, lower in consensus uncertainty 
conditions than the other frame types – for all issues except GMO labeling. It should be 
noted, though, that these statistically significant differences have very small effect sizes 
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(Table 23). In the GMO labeling issue, specifically, none of the outcome variables 
significantly differed between consensus uncertainty frame conditions and the other frame 
conditions. Also, there were no instances of behavioral intentions differing between 
consensus uncertainty frame conditions and other frame conditions. 
Table 23 
Significance of Interaction Term in MANCOVAs 
Issues DV df df error F p η² 
All Issues Belief 4 2234 2.69 .030 .01 
 Cred 4 2234 4.86 .001 .01 
 BI 4 2234 0.88 .478 .00 
Climate Belief 4 730 3.87 .004 .02 
Change Cred 4 730 2.44 .045 .01 
 BI 4 730 1.64 .162 .01 
GMO Belief 4 736 1.90 .108 .01 
Labeling Cred 4 736 2.20 .067 .01 
 BI 4 736 0.52 .724 .00 
Vibrating Belief 4 742 1.82 .123 .01 
Machinery Cred 4 742 4.65 .001 .02 
 BI 4 742 1.20 .309 .01 
Note. Values report the MANCOVA test results that specify the interaction term. Tests controlling for 
education, deference to science, prior issue position, collectivist worldview, egalitarian worldview, age, and 
media consumption. η²=partial eta-squared; Belief=claim belief; Cred=credibility; BI=behavioral intentions; 
All=all issues combined; CC=climate change; GMO=gmo labeling; VM=vibrating machinery. 
 
Informing RQ1, Figure 16 displays the marginal means of each DV in each of the five 
framing conditions, with 95% confidence intervals. Like Figure 15, Figure 16 first reports 
these mean differences that emerge with all issues combined (top left), and then within each 
issue separately. The values of any Yi displayed in Figure 16 are centered to the full-sample 
mean of that Yi, which is the x-axis (y=0.00). 
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Figure 16. Estimated marginal means and confidence intervals of DVs across frame types and issues. 
 
Note: Values are estimated marginal means (and 95% confidence intervals) in non-standardized units, reflecting 
points on the 7-point mean scales measuring each attitudinal outcome variable. All values produced by 
MANCOVAs controlling for education, deference to science, prior issue position, collectivist worldview, 
egalitarian worldview, age, and media consumption. 
 
Similar to the findings reported in Figure 15 regarding H4, Figure 16 and Table 23 
demonstrate that within each issue (and thus also across issues) participants’ reported 
behavioral intentions do not differ significantly across frame conditions. However, for both 
claim beliefs and perceive credibility, there are significant differences between some 
conditions in some issues (Table 23). The only pattern with consistency is that of lower claim 
beliefs and lower credibility perceptions in consensus uncertainty conditions compared to all 
other conditions (specifically in climate change and vibrating machinery conditions) – that is, 
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what was reported above regarding H4. To answer RQ1, it is adequate to summarize that 
these data do not exhibit convincing evidence of differences in claim belief and/or credibility 
perceptions between any pairs of conditions that do not include consensus uncertainty.  
When separated by topic, there are small but significant differences between the 
consensus uncertainty condition and the control condition in levels of both claim belief and 
credibility perceptions, such that these attitudes are significantly lower in the consensus 
uncertainty condition (Figure 15; top left). No such differences were evidenced in the GMO 
or vibrating machinery conditions (Table 23).  
These findings indicate partial support for H4, such that in the context of climate 
change – the most polarized and partisan of these three issues – consensus uncertainty frames 
significantly and negatively affect claim beliefs and credibility perceptions. However, this 
interpretation of these findings must be considered tentative. This is because, over the span of 
many tests of mean differences with a “significance” threshold of p=.05, it is probable that 
there will be a few significant results that are simply due to chance. Aside from replication 
tests in independent samples, two ways to separate the proverbial wheat from the chaff – and 
therefore to inform H4 and RQ1 – are to look for evidence of a cohesive pattern of findings 
that emerges across the many tests and, second, to apply relevant theoretical reasoning to the 
individual significant finding(s) and/or to any emergent pattern. 
The results of these tests do demonstrate a pattern where exactly one uncertainty 
frame type is likely to be associated with reported levels of claim belief and credibility 
perceptions that are slightly different than those associated with the rest of the frame types. 
Specifically, consensus uncertainty tends to be associated with slightly lower claim belief 
and lower credibility. Interestingly, this effect was decidedly absent in the GMO labeling 
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conditions. Further discussion and interpretations of these – and other – findings are offered 
in Chapter 5. 
4.5.3. H5 and RQ2: Interaction between prior issue position and frame type. H5 
predicted that the motivated reasoning effect – that is, the relationship between prior issue 
position (M) and the attitudinal outcome variables (Y1-3) – would be strongest in the 
consensus uncertainty conditions. RQ1 asked how the MY1-3 relationships in the other 
frame type conditions compare with each other. 
As described in Section 3.7.2, H5 and RQ2 were informed by using PROCESS to fit 
the data to Model 14 (Figure 7), such that the effect of X2 (with X1 as a covariate) on each Yi 
is mediated by M (prior issue position) and the MYi relationship is moderated by levels of 
Z (frame type). These tests were conducted within each issue separately – that is, three tests 
of the effects on Y1-3 in climate change conditions, three tests of the effects in GMO labeling 
conditions, and three tests of the effects in vibrating machinery conditions. In each test, 
uncertainty frame type was included as a multi-categorical variable that moderates the 
relationship between M and Yi. The PROCESS output provided the significance of the 
overall interaction terms (M*Yi), which are reported in Table 24. When this omnibus test is 
significant, it indicates that at least one of the pair-wise comparisons between the five levels 
of frame type evidences a significant difference. Nonsignificant test statistics indicate that the 
MYi relationship is not significantly different in any pair-wise combination of the five 
levels of frame type in that issue for that Y. 
Importantly, these PROCESS tests also provided simple slopes that specify the beta 
coefficient for each MYi relationship. Like with H3, these coefficients are standardized 
because the mean scales were standardized for these analyses (M=0; SD=1). Pair-wise 
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comparisons of these standardized coefficients with z-tests (Paternoster et al., 1998) inform 
H5 and RQ2 by identifying how the effect of M on Yi compares across individual 
combinations of frame types and issues. 
Table 24 
Overall Interaction Effects of M*Z1-5 Yi 
 Model (X2M*Z Yi)  β range M*Z Interaction 
 R2 F df1 df2 p |βmax-βmin| ΔR2 F p 
CC          
          Belief .78 142.79 18 724 .000 .039 .00 0.21 .934 
          Credibility .51 42.30 18 724 .000 .315 .01 2.88 .022 
          Behavioral .34 25.60 18 724 .000 .099 .00 0.42 .793 
GMO          
          Belief .25 12.56 18 730 .000 .120 .00 0.34 .848 
          Credibility .29 17.32 18 730 .000 .147 .00 0.60 .661 
          Behavioral .25 15.08 18 730 .000 .215 .01 1.27 .280 
VM          
          Belief .45 33.85 18 736 .000 .068 .00 0.25 .909 
          Credibility .37 28.17 18 736 .000 .107 .00 0.40 .809 
          Behavioral .35 27.60 18 736 .000 .129 .00 0.69 .599 
Note. Each row indicates a separate model test that includes 5 levels of uncertainty frame condition as a multi-
categorical moderator of MYi. Each test used egalitarian worldview as the exogenous predictor (X), prior 
issue position as the mediator (M), and controlled for collectivist worldview, education, age, deference to 
science, news media consumption, and the two Y variables not tested in the model. 
CC = climate change conditions; GMO = GMO labeling conditions; VM = vibrating machinery conditions; R2 = 
variance in Yi explained by the model; df = degrees of freedom; βmax-βmin = absolute value of the difference 
between the largest and smallest β values found in the five MYi paths (one per uncertainty frame condition) 
included in that row; ΔR2 = change in R2 from the interaction term. 
Table 24 clearly displays that these data do not indicate interaction effects between 
prior issue position and frame type when predicting claim belief, credibility perceptions, or 
behavioral intentions. That is, the motivated reasoning effects found in the test of H1 do not 
differ across uncertainty frame types. For greater specificity, Appendix E reports the results 
of t-tests comparing the β coefficient of MYi in every possible pair-wise combination of 
the five levels of Z (frame type), for each Y and within each issue. Only two of the 90 
possible comparisons are significantly different, which could be explained simply by chance. 
Overall – as a result of this robust and rigorous test with a large representative sample of 
participants who exhibited awareness of, and sensitivity to, the frame type manipulations – 
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we can confidently say that these data indicate that the MYi effect is not different across 
uncertainty frame conditions. 
These results must be interpreted in the context of the findings of the manipulation 
check and with those from H1, H4, and RQ1.  In sum, although individuals tended to 
recognize and correctly identify the existence of distinct types of scientists’ uncertainties in 
the reports of scientific evidence, and even though prior issue position predicts the attitudinal 
outcome variables, it seems clear that these uncertainty portrayals do not have a significant 
effect on how closely attitudinal responses fall in line with prior opinion. However, this does 
not mean that the uncertainty types do not have different effects on attitudinal responses. 
Specifically, the findings of the tests of H4 and RQ1 indicate that portrayals of consensus 
uncertainty (in climate change and vibrating machinery) sometimes do result in lower claim 
belief and credibility. Thus, the failure to reject the null hypothesis of H5 means that the 
regression slopes of MY are parallel across the different levels of Z (frame type), with 
consensus uncertainty having a different intercept than the other frame types (for belief and 
credibility in climate change and vibrating machinery). For example, the degree to which 
consensus uncertainty decreases attitudinal support is equal across the prior issue position 
spectrum. This has both discouraging and encouraging implications for science 
communication practice. These implications, and others, are discussed in Chapter 5. 
4.5.4. H6: Control conditions compared to all uncertainty conditions. H6 
predicted that the relationships between prior issue position (M) and the attitudinal outcome 
variables (Y1-3) – that is, the motivated reasoning effect – would be stronger in conditions 
where individuals were exposed to any uncertainty frame, compared to conditions where 
individuals were not. To test this hypothesis, first, two SEM models were estimated – one 
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with data from all of the uncertainty frame conditions (all types and issues), and one with 
data from all of the control conditions (all issues). Both demonstrated good fit to the data 
(Table 25). Then, z-tests were used to compare the standardized β coefficients of each MYi 
in each model, using the formula recommended by Paternoster et al. (1998). The results of 
the tests are reported in Table 26. 
Table 25 
Fit Indices of Uncertainty-Only SEM and Control-Only SEM 
Issues 
2 df p RMSEA 
RMSEA 
90% CI CFI SRMR 
All Uncertainty Conditions 3863.03 586 .000 .056 [.054, .057] .91 .065 
All Control Conditions 1599.18 586 .000 .062 [.059, .066] .89 .077 
Note. Δ2=change in chi-square test statistic from previous model; 2 = chi-square test of model fit; df = degrees 
of freedom; RMSEA = root-mean-square error of approximation; CI = confidence interval; SRMR = 
standardized root-mean-square residual. 
 
Figure 17. SEM Path Model of All Uncertainty Conditions Combined 
Note: Standardized path coefficients; ***= p<.001; hidden covariates in the model are education, age, deference 
to science, and news media consumption. A full model displaying all direct and indirect paths and their 
standardized coefficients is available in Appendix D. 
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Figure 18. SEM Path Model of All Control Conditions Combined 
Note: Standardized path coefficients; ***= p<.001; hidden covariates in the model are education, age, deference 
to science, and news media consumption. A full model displaying all direct and indirect paths and their 
standardized coefficients is available in Appendix D. 
Table 26 
Test of the Moderating Effect of Any Uncertainty Frames vs Control 
 β SE p n   
Claim Belief (Y1)       
       Uncertainty Conditions .542 .021 .000 1804   
       Control Conditions .579 .041 .000 443 z p 
       Difference -.037 .046 - 2247 -0.80 .212 
Credibility Perceptions (Y2)       
       Uncertainty Conditions .228 .025 .000 1804   
       Control Conditions .375 .048 .000 443 z p 
       Difference -.147 .054 - 2247 -2.72 .003 
Behavioral Intentions (Y3)       
       Uncertainty Conditions .143 .026 .000 1804   
       Control Conditions .228 .057 .000 443 z p 
       Difference -.085 .063 - 2247 -1.36 .087 
Note: β = standardized path coefficient indicating effect of prior issue position (M) on Yi in the SEM estimated 
from the data of the specified group of experimental conditions; SE = standard error of β; z = test statistic from 
z-test of the difference between the βs of the MYi paths in the two models.  
Table 26 indicates that the motivated reasoning effect (MYi) in uncertainty frame 
conditions is not stronger than in control conditions. Specifically, there is no significant 
difference between uncertainty frame conditions and control conditions in terms of the effect 
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of prior issue position on claim belief or on behavioral intentions. There is a small difference 
in their respective effects on credibility perceptions. However, this difference is in the 
opposite direction of the hypothesis, such that the relationship between prior issue position 
and credibility perceptions is slightly stronger in the control conditions. Thus, these data and 
test results do not support H6. This is not surprising, given the results of the tests of H5 and 
RQ2, which already presented very convincing evidence that MYi does not differ in 
response to different uncertainty frames. 
Table 27 
Hypotheses, Research Questions, and The Results of their Respective Tests 
 
 Hypotheses and Research Questions Results 
H1 Prior issue position predicts the outcome variables.  Supported (partial) 
H2a,b,c In climate change conditions, worldview predicts prior issue position, 
and prior issue position mediates the effect of worldview on the 
outcome variables. 
Supported (partial) 
H3 The relationship between worldview and prior issue position is 
dependent on the issue.  
Supported 
RQ1 
H4a,b 
How the means of the outcome variables compare across the five 
uncertainty frame conditions, when controlling for relevant attitudinal 
priors. 
Supported (partial) 
H5 The effect of prior issue position on the outcome variables is strongest 
in consensus uncertainty, relative to the other uncertainty frame types. 
Not Supported 
RQ2 Interaction effect of uncertainty frame type condition on relationship 
between prior issue position and the outcome variables. 
None Significant 
H6 The motivated reasoning effect (H1) will be stronger in conditions 
with an uncertainty frame than in conditions without. 
Not Supported 
   
 
4.6 Summary 
Together, the results of these many tests accomplished four goals. First, to validate 
the design and implementation of this study – which is evidenced by the manipulation check 
results and the reliability and validity of the measures. Second, to test the fit of the data to a 
theoretical model linking worldview, prior issue position, and attitudinal responses to 
uncertainty-framed science. Third, to explore whether (and to what degree) attitudinal 
responses are affected differently by different types of uncertainty frame portrayals. Finally, 
145 
 
fourth, to determine whether the motivated reasoning effect (i.e., the effect of prior issue 
position on the attitudinal outcome variables) differs across uncertainty frame types.  
The strength of the first two of these steps provided a foundation that secured 
confidence in the findings associated with the third and fourth goals. While H5 and H6 were 
not supported, these non-significant results produced by this rigorous test hold important, 
practical implications for science communication research and practice. These, and other, 
implications are discussed at length in Chapter 5, along with detailed explanations and 
interpretations of the findings of this dissertation.  
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Limitations, and Future Directions 
 
5.1 The Context and Rationale 
Uncertainty is native to science and to wholly accurate science communication 
(Popper, 1959; Shanteau, 2000; Stocking, 2010). However, the uncertainties that are 
inevitable in individual findings of science and in larger processes of science are often not 
clearly communicated to the public. Instead, many public-facing science communicators 
purposefully avoid discussing the uncertainties that are attached to the science they 
communicate – often out of fear of adverse effects of those uncertainty frames (Ebeling, 
2008; Retzbach & Maier, 2015; Stocking, 1999). To date, it has remained unclear whether 
these fears are well-founded. Even the social scientists who study public understanding of 
science and science communication often lack a clear or cohesive understanding of what the 
effects of uncertainty frames are. Ironically, this is in part due to consensus, deficient, 
scientific, and technical uncertainties. 
At first glance, it appears that the uncertainty about uncertainty has been caused by 
contradictory empirical findings – with some studies finding that uncertainty frames are 
associated with greater attitudinal support for a claim, other studies finding an association 
with less attitudinal support, and still others finding no effect (Tables 4-5). However, this 
dissertation’s conceptual explication of distinct uncertainty types enabled a more nuanced 
interpretation of the extant empirical literature. Specifically, that frames of consensus 
uncertainty have been associated with none of the reported findings of positive effects of 
uncertainty frames – only negative effects and nonsignificant effects. Conversely, technical 
uncertainty and scientific uncertainty frames have been associated with positive and 
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nonsignificant effects. Deficient uncertainty has not been a focus of the extant empirical 
literature.  
The explication of the nature of these four types of uncertainty frames, and the 
consequent revised organization of the literature, which reveals more consistent results 
within each type of uncertainty, are unique and valuable contributions of this dissertation. 
Still, though, Tables 4 and 5 did not answer the core question of the (different) effects of 
(different) uncertainty frames in science communication. This is because the collection of 
findings reported in Tables 4 and 5 are the product of disparate methods, issue contexts, 
concepts, and measures – all of which are confounding factors that render meta-analytic 
conclusions impossible. The literature lacked a controlled experiment that compared the 
effects of each uncertainty frame type within one consistent methodology. 
All of these factors together created a moment in science communication research 
where progress toward the answers to a question with universal importance and tangible 
applications was obfuscated despite many uncoordinated efforts occurring within disciplinary 
silos. Therefore, this dissertation was an effort to move this field of research forward – 
providing a rigorous and robust set of findings that inform the relative effects of different 
types of uncertainty frames in science communication and explore how these effects might 
differ across individual and contextual variables. 
5.2 The Priority of Method 
Much of this dissertation is exploratory. That is, it breaks new ground with the 
explication of new constructs and asks research questions about new relationships involving 
those new constructs. The few hypotheses were based on existing general theory and a small 
amount of related empirical research. Therefore, it was apparent early on in this process that 
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many of the key findings of interest to this dissertation would not be able to be compared to 
substantial precedent set by prior research. Because of this, it was of utmost importance to 
construct a methodological approach that was a) derived from prior theory and research 
enough to provide clear tests of justified hypotheses, b) robust enough to enable full 
confidence that any effects that do exist would very likely be detected, and c) rigorous 
enough that it would be very unlikely that spurious or confounding explanations would be the 
cause of any observed effects or non-effects. This is reflected in the extensive and meticulous 
care given to designing and validating the methodological components and procedures of this 
dissertation, as well as the extensive and meticulous care given to describing those efforts to 
readers of this manuscript. 
By testing the effects of uncertainty in each of three distinct issues (that each differed 
in nature and degree of polarization in public opinion), this dissertation enabled preliminary 
evidence as to whether each of the (non)significant findings might be an artifact of one 
unique issue context or – instead – whether they might be generalizable to multiple, diverse 
issue contexts. By structuring each issue’s claim to refer to risk to farmers, the potential for 
confounding influences across issues is reduced. By using a large national sample that 
approximated census levels of education, age, and gender – and contained equal proportions 
of self-identified liberals and conservatives – this dissertation instills confidence that the 
results are not unique to a niche, non-representative subgroup of American adults.  
By filtering the sample to only include those who agreed to read the whole news 
article, viewed the news article for a reasonable amount of time, passed two comprehension 
checks, completed the survey in reasonable time, and exhibited no evidence of straight-lining 
response patterns, this dissertation maximized the likelihood that all responses (and, thus, the 
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results of the analyses) indicate genuine personal opinions given in conjunction with careful 
consideration of the stimulus. By applying a rigorous sequence of reliability analysis, 
exploratory factor analysis, and confirmatory factor analysis in the development of the 
measures and the measurement model, this dissertation demonstrates clear evidence that the 
multi-item scale measures have strong convergent and discriminant validity. By first 
establishing the manipulation check and the basic model structure, this dissertation builds a 
foundation of confidence in conceptual, theoretical, and methodological validity upon which 
to base interpretations of the later tests of interaction effects. 
5.3 The Results  
5.3.1. The manipulation check. A manipulation check can be the cornerstone of the 
interpretations of the results of the later hypothesis tests. That is, the purpose of the 
manipulation check is to effectively eliminate or mitigate the possibility that the 
(non)significance of the test results is due to a manipulation or treatment that is too weak, too 
strong, too blatant, or too subtle. For this study, when one has confidence in the manipulation 
check, this enables confidence that the observed test results are in fact the effect of the 
manipulation, and not, instead, the result of a manipulation that went unnoticed 
(perceptually) or was misinterpreted (conceptually). 
In this dissertation, the manipulations were news portrayals of scientists having 
different types of uncertainties about new research. Naturally, the manipulation check was 
measures of participants’ perceptions of the different types of uncertainties that scientists 
have about that new research. In short – as reported in Section 4.3.2 – the results of the 
manipulation check demonstrated that participants demonstrated awareness and 
understanding of the manipulations. This is evidenced by the fact that in each uncertainty 
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frame condition (e.g., consensus uncertainty condition, deficient uncertainty condition) 
participants’ ratings of the corresponding item on the external uncertainty type (EUtype) 
scale (e.g., consensus uncertainty item, deficient uncertainty item) was significantly different 
from the ratings of that item in the control condition (Figure 10). To summarize, people 
reported believing that scientists had significantly more _type_ uncertainty when they read an 
article that said scientists indeed had _type_ uncertainty, compared to when they read an 
article that didn’t mention uncertainty at all, and also compared to when they read an article 
that said scientists had some other uncertainty type.  
One natural follow-up consideration is whether the reported EUtype item scores were 
also different from the scores of the same item in other uncertainty frame conditions. For 
example, it is clear that perceptions of scientists’ consensus uncertainty were greater in the 
consensus uncertainty condition than in the control condition. But were perceptions of 
consensus uncertainty in the consensus uncertainty condition also greater than perceptions of 
consensus uncertainty in the technical, scientific, and deficient uncertainty conditions? The 
answer is “yes” – this was true within every issue and overall across issues for consensus, 
deficient, and scientific uncertainty – such that the differences between their item scores in 
their corresponding frame type condition and their item scores in any and all other frame type 
conditions were all significant. Like with the other uncertainty type items/conditions, the 
scores of the technical uncertainty item were most extreme (most reported technical 
uncertainty) in the technical uncertainty condition, as expected, and these levels were 
significantly different than the control and consensus conditions. However, participants also 
reported moderate levels of external (scientists’) technical uncertainty in the deficient and 
scientific uncertainty frame conditions, and these estimated marginal means were not quite 
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significantly different from those in the technical uncertainty condition. That is, the scores on 
the technical uncertainty item in the technical uncertainty condition did not (quite) differ 
significantly from the technical uncertainty item scores in the deficient and scientific 
uncertainty conditions. This is understandable, since the technical uncertainty item (“…these 
findings are rough estimates that could vary by a large margin…”) is also often salient to 
situations of deficient uncertainty and scientific uncertainty.  
Overall, this indicates that all uncertainty frame type manipulations are noticed and 
correctly understood as representing the uncertainties held by scientists. In addition, 
participants perceived consensus, deficient, and scientific uncertainty in scientists as each 
being distinct from portrayals of all other types and from portrayals of no uncertainty. 
Participants perceived technical uncertainty as being distinct from no uncertainty, which 
approached significance. In sum, these findings indicate that participants were indeed taking 
notice of the existence of uncertainty frames portrayed in the stimuli and even were correctly 
parsing the semantic differences between individual uncertainty types. 
5.3.2. The structural model. One of the central purposes of testing the structure of 
the conceptual model with SEM was to specify the motivated reasoning effects (H1) within 
and across issues while simultaneously accounting for all the other relevant variables and 
their respective errors. Across all three issues combined (Figure 11), this hypothesis was 
supported – with stronger effects of prior issue position on claim belief and credibility than 
on behavioral intentions (which reflects most research on attitude-behavior relationships). 
When the SEM is performed within each issue separately, interesting but expected 
differences emerge between issues (Figures 12-14). 
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First, overall, the motivated reasoning effect is clearly stronger for climate change 
than for the other two issues. Specifically, all paths between prior issue position and the 
outcome variables are β>.400, and the effect on claim belief is β=.811. This means that in 
climate change conditions, every 1 SD increase in prior general opinion about the broad issue 
of climate change resulted in a 0.8 SD increase in beliefs in the likelihood and severity of the 
risk to farmers that was presented as a new scientific finding in the news article, and a 0.4 SD 
increase in both perceived credibility of the scientists and intentions to engage in behaviors 
that would help mitigate the consequences of this threat. This model controls for education, 
general deference to science, and worldview – among other covariates – leaving motivated 
reasoning as the primary explanation for these strong effects. 
The strength of motivated reasoning in response to science regarding climate change 
is not surprising, as prior empirical research cited above has demonstrated that many people 
have strong positive and negative opinions about climate change (generally), that in turn 
cause motivated reasoning in response to (specific) climate change information. What is 
more interesting is the observed difference in the motivated reasoning effects between issues. 
Specifically, these effects are much smaller in the models of GMO labeling and vibrating 
machinery opinion. In these two issue contexts, the motivated reasoning effect of prior issue 
position on behavioral intentions is not significant. The effect on credibility is significant in 
the GMO labeling conditions, but is less than half of the size (β=.200) of the effect on 
credibility in climate change (β=.430). 
There are a few possible inferences that could be drawn from these findings. One is 
that regardless of issue and the distribution of prior general issue positions, there is a 
significant motivated reasoning effect of prior issue position on (at least these three) specific 
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claim beliefs. This interpretation is reasonable – given that specific beliefs about a claim 
have more conceptual similarity to general beliefs about the broader issue than, say, 
intentions to engage in specific behaviors. However, this interpretation should be considered 
in conjunction with the caveat that this relationship could be partly an artifact of survey 
designs where responses to measures of general prior issue position can prime similar 
responses to the subsequent measures of agreement with a scientific claim about that issue.  
A second possible inference from these findings is that the climate change issue has 
some characteristic that causes stronger motivated reasoning effects. It is understandable that 
the vibrating machinery model would show smaller or non-significant motivated reasoning 
effects, given that most people have weak or non-existent prior opinions on this issue and 
thus their tendencies to believe the claim, perceive the scientists as credible, and be willing to 
help would be not significantly influenced by those weak or non-existent prior opinions. A 
more difficult puzzle is that the GMO labeling model displays much weaker motivated 
reasoning effects than the climate change model, even though they exhibit similar variance in 
prior issue position. One explanation is that the partisan nature of the climate change issue 
makes it more value-laden and identity-salient, while prior opinions about the issue of GMOs 
are (among other differences) less related to identity, culture, worldview, and values and are 
more of a cerebral, calculated opinion. If there is indeed a significant difference in the roots 
and nature of prior opinions about these two general issues, this could impact the degree to 
which individuals are open to processing new evidence independent from their prior stance 
on the issue.  
Another potential explanation for the strong association between prior issue position 
and the attitudinal outcome variables in climate change is the skewed distribution of climate 
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change prior opinions in the sample (Figure 8). Like the U.S. population at large, there are 
quite a few more people with strongly or partially supportive opinions toward the scientific 
consensus on climate change than there are people with strongly or partially oppositional 
opinions. This is not the case for prior opinions on the general issues of GMOs and 
occupational hazards of farming (i.e., vibrating machinery conditions) (Figure 8), which 
include a greater proportion of moderate opinions. If it is the case that strong positive and 
negative opinions are more likely to be associated with motivated reasoning, then it is likely 
that the issue with the most extreme (rather than moderate) opinions (i.e., climate change) 
has the strongest motivated reasoning effects.  
A third possible inference is that the items selected to comprise the behavioral 
intentions factor do not have a strong causal link with prior issue position. With the exception 
of the motivated reasoning effect in climate change, behavioral intentions are not affected by 
prior issue position. Further, as will be discussed in Section 5.3.4, the mean scale of 
behavioral intentions was not differentially affected by uncertainty frame manipulations. 
Thus, while the behavioral intentions items demonstrated convergent and discriminant 
validity, it is possible that they either a) lack construct validity or b) are measuring types of 
behaviors that are simply not affected by prior issue position and/or frame type 
manipulations. Of course, any explanation would have to also reconcile the significant effect 
found in climate change. One reasonable explanation is that these items comprising the 
behavioral intentions factor (donating, voting for a tax, voting for a tax break) are seen as 
logical consequents of general issue support in climate change, but not in GMO labeling or 
vibrating machinery. This could be because real-world instances of these kinds of behaviors 
are much more common and familiar in the context of climate change than in GMOs and 
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vibrating machinery. That is, in climate change, these particular behavioral intentions are an 
extension of supportive attitudes toward the issue/claim, while in GMOs and vibrating 
machinery, these particular behavioral intentions are more closely associated with 
individuals’ broader attitudes toward helping other people, regardless of the issue. This is 
likely, because Appendix E shows that both the GMO labeling model and the vibrating 
machinery model show significant residual direct effects of collectivist worldview on 
behavioral intentions (GMO β=.126; VM β=.145) and of egalitarian worldview on behavioral 
intentions (GMO β=.259; VM β=.468). But in these two models, both worldview dimensions 
have no indirect effects on behavioral intentions that are explained by prior issue position.  
The assorted SEM models (Figures 12-14; Appendix E) reveal further interesting 
insights about how the effects of each worldview dimension vary across issues. In sum, the 
collectivist dimension of worldview does not predict prior issue position in any issue. In each 
issue, it has a small residual direct effect on behavioral intentions, but no direct effect on 
claim belief or credibility, and (again) no indirect effect through prior issue position. 
However, the egalitarian dimension of worldview does – in each issue – have a significant 
effect on prior issue position, to varying degrees and directions.  
Interestingly, in every instance where an indirect effect of egalitarian worldview (X2) 
on an attitudinal outcome variable (e.g., behavioral intentions) via prior issue position was 
nonsignificant (all of such instances occurred in the GMO and vibrating machinery models), 
there was instead a significant direct effect of egalitarian worldview on that outcome variable 
(Appendix E). Together, these findings indicate that the egalitarian worldview was much 
more influential than collectivist worldview in terms of their effects on prior attitudes and 
attitudinal responses to the stimuli. This is not easily attributed to inadequate construct 
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validity in the measure of collectivist worldview, because the collectivist worldview measure 
has been frequently validated and employed successfully in prior research – and in this study, 
the relationship between collectivist and egalitarian worldview dimensions is robust as 
expected (ranging from β=.446 to β=.659). Also, an independent samples t-test comparing 
the mean levels of the individualist-collectivist mean scale scores between self-identified 
conservatives (N=1124; M=2.93) and self-identified liberals (N=1123; M=3.76) indicates a 
significant difference in the expected direction, t(2245)=18.03, p=.000, such that liberals are 
more collectivist than conservatives. It is not clear at this point why collectivist worldview 
did not play a more important role in the model. It may be that collectivist worldview just 
happened to not be relevant to prior general opinions on these three particular issues and also 
not relevant to beliefs, credibility perceptions, and behavioral intentions regarding these 
particular claims, but is still relevant to prior issue positions, beliefs, credibility, and 
behavioral intentions in other science issues and claims. Future research should explore the 
degree to which these nonsignificant associations can extrapolate to other contexts, to other 
measures of these variables, and to other variables entirely.  
Also, it is interesting to note that although egalitarian worldview had a negative 
relationship with prior issue position about GMOs (indicating that people with more 
egalitarian worldviews were less in agreement with the scientific consensus on GMOs), there 
were still small but significant positive direct relationships between egalitarian worldview 
and perceived credibility of the scientists and between egalitarian worldview and behavioral 
intentions. This means that even though high-egalitarians tended to think less positively of 
GMOs than low-egalitarians do, they still tended to think more positively of the scientists 
doing GMO research than low-egalitarians did. The same was true for behavioral intentions. 
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Strong egalitarian worldview may have been associated with lower support for the use of 
GMOs in general, but it was associated with greater intentions to enact behaviors to support 
those negatively affected by GMO labeling laws. 
5.3.3. The indirect and interaction effects in the climate change model. H2a was 
supported, in that prior issue position on climate change mediates the relationship between 
egalitarian worldview and each of the three attitudinal outcome variables. This was partial 
mediation, as there were smaller but significant and positive residual direct effects (H2c) of 
egalitarian worldview on each of the outcome variables. H2a was only partially supported 
because this mediation effect was not found with collectivist worldview. This is because, in 
partial support for H2a, only egalitarian worldview had a positive effect on prior issue 
position on climate change, while collectivist worldview had no significant effect.  
The test of H3 added more confidence in the overall structural model, and provided a 
specific test of the differences between the issues of climate change, GMO labeling, and 
vibrating machinery in terms of the relationships between the worldview dimensions and 
prior issue position. Specifically, the findings indicated that the relationships between 
worldview dimensions and prior issue position were significantly stronger in climate change 
conditions than in GMO or vibrating machinery conditions. 
Overall, these findings validate the core pieces of the conceptual model. Also, they 
indicate the importance of measuring and modeling prior issue position when predicting 
attitudinal response variables in the context of climate change, instead of just relying on 
worldview as a proxy for prior opinion, and especially instead of relying on a combined 
measure of collectivist and egalitarian worldview as a proxy for prior opinion. That is, 
certainly in the context of GMOs and occupational hazards of farming – but also in the 
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context of climate change – the motivated reasoning effects that are of interest to this 
dissertation are likely better modeled as the influence of prior general issue position, rather 
than as the influence of ideological worldview. 
Having established clear evidence for the validity of the manipulations and of the 
underlying conceptual model, we can now discuss the conditional effects involving variations 
in uncertainty frame types. 
5.3.4. The comparisons of DV means across frame types. H4a,b predicted that 
frames of consensus uncertainty would be associated with lower belief certainty, perceived 
credibility, and behavioral intentions compared to control conditions, to technical uncertainty 
conditions, and to scientific uncertainty conditions. Figure 15 shows how the estimated 
marginal means of each variable in the consensus uncertainty condition(s) compare to the 
estimated marginal means of the same variable in a different frame type conditions. Overall, 
for all issues combined, and for climate change and vibrating machinery separately, claim 
belief and credibility perceptions are significantly lower in the consensus uncertainty 
conditions than in technical, scientific, and deficient uncertainty conditions (providing partial 
support for H4b). For climate change and vibrating machinery, separately, claim belief is 
significantly lower in the consensus uncertainty conditions than in the control conditions and 
for climate change only, credibility is significantly lower (providing tentative partial support 
for H4a).  
One explanation for this is precisely the rationale given for the hypothesis and given 
by the prior research that has found negative effects of consensus uncertainty. That is, that 
portrayals of consensus uncertainty have especially negative effects because they introduce 
the possibility of expert support for both sides, thereby legitimizing and giving credibility to 
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positions of dissent. One other explanation for this observed effect is that it is, in fact, 
scientific, technical, and deficient uncertainty frames that are exhibiting positive effects, 
which is why consensus uncertainty’s effects appear relatively negative. That is, the potential 
positive effects on the part of technical, scientific, and deficient uncertainty frames (e.g., 
increased attitudes of trust and perceptions of transparency, as reviewed in Chapter 2) may be 
what is causing the observed difference between consensus uncertainty frames and the 
others. Not, per se, the “negative effects” of consensus uncertainty. 
One way of determining which (or both) explanation is justified is by investigating 
the mean levels of these variables in the control conditions. But this seems to vary by issue. 
That is, in the climate change condition (Table 16), the mean levels of belief and credibility 
in each frame type indicate that the control condition was just as high (or higher) than any of 
the uncertainty types. But in the vibrating machinery condition (Table 16), the mean levels of 
belief and credibility in each frame type indicate that the significant differences between 
consensus uncertainty and the three other uncertainty frames (deficient, scientific, technical) 
is because consensus uncertainty tends to be slightly lower than the control condition, and 
deficient, scientific, and technical tend to be slightly higher than the control condition. These 
differences are, however, too small to offer confident conclusions.  
There are two inferences that we can have confidence about. The first is that in two 
very different types of issues (in terms of prior opinions), consensus uncertainty frames – in 
many situations – seem to be associated with the lowest claim beliefs and credibility 
perceptions. This echoes the existing findings of the negative effects of consensus 
uncertainty frames (Table 4), and goes beyond them by comparing them to the other 
uncertainty frames. This is important because, for science communication practice, it is not 
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entirely helpful to only know that consensus uncertainty frames have detrimental effects 
when compared to a control condition of no uncertainty. That is, it is not particularly helpful 
because science communicators often do not have the option of communicating with no 
uncertainty. In the real world, a “control condition” message to the public can be misleading 
and therefore harmful in its own way. This makes the results of these comparisons between 
consensus uncertainty and the other three uncertainty frame types (H4b) especially valuable 
for public-facing science communicators. It gives science communicators reassurance that 
not all uncertainty is certain to have negative effects. 
The second confident inference is that these data indicate no significant differences in 
the respective effects of scientific, technical, and deficient uncertainty on attitudinal outcome 
variables of claim belief, credibility perceptions, and behavioral intentions. These three types 
do have effects that are decidedly more positive than consensus uncertainty and decidedly 
not different from each other (for any variable in any issue). Also, as a reminder, distinctions 
between these uncertainty types were clearly made in the manipulation check, such that 
participants reported beliefs of highest external uncertainty of a particular type precisely 
when they stimulus contained that type (although, in fairness, this is least true of technical 
uncertainty). So the finding that attitudinal outcome variables did not vary across conditions 
of scientific, technical, and deficient uncertainty is not likely because participants failed to 
see a difference between any of these three types of frames. Rather, it is more likely that 
these three different frames just do not have different effects (on these attitudes, in this study, 
on these issues, among this sample, etc.). 
The most surprising of these is deficient uncertainty. Prior to the hypotheses, I offered 
a tentative statement that said, in effect, although there is not enough theoretical or empirical 
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evidence to officially hypothesize, that deficient uncertainty will have negative effects akin 
to consensus uncertainty, I would not at all be surprised if it did. Miles and Frewer (2003) 
found that individuals in a focus group identified deficient uncertainty as the least desirable 
type for scientists to have. In a strong rejection of these tentative suspicions, the effects of 
deficient uncertainty did not differ from those of the types of uncertainty frames that have 
occasionally been associated with positive effects (scientific and technical). Deficient 
uncertainty communicates science’s current state of ignorance and shortcoming in 
knowledge. This could be considered a negative thing that reflects poorly on the capability 
and achievements of science and scientists. However, this could also be considered a positive 
thing that reflects well on the honesty, transparency, and even ambitions of science and 
scientists (quite similar to scientific uncertainty). I had not considered this latter 
interpretation of deficient uncertainty before seeing the results. Further, to reconcile these 
findings with those of Miles and Frewer (2003), it could be that people list deficient 
uncertainty as being maximally undesirable but in fact do not react negatively to portrayals of 
it. Of course, this has especially valuable implications for public-facing science 
communicators. If it is true that portrayals of deficient uncertainty do not result in negative 
effects on beliefs and credibility, then they should not be hesitant to openly present 
preliminary findings and new breakthroughs as still having some uncertainties.  
There are two truly puzzling findings of these tests. First, behavioral intentions were 
no different across any frame type conditions within any issue or combinations of issues. 
That is, these manipulations of uncertainty frame did not appear to affect behavioral 
intentions, and this lack of effect was constant across issues. However, effects on beliefs and 
credibility perceptions did emerge. One potential explanation that is well-supported by theory 
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is that changing behaviors is more difficult than (and thus less likely than) changing beliefs 
(e.g., McGuire, 2012). Another potential explanation that is supported by the findings of the 
SEM models is that the behavioral intentions measure used in this study was somehow 
semantically and conceptually disconnected from either the stimulus itself or from the 
concept it was designed to measure. The answer to this is impossible to determine at this 
point, so it is important for future research to determine if other measures of behavioral 
intentions in other contexts are similarly unaffected by variations in uncertainty frame types.  
The second puzzling finding is that consensus uncertainty (or any of the frame types) 
did not have an effect on any outcome variables in the GMO conditions like it did in the 
climate change and vibrating machinery conditions. Excepting random chance, one potential 
explanation is that prior opinions about GMO foods were much less supportive of the 
scientific consensus than were prior opinions about climate change or vibrating machinery. 
This could affect attitudinal responses in the consensus uncertainty condition (in particular) 
such that people who were more opposed to GMO foods (and thus supportive of GMO 
labeling) would be more amenable to a report that repeatedly mentioned that scientists admit 
they have consensus uncertainty. So, given that the GMO issue had the lowest mean prior 
opinion score and the largest number of strong opponents, positive responses to consensus 
uncertainty by this segment of the prior opinion distribution could raise the mean attitudinal 
response scores in the consensus uncertainty condition of GMO foods. There is (at least) one 
problem with this explanation, though. If this were the case to a significant degree, then there 
would be a significant interaction of M*ZYi in the GMO conditions involving consensus 
uncertainty and claim beliefs, and consensus uncertainty and credibility. There are not 
(Appendix F). 
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Another possible explanation for this puzzling finding is that individuals expect (or 
are at least accepting of) more consensus uncertainty about GMO foods than about an issue 
like climate change where consensus is highly publicized, or an unfamiliar science issue like 
vibrating machinery where there is no reason for most people to assume anything except 
scientists being in agreement. The issue of GMO foods is widely known to be controversial 
and polarized, but the scientific consensus is not widely publicized. Therefore, portrayals of 
disagreement among scientists (i.e., high consensus uncertainty) are expected, rather than a 
violation of a normative state. This implies that “acceptable” levels of uncertainty vary across 
issues. This is also argued by Jensen and Hurley (2012) who invoke the theory of motivated 
information management (Afifi & Weiner, 2004) to explain why uncertainty frame effects 
vary by issue. This explanation raises some widely-applicable questions that should be 
addressed by future research: How do expected, desired, and tolerated levels and types of 
uncertainty vary across science issues? How do these expectations, desires, and tolerations of 
levels and types moderate the effects of uncertainty frames? This field is ripe for growth and 
will produce actionable recommendations for science communicators. 
5.3.5. The interactions of motivated reasoning with frame types. The tests of H5, 
H6, and RQ2 indicated that the motivated reasoning effects of prior issue position on each 
attitudinal outcome variable (i.e., MYi) are not meaningfully different between any pairs or 
combinations of frame types in any issue. This is a very interesting finding, and has several 
important implications and applications. Also, as demonstrated in detail above, it is important 
to emphasize that these nonsignificant test results are likely not due to participants’ 
inattention in the study generally, inattention to the stimulus or manipulations specifically, or 
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misunderstanding or conflation of those subtle frame type manipulations. This study took 
many steps to ensure confidence in whatever results the tests produced.  
First, researchers and theorists should consider the following. A natural initial critique 
of the observed lack of differences across frame types is to reference the multiple studies that 
have, individually and separately, found different effects for different frame types, 
respectively (Tables 4-5). However, one must keep in mind that one of the reasons for 
finding non-significant differences in a controlled experiment that only varied frame type 
(within each issue) is precisely because it was a controlled experiment that only varied frame 
type. For example, imagine if Study A tests the effects of consensus uncertainty about an 
issue/claim in which consensus uncertainty among scientists (and/or portrayals of it) is not 
normal (e.g., climate change), while Study B tests the effects of technical uncertainty about a 
different issue/claim in which technical uncertainty by scientists (and/or portrayals of it) is 
normal (e.g., earthquake risk probability). It would not be surprising for the former to have 
more negative effects and the latter to have more positive effects. This is, in fact, what most 
of the literature has done to date. However, it is fallacious to assume that these two findings 
together indicate that it is the difference in these two frame types that is primarily (or even at 
all) responsible for the observed different effects. That is, despite findings of vastly different 
effects found in different studies, it may be the case that when all other things are held equal, 
variations in uncertainty frame type have no differences in effect. It is important to remember 
that this is precisely why this dissertation’s large controlled experiment was necessary and 
continues to be valuable. 
With that said, the lack of significant differences between frame type conditions in 
the strength of the motivated reasoning relationship indicates several implications for theory 
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and research and several applications for science communication practice, as well as some 
tempering caveats and considerations. Overall, in response to H5 and RQ2, these data 
indicate that it is not the case that consensus uncertainty or any other uncertainty type 
significantly increases or decreases the likelihood for individuals to exercise motivated 
reasoning in their attitudinal responses to new claims of science. Importantly, this is 
consistent in all three topics – indicating that the large variations in the nature, strength, and 
distribution of prior opinions across issues did not change the interaction effects of frame 
type with prior issue position on the outcome variables to a significant degree.  
These findings are consistent with the large body of evidence in the framing literature 
(e.g., O’Keefe & Jensen, 2007; 2009) that has indicated that framing effects are typically 
small, are context-specific, and play a very minor role in comparison to the effects of prior 
beliefs and identity associations. In this study, the results indicate strong, reliable, and 
predictable motivated reasoning effects that are not significantly different across variations in 
whether or which uncertainty frames were used. The focus of this dissertation on the nature 
and effects of uncertainty frames should not be interpreted as a perspective that message 
manipulations are the most influential forces (or even most important research agenda items) 
in science communication. Rather, it furthers the trend in framing research that is indicating 
that frame variations have small effects that emerge in very particular combinations of 
contexts and individual characteristics.  
Still, these findings have simultaneous negative and positive implications for science 
communication practice. The glass-half-full perspective is that portrayals of uncertainty do 
not exacerbate motivated reasoning and, thus, do not exacerbate opinion polarization. If these 
findings are generalizable, science communicators can present a great many of the interesting 
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and necessary uncertainties of science without fear of creating further distrust and opposition 
in those who already hold oppositional opinions. Opinion divides will not increase (nor 
decrease) from uncertainty portrayals.  
The glass-half-empty perspective is that the observed negative effects of consensus 
uncertainty (H4 and RQ1) are not unique to those with oppositional prior opinion. That is, if 
we think of the relationship between prior issue position and each outcome variable (MYi) 
as a slope (which it is), the effect of consensus uncertainty portrayals (relative to other 
uncertainty types or no uncertainty) is not to change the slope (i.e., differential effects), but 
instead to decrease the levels of that outcome variable (Yi) in everyone equally. In consensus 
uncertainty conditions, the slope of the motivated reasoning relationship (MYi) is parallel 
to, but has a lower intercept than, the other uncertainty frame conditions. This indicates that 
those with supportive prior attitudes are similarly negatively affected by consensus 
uncertainty portrayals (about climate change and vibrating machinery, in this study, using 
these measures, in this sample, etc.). 
One should not, though, interpret this evidence as demonstrating that uncertainty 
frames never exacerbate motivated reasoning in the real world. Despite the manipulation 
check demonstrating that participants were able to notice and distinguish between the frame 
type manipulations, it may be the case that much stronger, weaker, more repeated, more 
ecologically valid, or otherwise different implementations of uncertainty frames are 
necessary to trigger those interaction effects referenced in H5 and RQ2. It is likely that 
framing effects are most potent over time, and that the effects of different uncertainty types 
are most potent when internalized into individuals’ subconscious schema and not when 
engineered as a few short sentences. As mentioned above, there may also be large differences 
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between issues in the degree to which variations in uncertainty frame types affect the 
motivated reasoning effect. Preliminary evidence also indicates that differing amounts of 
portrayed (consensus) uncertainty have differential effects on attitudes, particularly for those 
with high trust in science (Chinn et al., 2018). These are all valuable questions for future 
research. The theoretical rationale of this dissertation should not be rejected on the basis of 
one study’s results. Rather, a position of scientific, deficient, and technical uncertainty should 
be adopted regarding these preliminary findings of no effect. But, still, future research can 
build off of this foundation of conceptual explication, rigorous design, robust power, and 
preliminary findings. 
5.4 The Limitations 
With every study, there are aspects of theory, design, execution, and analysis that 
each (and together) limit the interpretability, reliability, and generalizability of the results. 
With a study that is both exploratory and complex – such as this one – there are many such 
limitations. In this section, I summarize many of them – although I am sure that there are 
others that have eluded my attention. 
First and foremost, it is not the case that there are necessarily four types of 
uncertainty (frames), and if there happen to be, it may not be these four. The typology 
presented here is a valid one, but it is just one of many potential valid categorizations of the 
broader concepts of uncertainty and uncertainty portrayals. It may be that under a different 
(whether more or less nuanced) categorization, the results of this study would have been 
different. For example, consensus uncertainty could be subdivided into “competing opinions 
by entities” and “conflicting evidence/findings.” It may be the case that portrayals of 
disagreement between experts have different effects than portrayals of mixed evidence in the 
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extant body of research. Or, it could be that it is efficient and appropriate to combine 
technical, scientific, and deficient uncertainty into one higher-order dimension (e.g., “known 
uncertainties”) and to treat all kinds of consensus uncertainties as the other dimension (e.g., 
“competitive uncertainties”). This typology would reflect one of the core explanations given 
in this dissertation for the observed pattern of effects (i.e., that consensus uncertainty is 
unique in that it provides evidence for multiple competing sides). As such, it would not 
necessarily be more/less incorrect than the four-piece taxonomy, and the question of the 
whether it would be more/less useful remains open. In general, it is important for 
communication scholars to not settle for the definitions and taxonomies that have been 
invented by others. These are among the most unscientific fixtures in our discipline, and they 
should be treated with levels of skepticism that they deserve. 
Second, the operationalizations of each uncertainty frame in the stimuli are just one 
set of countless possible variants of valid operationalizations, and are not necessarily the 
most optimal set (by any standard). In fact, it is not difficult to identify elements of the 
manipulations that could have confounding effects, including many ways in which the 
operationalizations of the four uncertainty frame types may be inequivalent in ways other 
than just the type of uncertainty. For example, the technical uncertainty conditions do not use 
the word “although” to introduce the uncertainty clause in the article sub-heading, while all 
three of the remaining uncertainty type conditions do. Also, there is no good metric to assess 
whether the degree of uncertainty portrayed and/or strength/vividness of the portrayal were 
equivalent across frame types. Further, future research is needed to investigate whether the 
position of uncertainty clauses in a sentence, and/or in the article overall, determines effects. 
An additional consideration is that consensus uncertainty was operationalized by portraying 
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the scientists as admitting that other scientists disagree. This may produce much different 
responses than if the article directly reported the competing opinion from the disagreeing 
scientist(s) separately. That is, one person admitting that there is competing evidence might 
even have positive effects on credibility by demonstrating willingness to give full disclosure 
(similar to deficient, scientific, and technical uncertainty). If it is the case that consensus 
uncertainty has an especially strong effect on attitudinal responses (relative to other 
uncertainty types or to no uncertainty), it is very important that future research determine 
how variants of consensus uncertainty differ in their effects.  
Third – for all its careful attention to design – this experiment does not test the effects 
of uncertainty frames in an ecologically valid environment. As with many scientific studies, 
participants did not encounter the article in a natural way, were aware that the stimulus and 
measures were part of a study, and some may have even been aware that these types of 
studies are experiments that manipulate characteristics of the stimulus. Of course, many 
safeguards were put in place to mitigate these concerns and to ensure the quality of the 
responses. But these safeguards are themselves a potential limitation, as they ensured that the 
data consisted of responses from people who paid close attention to the entire article, 
understood it, and carefully considered their opinions of it. This is not representative of a 
great deal of information consumption in the real world. Rather, people skim headlines, scroll 
past content, and rarely engage in concerted self-reflection about their opinions about one 
piece of content. The elaboration likelihood model (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) suggests 
that there is good reason to expect that highly motivated, highly focused individuals often 
respond to messages differently than those who are processing with low effort and low 
attention, particularly when the message components of interest are small nuanced variations 
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in phrasing. This is not to say with certainty that different effects would have emerged if 
participants were less attentive, as some studies have found that elaboration accentuates 
framing effects and other have found that elaboration mutes framing effects (Rothman & 
Updegraff, 2010). Rather, the reader should simply make a note that this sample may have 
processed the messages with higher elaboration than occurs in the real world, due to the 
artificial nature of the study and due to the “quality” filters. Future research could even 
investigate differences between results with low- and high-attention (or, elaboration) 
participants. 
Fourth, the results of this study are fully subject to the criticisms of all studies of one-
shot message effects. Specifically, attitudes rarely change after one message and when they 
do the change is likely small and/or transient. Longitudinal studies and/or studies using a 
diversified mix of media sources and platforms are difficult and expensive, but they are often 
much more informative and much more important than this dissertation. 
Fifth, this dissertation does not focus on comparing relationships between issues – in 
part because the issues are likely inequivalent in innumerable inherent and irreconcilable 
ways. For example, the issues likely differ in terms of public understanding of the science, 
public awareness and understanding of the issue, scientific consensus, threat severity, threat 
salience, and the degree to which a particular degree of scientists’ uncertainty is perceived as 
acceptable. While these differences can be an advantage when a consistent pattern of 
(non)significant findings emerge across all three disparate issues, it also introduces a 
significant confound when interpreting results that emerge in one or two issue(s) but not the 
other(s). 
171 
 
Sixth, the complexities of this experimental design precluded simultaneous testing of 
all pieces of the conceptual model, which resulted in numerous tests in a piece-meal analytic 
approach. Conducting numerous tests can reduce confidence in the findings, as the chances 
of Type 1 error increases rapidly. It is important that future studies test and re-test pieces of 
model of relationships between constructs that was proposed here.  
Seventh, also regarding the conceptual model, most traditional theoretical persuasion 
models structure behavioral intentions as an antecedent and consequent of attitudes (Fishbein 
& Ajzen, 2011; McGuire, 2012). In the conceptual model proposed by this dissertation, 
behavioral intentions is placed at the same level as beliefs and perceived credibility. It may 
be more theoretically and conceptually accurate to treat beliefs and credibility as mediators 
that in turn influence behavioral intentions. The possibility of this relationship is further 
evidenced by the results of the models presented above, which indicated small or 
nonsignificant direct and indirect effects of prior issue position on behavioral intentions, but 
strong associations between credibility and beliefs with behavioral intentions. Future 
analyses could explore this. 
Eighth, the nature of the sample recruitment and survey administration process makes 
it impossible to control the environment(s) in which this study was performed. Within the 
sample, there is likely great variation in the motives for participation and the general study 
experience. More importantly, this might include systematic variation such that certain 
demographic or attitudinal segments of the sample were motivated to opt-in and/or 
experienced the study in a consistently different manner than other segments of the sample. 
Such differences could cause systematic differences in response patterns between segments. 
One way to further explore how the differences in study experience affect the results is to use 
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measures of study completion time and of stimulus viewing time as covariates, or even as 
modeled moderators.  
Ninth, there are many aspects of the measures used in this dissertation that introduce 
known and unknown confounds. Some were significantly modified from the form used in 
prior studies, and some were constructed from scratch for the purposes of this particular 
study. For example, the behaviors included in the behavioral intentions measure were 
selected with minimal justification, and were not a logical consequent of the stimulus itself. 
This disconnect and minimal development may have been the cause of the nonsignificant 
effects. As such, one cannot conclude from this dissertation that uncertainty frame variations 
do not affect behavioral intentions, in general. In addition, these Likert-type self-response 
measures do not differentiate the reported strength of attitude from its indelibility, 
confidence, or perceived evidence-basis. This is important because, for example, there may 
be a difference in motivated reasoning effects between attitudes that are reported as “strong” 
in their extremity on a scale and, instead, attitudes that are based on a great deal of evidence 
or experience. Further, many measures could conceivably be combined or subdivided into 
different variables or factors, which may produce different results. For example, it may be 
that the interaction effects of uncertainty type is different for the trustworthiness dimension 
of credibility compared to the expertise dimension. This concern is mitigated by the evidence 
of unidimensionality of the credibility factor, but this does not preclude the possibility of 
differential effects. Overall, it is likely that these (or any) self-response items, mean scales, 
and latent factors are far from the ideal method of assessing these (or any) attitudinal 
constructs. The limits on construct validity associated with such measures are applicable in 
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most survey experiments but also are especially applicable in this one that uses (but still 
carefully validates) new and specialized measures. 
Relatedly, tenth, the main study did not make full use of the constructs of positivist 
understanding of science and deference to science, which are both included in the full 
theoretical model (Figure 1). For positivist understanding of science, the exclusion was 
because the pilot test found it to have low reliability and small or nonsignificant correlations 
with the outcome variables, and also because it introduced a risk of priming thoughts about 
the nature of uncertainty in science. However, it is intuitive that individual differences in 
opinions about the role of uncertainty in science would moderate attitudinal effects of 
uncertainty frames, and prior research has supported this (Rabinovich & Morton, 2012). 
Thus, it is important for future research to improve this measure and more closely investigate 
this construct and its influence in the effects of uncertainty. Similarly, individuals’ trait-level 
tolerance for uncertainty and context-specific preferences for uncertainty are important to 
assess in order to specify the degree to which observed effects can be attributed to the 
message characteristics and which are better-attributed to individual and contextual factors. 
To preserve some parsimony in this study, the analyses simply used deference to science as a 
covariate, rather than as a modeled predictor of the outcome variables (a relationship that 
would be moderated by uncertainty frame). This interaction effect should be explored by 
future research because an individual’s trust in, or deference to science, likely has an 
important effect on their tolerance for – and/or interpretations of – uncertainty by scientists. 
Eleventh, in an exploratory study with large ambitions, a complex design, and many 
layers of analysis, one of the limitations is that there are a) too many limitations to document, 
and b) more limitations than are readily apparent. Thus, the reader should interpret the 
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findings of this dissertation in full consideration of any additional limitations that they think 
are applicable. 
5.5 The Future Directions 
The conceptual explication, theoretical model, and empirical tests presented in this 
dissertation form a springboard for many future research opportunities – many of which I 
hope to undertake. First, given that this particular taxonomy of uncertainty frames is at once 
innovative, exploratory, and (somewhat) subjective, it is important for future research to 
explore and expand on whether functional differences underlie the responses to these 
different uncertainty frame types. That is, although Chapter 1 demonstrates intuitive 
linguistic and semantic distinctions between the four uncertainty frame types, this does not 
necessarily imply differences in fundamental cognitive responses to, or interpretations of, 
these different types. The degree to which, and the manner in which, these different frames 
spark different schema or emotions is the fundamental reason for expecting there to be (or 
not be) different effects. Given the nascent state of research into the effects of uncertainty 
frames, these questions present valuable opportunities for future research. 
Also, it may be the case that (say, consensus) uncertainty frames about Claim A in 
Issue 1 may not only have negative effects on attitudes about Claim A in Issue 1, but also 
about Claim B in Issue 1. A highly relevant practical example is if scientists are portrayed as 
having consensus uncertainty about the effects of climate change (which would not be 
inaccurate), this portrayal may also increase perceptions that scientists have consensus 
uncertainty about the existence or causes of climate change (which would be inaccurate). 
This “uncertainty transfer” might also follow patterns of motivated reasoning. I hope to 
continue the research on uncertainty frame effects in this direction.  
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In addition, I hope to explore how variations in dosage (quantity and strength) and 
source (e.g., sources beyond just scientists) moderate the effects of uncertainty frames. This 
dissertation only tested the effects of one level of dosage, and that particular level may not 
have been the level associated with the strongest (or weakest) effects. Similarly, this 
dissertation only tested the effects of portrayals of uncertainty on the part of scientists. There 
are many other entities that are often portrayed as having uncertainties about science (Rice et 
al., 2018), and responses to these uncertainties may be different than responses to the 
uncertainty by scientists that were manipulated in this dissertation. 
Further, it is likely that affective responses are relevant to the effects of uncertainty 
frames. Specific to science communication in climate change, studies have indicated that the 
effects of frames are mediated by felt emotions (e.g., Nabi, Gustafson, & Jensen, 2018). That 
is, framing manipulations have effects on attitudinal outcome variables to the degree that 
they elicit discreet emotions of hope or fear. Applied to the present investigation, it could be 
that a _type_ uncertainty frame has a significant effect on _outcome variable_ to the degree 
that it evokes a particular emotional response. If this was the case, tests of effects of frame 
type that do not consider emotional response would be (partially) muted. For example, it 
seems probable that portrayals of consensus uncertainty would be associated especially 
negative effects on beliefs, credibility, and behavioral intentions in instances where it elicited 
positive emotional responses (i.e., positive affective response to the portrayed discord). 
Conversely, consensus uncertainty would not be associated with negative effects on beliefs, 
credibility, and behavioral intentions when the affective response is negative (e.g., frustration 
that agreement is not being portrayed). These, of course, are hypothetical musings. And the 
variance in the model that is explained by measures of affective response might already be 
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mostly captured by the measure of prior issue position. But, still, given the relevance of prior 
research in science communication that has found that framing effects are mediated by 
emotional responses, this is a valuable avenue for future research.  
Another consideration for future research is differences in effects across levels of the 
covariates used in the analyses of this dissertation. Specifically, the present study controlled 
for education, frequency of news media consumption, deference to science, and age – thereby 
muting their effect. But this does not inform valuable questions about how the modeled 
relationships and the interaction effects might differ across levels of these variables. For 
example, the review of relevant theory and empirical evidence (Chapters 1 and 2) implicated 
education and deference to science as likely moderators of the effects of uncertainty frames. 
But controlling for their respective effects simply helps specify the other relationships in the 
model – it does not answer the valuable question of how they might interact with these other 
relationships. Future research should apply specific focus to these questions. 
Also, there is reason to suspect that uncertainty frames could be a strategic tool used 
to mitigate psychological reactance. That is, it may be that the right portrayals of (say, 
scientific or deficient) uncertainty could reduce the severity or frequency of instances where 
oppositional audiences perceive scientists (or others) as being elitist, domineering, and 
demanding obedience. It may be that individuals – particularly those with prior oppositional 
attitudes – would respond more positively to behavioral recommendations (and the sources of 
them) if they were presented with full disclosure of the uncertainties of science. All of these 
are potentially valuable future opportunities for research, and they all build on the 
groundwork that was laid by the theorizing and empirical tests of this dissertation.  
5.6 Conclusion 
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Amongst themselves, scientists take great care to specify the uncertainties of science 
– using tentative verbs and clauses that bound the confidence of their findings and the degree 
to which those findings can be extrapolated. And even when the uncertainties of a field or 
finding are not specified, scientists usually assume them anyways. These norms of 
communication, and of information processing, reflect the fundamental philosophies of 
science – such that continued uncertainty is one of the primary (and valuable) 
epistemological characteristics of science and the scientific method. 
But public-facing science communication is much different. Not only are the 
uncertainties of science communicated to the public with sporadic frequency and tenuous 
fidelity, but the public(s) also likely has different understandings of uncertainty in science 
than scientists do. As such, the different types of uncertainty frames may have unintended, 
undesirable, or conditional effects within and across various publics. Still, as science 
communicators, it is both impractical and fallacious to take the perspective that the solution 
to the problems of uncertainty communication is to demand the public develop a better 
understanding of uncertainty (a deficit model perspective). Further, it is neither prudent nor 
feasible to eliminate mentions of uncertainty in science communication. Thus, we must 
develop robust and generalizable theoretical and practical understandings of the positive and 
negative effects of specific uncertainty portrayals in specific contexts.  
This dissertation is a small effort in this direction, indicating that consensus 
uncertainty is more detrimental than other uncertainty framing options; that the effects 
deficient, technical, and scientific uncertainty frame types do not differ significantly from 
one another; and that motivated reasoning is a more powerful effect than framing 
manipulations and is (practically) invariant across frame types.  
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It is easy to say that these findings are specific the contexts and methods of this study, 
but the truth is that these findings are supremely relevant to many contexts. That is, while 
these analyses should be interpreted in light of their many limitations, these stated limitations 
and unanswered questions should serve as catalysts for extensions to relevant contexts like 
risk communication, health communication, and political communication – as well as to 
other types of research, such as longitudinal designs and/or natural experiments. Given the 
complexities of human behavior, the development of reliable, generalizable best-practices for 
diverse uncertainty communicators is not achieved just through tighter study controls but 
instead through more (and more diverse) studies. As such, the small theoretical and empirical 
contributions of this dissertation are just a step toward its greater goals – which are to 
catalyze future studies that progressively and programmatically reduce and specify the 
existing uncertainties about the effects of uncertainty frames.  
Overall, this dissertation clearly unveils more questions than it answers. Or, put 
differently, it increases more uncertainties than it reduces. Uncertainty is (at least) as much a 
fixture of this dissertation as it is of science at large. However, in the world of science, the 
specification of uncertainties is a valuable accomplishment, and is integral to advancement. 
This dissertation identified a great deal of deficient uncertainty that exists within the extant 
research about the concept(s) of uncertainty frames. It also highlighted the consensus 
uncertainty that has surrounded the question of the effects of uncertainty frames on 
attitudinal responses. Through a robust empirical test, it specified the technical uncertainties 
which are the very evidence for the estimates of the differential effects of uncertainty frames 
in a structural model of motivated reasoning effects. And, finally, this dissertation explored 
the many scientific uncertainties attached to these methods and findings – offering 
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suggestions for the many ways that these ideas will (hopefully) be modified by future 
scientific inquiry. The identification and specification of these uncertainties are what enable a 
more nuanced understanding of the social effects of public-facing science communication for 
researchers in the present, and will lead to the development of more confident practical 
recommendations for science communicators in the future.  
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Appendix A: Exemplar Stimuli 
Item 1 
Example Stimulus: Climate Change Consensus Uncertainty Condition 
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Item 2 
Example Stimulus: GMO Labeling Technical Uncertainty Condition 
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Item 3 
Example Stimulus: Vibrating Machinery Scientific Uncertainty Condition 
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Appendix B: Scale Descriptive Statistics, Scale Items, and CFA Factor Loadings 
 
  α skew kurt M SD CFA 
Prior Opinion (climate change)  .90 -.77 -.25 5.08 1.52  
1. Climate change (aka “global warming”) is happening 5.56 1.74 .851 
2. Humans are the main cause of climate change  5.05 1.87 .797 
3. The climate change we see today is part of a natural cycle of warming and cooling (r) 3.82 1.87 .605 
4. Climate change is going to have serious negative impacts on our planet 5.54 1.70 .919 
5. Climate change is going to have serious negative impacts on our way of life 5.42 1.74 .918 
Prior Opinion (GMO foods)  .88 .17 -.47 3.80 1.49  
1. GMO foods are harmful to our health (r) 3.64 1.76 .893 
2. GMO foods are unethical (r) 3.71 1.88 .794 
3. GMO foods are beneficial to society 3.88 1.71 .784 
4. It is morally wrong to be changing nature with genetic engineering (r) 3.89 1.91 .737 
5. Widespread use of GMO food does more good than bad 3.85 1.75 .652 
Prior Opinion (vibrating machinery)  .74 .01 .43 3.96 0.94  
1. A career in farming or agriculture work is dangerous 4.39 1.46 .684 
2. A career in farming or agriculture work is safe (r) 3.82 1.30 .593 
3. A career in farming or agriculture work is healthy (r) 3.12 1.22 .430 
4. Farmers and agriculture workers could get hurt easily 5.06 1.25 .571 
5. Farmers and agriculture workers should fear for their health 3.41 1.47 .615 
Deference to Science  .76 -.07 -.58 4.58 1.36  
1. Scientists should listen to the wishes of the public, even if they think citizen are 
mistaken or do not understand their work (r) 
4.07 1.81 - 
2. Scientists should do what they themselves think is best, even if they have to persuade 
the public that it is right 
4.52 1.64 - 
3. Public opinion is more important than scientists’ opinions when making decisions 
about scientific research (r) 
5.04 1.59 - 
4. We depend too much on science and not enough on faith (r) 4.67 2.03 - 
Individualism/Collectivism  .78 -.08 -.30 3.43 1.20  
1. The government interferes far too much in our everyday lives (r) 3.09 1.71 .452 
2. The government needs to make laws that keep people from hurting themselves 4.32 1.63 .689 
3. It’s NOT the government’s business to try to protect people from themselves (r) 3.84 1.77 .821 
4. The government should stop telling people how to live their lives (r) 2.90 1.59 .541 
5. The government should do more to advance society’s goals, even if that means 
limiting freedom and choices of individuals 
2.99 1.70 .432 
6. The government should put limits on the choices individuals can make so they don’t 
get in the way of what’s good for society 
2.92 1.67 - 
Hierarchical/Egalitarian  .90 -.33 -.99 4.58 1.69  
1. We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country (r) 4.65 2.19 - 
2. Our society would be better off if the distribution of wealth was more equal 4.79 2.02 .659 
3. We need to dramatically reduce inequalities between the rich and the poor, between 
whites and people of color, and between men and women 
4.98 1.97 .725 
4. Discrimination against minorities is still a very serious problem in our society 5.28 1.83 .771 
5. It seems to me like blacks, women, homosexuals, and other groups don’t want equal 
rights; they want special rights just for them (r) 
4.26 2.34 .835 
6. Society as a whole has become too soft and sensitive (r) 3.61 2.17 .733 
External Uncertainty Types (manipulation check)  - - - - -  
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1. These scientists think there is still a lot that they don’t know about this subject  3.23 1.62 - 
2. These scientists think that the findings of this research are rough estimates that could 
vary by a wide margin 
3.43 1.58 
- 
3. These scientists think that they often disagree with each other or have controversy 
with each other about this subject 
4.16 1.68 
- 
4. These scientists think that their findings and opinions about this topic will 
significantly change as future research progresses 
3.20 1.57 
- 
Claim Belief  .91 -.42 -.39 4.73 1.39  
Internal Certainty (general)  .84 -.44 -.43 4.78 1.49  
1. I myself am very certain that __ is indeed causing negative effects on  _ 4.84 1.67 .835 
2. I myself am skeptical of the idea that __ is indeed causing negative effects on __ (r) 4.54 1.80 .673 
3. I myself think there is very strong evidence for believing that __ is indeed causing 
negative effects on __ 
4.94 1.64 .865 
Risk Perceptions  .84 -.42 -.41 4.69 1.43  
1. I think __ poses serious dangers to agriculture workers. 4.78 1.69 .868 
2. I think farmers and agriculture workers should be worried about ___. 5.00 1.61 .862 
3. I think, despite __, farmers and agriculture workers will be able to continue on as 
usual, remaining mostly unaffected. (r) 
4.29 1.62 .645 
4. I think __ poses serious dangers to me and my loved ones. 3.40 1.92 - 
5. I think people like myself do not need to be worried about __. (r) 4.32 2.00 - 
6. I think __ will affect my life or lifestyle. 3.70 1.97 - 
Credibility  .93 -.53 -.06 5.29 1.27  
1. Incompetent … Competent 5.59 1.39 .798 
2. Knowledgeable … Ignorant (r) 5.58 1.47 .855 
3. Unskilled … Skilled 5.70 1.38 .791 
4. Intelligent … Unintelligent (r) 5.72 1.48 .806 
5. Trustworthy … Untrustworthy (r) 5.11 1.60 .832 
6. Honest … Dishonest (r) 5.31 1.53 .843 
7. Biased … Unbiased 4.60 1.87 .635 
8. Telling the Whole Truth … Withholding Information (r) 4.74 1.74 .779 
Behavioral Intentions  .73 -.00 -.50 3.55 1.44  
1-2. “In the future, if you saw another newspaper article about this same topic…”    
     How likely would you be to read it? 5.31 1.71 - 
     How likely would you be to share it with others? 4.53 1.88 - 
3. “Recently, non-profit organizations have been raising money to provide financial 
assistance to the farmers, workers, and their families whom the research study 
claims have been affected by ____.” 
   
      If you were given the option to donate part of your payment for this survey to this 
charitable cause, how much of it do you think you would give? 
2.25 1.63 .444 
4. “Some countries and states have considered creating a small tax on agricultural 
products, which is then used to provide financial assistance to the workers that the 
research study claims have been affected by ___.” 
   
     Would you vote Yes in favor of creating this tax to assist workers? 3.76 1.92 .897 
5. “Some other countries and states have considered giving a small tax break to the 
agricultural workers that the research study claims have been affected by____, which 
would be a way to provide financial assistance to them.” 
  
 
    Would you vote Yes for this? 4.64 1.80 .702 
General External Certainty (not used)  .64 -1.02 1.01 5.41 1.25  
195 
 
1. It seems to me that these scientists are very certain that __ is indeed causing negative 
effects on farmers’ and workers’ livelihood/health  
5.33 1.51 - 
2. It seems to me that these scientists are very skeptical that __ is indeed causing 
negative effects on __ (r) 
5.12 1.62 - 
3. It seems to me that these scientists see very strong evidence for believing that __ is 
indeed causing negative effects on __ 
5.50 1.38 - 
Internal Uncertainty Types (not used)  - - - - -  
1. I myself think there is still a lot that these scientists don’t know about this subject (r) 2.97 1.57 - 
2. I myself think that the findings of this research are rough estimates that could vary by 
a wide margin (r) 
3.11 1.56 - 
3. I myself think that these scientists often disagree with each other or have controversy 
with each other about this subject (r) 
3.60 1.67 - 
4. I myself think that these scientists’ findings and opinions about this topic will 
significantly change as future research progresses (r) 
3.16 1.53 - 
Note: All values calculated across all 15 main study conditions (except Prior Opinion values, which are within 
each issue); α=Cronbach’s alpha for the items used in mean scales; skew=skewness; kurt=kurtosis; M=mean for 
scale and for items; SD=standard deviation for scale and for individual items; CFA=item loadings as produced 
by measurement model CFA with oblique rotation. Prior Opinion CFA values are from CFAs performed within 
each issue. Section 3.4 in the main manuscript justifies the one-factor structures for each scale and the excluded 
items. (r)=reverse coded item.  
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Appendix C: CFA and SEM Factor Loadings and Error Terms 
 
CFA Factor Loadings and Parameters 
 
 
SEM Factor Loadings and Error Terms 
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Appendix D: SEM Paths, Coefficients, and Indirect Effects 
 
Item 1: SEM Paths, Coefficients, and Indirect Effects in All Issue Combined 
 
 
Item 2: SEM Paths, Coefficients, and Indirect Effects in Climate Change Conditions 
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Item 3: SEM Paths, Coefficients, and Indirect Effects in GMO Labeling Conditions 
 
 
 
Item 4: SEM Paths, Coefficients, and Indirect Effects in Vibrating Machinery Conditions 
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Appendix E: All Pair-Wise Combinations of Z-Tests 
Z-statistics of Pair-wise Comparisons of the MYi Effect Between Uncertainty Frame Types 
MYi β SE 1 (Ctrl) 2 (Con) 3 (Def) 4 (Sci) 5 (Tec) 
Belief (CC)        
1. Control .6124 .0484 - 0.05 0.46 0.03 0.47 
2. Consensus .6163 .0564  - 0.48 0.03 0.53 
3. Deficient .5776 .0585   - 0.48 0.02 
4. Scientific .6144 .0485    - 0.50 
5. Technical .5795 .0505     - 
Credibility (CC)        
1. Control  .2366 .0825 - 0.72     2.50** 1.39 1.52 
2. Consensus  .1387 .1081  - 1.51 0.46 0.62 
3. Deficient -.0783 .0951   - 1.25 1.01 
4. Scientific  .0766 .0798    - 0.20 
5. Technical  .0529 .0879     - 
Behavioral (CC)        
1. Control .0876 .0963 - 0.18 0.77 0.04 0.34 
2. Consensus .1114 .0863  - 0.61 0.23 0.16 
3. Deficient .1820 .0771   - 0.86 0.43 
4. Scientific .0831 .0851    - 0.39 
5. Technical .1317 .0891     - 
MYi β SE 1 2 3 4 5 
Belief (GMO)        
1. Control .3418 .0818 - 0.90 0.54 1.03 0.72 
2. Consensus .2452 .0686  - 0.29 0.22 0.07 
3. Deficient .2773 .0870   - 0.46 0.19 
4. Scientific .2216 .0826    - 0.26 
5. Technical .2536 .0901     - 
Credibility (GMO)        
1. Control .0558 .0785 - 1.19 0.10 0.61 0.05 
2. Consensus .2025 .0944  - 1.31 0.64 1.14 
3. Deficient .0452 .0748   - 0.72 0.15 
4. Scientific .1240 .0797    - 0.56 
5. Technical .0616 .0792     - 
Behavioral (GMO)        
1. Control  .0781 .0771 - 1.25   1.92* 1.14 0.27 
2. Consensus -.0598 .0792  - 0.68 0.15 0.96 
3. Deficient -.1366 .0806   - 0.84 1.63 
4. Scientific -.0440 .0747    - 0.84 
5. Technical  .0477 .0793     - 
MYi β SE 1 2 3 4 5 
Belief (VM)        
1. Control .2620 .0634 - 0.23 0.47 0.47 0.28 
2. Consensus .2860 .0819  - 0.64 0.64 0.01 
3. Deficient .2193 .0647   - 0.02 0.74 
4. Scientific .2207 .0619    - 0.74 
5. Technical .2873 .0660     - 
200 
 
Credibility (VM)        
1. Control -.0581 .0801 - 0.39 0.65 0.01 0.04 
2. Consensus -.0093 .0969  - 1.02 0.40 0.39 
3. Deficient -.1167 .0424   - 0.67 0.83 
4. Scientific -.0588 .0756    - 0.05 
5. Technical -.0543 .0624     - 
Behavioral (VM)        
1. Control -.0161 .0830 - 0.74 1.26 0.26 0.04 
2. Consensus -.0968 .0716  - 0.52 0.49 0.78 
3. Deficient -.1455 .0600   - 1.03 1.39 
4. Scientific -.0457 .0763    - 0.25 
5. Technical -.0206 .0672     - 
Note: Values are the absolute value of the z-statistic resulting from a z-test comparing the β of MYi in the 
corresponding row and column frame type conditions; *=p<.05; **=p<.01. 
 
 
